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This study aims to analyse the nexus between identity, France and peace. It examines the relationship 
between the construction of French identity and the emergence of cultures of peace(s). This thesis 
states that the recognition of French alternative identities dismantles the mainstream discourses on 
French identity, based on essentialist and colonialist ideologies, and contributes to cultures of peace(s) 
in France. This study uses theoretical content analysis, qualitative literature-based research and 
discourse analysis from secondary data in order to thoroughly review the concepts of identity and 
alternative identities, as well as to critically assess French identity, peace theories and practices. The 
findings of the research indicate that the current French republican system stems from a culture of 
war and violence, and that peace and alternative identities are intrinsically linked together. This thesis 
lays the theoretical basis for the transformation of inner and societal conflicts on French identity and 
the building of cultures of peace(s) in France. 
 





Cette étude vise à analyser le lien entre l'identité, la France et la paix. Elle examine la relation entre 
la construction de l'identité française et l'émergence de cultures de paix. Ce mémoire affirme que la 
reconnaissance d'identités alternatives françaises démantèle les discours dominants sur l'identité 
française, basés sur les idéologies essentialistes et colonialistes, et contribue à l'émergence de cultures 
de paix en France. Cette étude utilise l'analyse théorique du contenu, la recherche qualitative basée 
sur la littérature et l'analyse du discours à partir de données secondaires afin de revoir en profondeur 
les concepts d'identité et d'identités alternatives, ainsi que d'évaluer de manière critique l'identité 
française, les théories et les pratiques de la paix. Les résultats de la recherche indiquent que le système 
républicain français actuel est issu d'une culture de guerre et de violence, et que la paix et les identités 
alternatives sont intrinsèquement liées. Ce mémoire pose les bases théoriques de la transformation 
des conflits internes et sociétaux sur l'identité française et de la construction de cultures de paix en 
France. 
 





Este estudio tiene como objetivo analizar el nexo entre la identidad, Francia y la paz. Examina la 
relación entre la construcción de la identidad francesa y el surgimiento de culturas de paz. Esta tesis 
afirma que el reconocimiento de las identidades alternativas francesas desmantela los principales 
discursos sobre la identidad francesa, basados en ideologías esencialistas y colonialistas, y contribuye 
a las culturas de paz en Francia. En este estudio se utiliza el análisis del contenido teórico, la 
investigación cualitativa basada en la literatura y el análisis del discurso a partir de datos secundarios 
para examinar a fondo los conceptos de identidad e identidades alternativas, así como para evaluar 
críticamente la identidad francesa, y las teorías y prácticas de paz. Las conclusiones de la 
investigación indican que el actual sistema republicano francés proviene de una cultura de guerra y 
violencia, y que la paz y las identidades alternativas están intrínsecamente vinculadas entre sí. Esta 
tesis sienta las bases teóricas para la transformación de los conflictos internos y sociales sobre la 
identidad francesa y la construcción de culturas de paz en Francia. 
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Dear reader, thank you for willing to delve into my writing. This prologue is not officially part 
of the intellectual reflection below, but it emotionally fuels its origins. It therefore explains the process 
that led my endeavour to write this thesis. If you do not wish to read this prologue, I invite you to 
start from the ‘General Introduction’ on page 1.  
 
‘Where are you from?’ 
‘Where am I from?’ 
 
Wherever one goes in a new place and interacts with people, that person is likely to being 
asked where are you from? At first, answering such question seems like a no-brainer reply. For some 
people, it indeed is. For some others, reflecting on the context they are being asked the question may 
make them delay the speed of their answer. For another group of people, their answer might be too 
long to hold on to the end for the one who asked the question. For others, they may simply have no 
answer. They may even not want to answer. All those types of answers, including the silent one, are 
valid and understandable. The only task the questioner should be compelled to do is listening actively 
to care the connection that was just created by asking that question. 
I have been asked this question I do not know how many times in the span of my twenty-eight 
years. My ‘Blasian’ skin tone and facial features allowed me to be playful and always ask back where 
do you think I am from? The answers I have heard funnily covered perhaps over twenty-five countries 
from the south-east Asian, Arabic, sub-Saharan African and Latin-American parts of the world. It 
indeed was funny playing such game at the beginning but turned out sometimes annoying when 
people could not find the answer and started to make generalization comments when I delivered them 
my response. It also at times made me uncomfortable giving a reply since I did not really know how 
to answer. Indeed, I was born and raised in France, but both my parents are originally and ethnically 
from Madagascar. I have spent the first twenty years of my life in France. However, the eight 
remaining years are split chronologically as such: four years in the UK, three months in Senegal, one 
year in Vietnam and two years and a half in Spain, where this thesis was birthed. These life 
experiences have impacted me to the point that I am sometimes lost in knowing where I am from. 
Such (radical) change process has been described by Frantz Fanon (1986: 19) and as Amin Maalouf 
expressed (1998: 34), one of my belongings is touched and it is my whole being that vibrates. Thus, 
I prefer to locate myself in the above two categories of people who whether delay their answer or 
have a long list of ‘homes’ to mention. This may also be due to some anecdotal experiences that have 
happened to me and have shaken my identification process since I left France to study, work and live 
abroad. Below are few of them that marked me: 
- In July 2013, I was working as a health care assistant in a care home in Wolverhampton 
and a resident, an elderly Indian looking man, directly came and spoke to me in what I 
think was Punjabi. 
- In 2015 in Senegal, the locals knew I had something very in common with them through 
music tastes, music knowledge and dancing. Even if I did not look like them in term of 
skin colour, they knew I had African roots and recognised me in these. Senegalese author 
Fatou Diome described this embedded link between African people, the sound of the 
djembe and dancing in her book Le ventre de l’Atlantique (Diome, 2003: 194-195). 
- In April 2018, a man in the cafeteria of the Universitat Jaume I in Castellón de la Plana 
asked me "¿De donde eres, Filipinas?" (Where are you from, Philippines?) to which I 
replied "Francia" (France). Then the man asked again "¿Pakistán?" (Pakistan?). 
- In summer 2018, I was walking in Paris with a friend and someone came directly speaking 
to me in Spanish, asking me if I was Colombian.  
- In pictures, I blended in with the students from the Bahnar, Jarai, Rơ Măm, and Xo Dang 
ethnic minorities of Vietnam, with Bidayuh indigenous friends from Malaysia or look 






All above anecdotal experiences happened to me after I started living abroad. Indeed, in 
France Malagasy people are more common and they are recognisable by their facial features and, 
especially, their surname. Therefore, in France I am French with Malagasy origins. Since I left in 
2012 and came back (mainly for holidays or summer work), reflecting on where I am from has thus 
been a constant questioning to myself. Writing this thesis on identity and cultures of peace(s) in 
France is therefore a way to cover my need of knowing more about myself and my interests of 
understanding this identity process that each human being is going through. Moreover, as a French 
citizen questioning my identity, I wished to undertake this venture in order to make a dent in building 
cultures of peace(s) in France where French national identity is a long-time conflictual issue. Besides, 
French national pride has been a topic I have been critical about since listening to Irish humourist 
George Carlin on ethnic and national pride saying that ‘pride should be reserved for something you 
achieve or obtain on your own, not something that happens by accident of birth. Being Irish isn't a 
skill... it's a […] genetic accident’.1 In this sense, the French Football Federation main hashtag 
#fierdêtrefrançais (proud to be French) has been bothering me since the Irish humourist gave me a 
hand in noticing the French (football) misplaced pride. It is the meaning of being French and how 
French identity is perceived and approached that I want to critically assess from a peace studies 
perspective. I endeavour to tackle this topic to personally not have to live again anecdotal experiences 
as those below, that perpetuate a dominant discourse on French identity: 
- When I arrived in Castellón de la Plana for the first time in February 2018, my Spanish 
housemate knew a French girl was going to live with her. Now that we are friends, she 
told me that she expected a ‘typical French girl’ with white skin and brown hair to be her 
new housemate. When she met me, she was surprised to not be in front of one of those 
French actresses with a ‘touch of elegance’ such as Marion Cotillard, Audrey Tautou, 
Sophie Marceau or Charlotte Gainsbourg.2 
- In October 2019, my Colombian housemate made a statement, that I did not know how to 
answer at the time, when I mentioned him the topic of my final master thesis. He said that 
he felt Colombian and he could not understand how sometimes I could not feel French or 
was disturbed about it.  
- In February 2020 during a meeting reunion with fifteen students and ex-students of the 
‘Peace Master’ in Castellón de la Plana, three of us had a European background -and 
passport I presume- including me (a Swiss, a Franco-German and a Franco-Malagasy). 
However, at one point it was recounted the diversity of the group and it was stated that 
only two persons were coming from Europe. The Swiss and the French-German students 
were both white-skin coloured. I believe I was skipped in the ‘European’ counting despite 
having the French citizenship. I did not reclaim being European on the moment and was 
surprised by what had happened. However, I did reflect on this little event afterwards. 
- In April 2020, my indigenous Nasa Colombian friend had a call and I overheard that she 
mentioned that she was living with una chica francesa (a French girl). I smirked in hearing 
her saying this because I knew it did not describe entirely who I was. I was wondering 
how that person on the phone would imagine how I looked like. 
 
Undertaking this thesis on identity, France and peace is thus a project that I mulled over years. 
The completion of a Master of Laws on the implementation of the human right to peace in 2015 
propelled the peace perspective. Participating to the ‘National Identity’ workshop at ISFIT3 in 
February 2019 and to the Malagasy diaspora conference on ‘Dual belonging and homecoming’4 in 
October 2019 nourished the identity and French identity ones. Publishing an article in an academic 
journal in May 2020 on the tragic events of Charlie Hebdo encompassed the three perspectives. 
This research’s purpose, by the end of its last sentence, is to shift the approach to the current 
discourse on French identity, but also the approach to asking about identity in general. As such, 
 
1 George Carlin on national and ethnic pride: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mIG4-03Gru4  
2 ‘Top 10 French Actresses with that touch of elegance’: https://www.discoverwalks.com/blog/top-10-french-actresses/  
3 International Student Festival in Trondheim 





instead of asking where are you from?, asking who are you? or what are your experiences? can help 
understand fully the person one is asking about. The shift from being proud to being happy (as George 
Carlin suggested) and grateful of one’s identity/ies is also a goal this work aims to prompt. 
 
This thesis is therefore also a reflection of and with all parts of my being. Spiritual and 
symbolic identity aspects are inscribed in it. My natal chart says that I am skilled in communication 
and passing the message through, hence the recurring analysis in connecting and bridging various 
concepts. I have a simian line on both of my hands, which stresses that matters of the head and of the 
heart are strongly linked. 
While writing this research during the 2020 unprecedented sanitary times where I could only 
go out for basic human needs, I had to stay home to reflect and research on one of our basic human 
need: identity. I hope that the unique approach taken in this thesis on the topics of identity, France 
and peace triggers a keen interest to the readers. 
My professor of the International Humanitarian Law module while studying my Master of 
Laws made the comment on my formative essay that it was a good essay but, especially, there was a 
different approach that she did not find in the formative essays of the other students. Unfortunately, 
I failed this subject at the exam for misunderstanding the context and using the wrong laws. 
Fortunately, I successfully passed at the recess. Now, I wish that you, reader, will say the same after 
going through this thesis. I hope that you can take something out of it that you did not know, think 
about or realise before and that it sparks more endeavours towards peaceful coexistence, in France 











About the topic and I 
 
A clarification must be made to the readers before they continue reading the following pages: 
this thesis is written with a peace studies perspective. In such approach, the ‘situatedness’ of the 
author is paramount to clarify in order to understand from which positions and context the research 
is being undertaken and towards which direction. In this sense, the pronouns ‘I’ or ‘my’ will be 
referred to when mentioning the author’s point of view and input. Indeed, peace studies is defined as 
such by Johan Galtung, ‘the father’ of peace studies: 
Peace studies seeks to understand the negation of violence through conflict transformation, cooperation 
and harmony by drawing from many disciplines, including psychology, sociology and anthropology, 
political science, economics, international relations, international law and history (Galtung, 2010: 20). 
 
Besides, peace studies put a high emphasis on values. Indeed, theoretical perspectives such as critical 
theory where values are superior to facts, and constructivism where values are superior to theories 
(Galtung, 1993) are at the basis of the peace studies analysis. That is why clarifying my personal 
stance and background on this topic within the prologue and this general introduction is paramount. 
In April 2018, I was introduced to the concept of hyphenated identities by Dr Paul Scott who 
was my professor of the Conflict Mediation and Negotiation course in the International Master in 
Peace, Conflict and Development studies at Universidad Jaume I in Castellon de la Plana, Spain 
(Peace Master). He mentioned such concept regarding the fact that some people sometimes may not 
belong to one side or another if they were involved in the process of drawing borders between two 
countries if they had links to both parts. They were people with hyphenated identities. I instantly felt 
connected to this idea. Indeed, I was born and raised in France and, thus, I am a French citizen. 
However, both my parents were born in Madagascar and were naturalised French after they came to 
study and work in France. At home, Malagasy language is spoken, Malagasy food is eaten, Malagasy 
music is listened to and danced on, Malagasy people are always present. I was and I am constantly 
surrounded by Malagasy influences when I am back in my parent’s home, in France. Being able to 





I embrace my hyphenated identity. Besides, I was born a French citizen and only obtained my 
Malagasy citizenship in February 2018, after requesting it at the age of twenty-five. My will to request 
a double citizenship sprouted in May 2016. In October 2016, I mentioned such will to a French work 
colleague who replied me negatively on my endeavour since I had never lived in Madagascar. I was 
surprised and started to question myself on my identity and if, indeed, I was legitimate to request the 
Malagasy citizenship. My relation to a hyphenated French-Malagasy identity is illustrated as such. 
However, my relationship with my identity, who I wholly am, does not stop there, with these two 
citizenships and cultural backgrounds. Indeed, I believe and feel that my belongings and affiliations 
embrace every experiences and encounters that I had the chance to have. The places where I settled, 
interacted with the locals and lived their daily routine (France, the UK, Senegal, Vietnam and Spain) 
do feel special to me. These experiences have altered my sense of identity and make me unique. It 
saddens me that the discourse on French identity does not recognise all of them in my identity and, 
consequently, me. Indeed, ‘to recognise is the key word’, to recognise oneself and how one is 
(Espinosa, 2008:77). By extension, to be recognised is thus a key aspect regarding identity. Therefore, 
the lack of recognition of mine or anyone else’s whole identity, including the French one, when the 
mainstream discourse on French identity emerges is a critical topic. That is how my interest to 
research on identity and the discourse on French identity blossomed. 
My interest in the concept of peace has always been existent. The sole hearing of the word 
soothes my spirit. That is why I undertook specialised modules related to its many facets during my 
law studies, such as international human rights law, international humanitarian law or even the death 
penalty in law and practice. Enrolling in the Peace Master in Castellón was thus a natural follow-up. 
My interest in cultures of peace(s) started after finishing my Master of Laws dissertation on 
‘The steps to implement and enshrine the Human Right to Peace in International Law’. It grew and 
intensified while studying in the Peace Master. ‘Cultures of peace(s)’ is an ‘expansion’ of the peace 
studies staple notion of ‘culture of peace’. I will explain why this thesis is taking the plural approach 
below. Johan Galtung regards the culture of peace as a means to foster positive peace (Galtung, 1969) 





Galtung’s triangle of direct, structural and cultural violence (Galtung, 1969) at the basis of the neglect 
of basic human needs. My interest of researching about the culture of peace grew especially in 
analysing its relationship with France and the French context. It intensified throughout the writing 
process of the final papers of courses of the Peace Master since March 2018. Half of my final works 
dealt about how France, the French government or the French institutions’ features limited the 
development of a culture of peace in the country, how it impacted the French society and which 
improvements could be envisioned. I am interested in the culture of peace because this is the concept 
in peace studies that I believe needs to be fostered to a larger extent to be able to live in peace with 
all living beings. However, it must be recognised the plurality of cultures that can and, currently, do 
promote and contribute to peace. That is why it would be truer to talk about ‘cultures of peace’. 
Nevertheless, this thesis also embraces the vision of the Peace Master acknowledging the plurality of 
peaces5: ‘There is no single way of understanding peace – there are as many ways of making peace 
as there are diverse people and cultures’6 (Universitat Jaume I, 2013). The pluralisation of the word 
‘peace’ is based on the Peace Master founder Vicent Martínez Guzmán’s philosophy for making 
peaces. The Spanish original term is cultura para la paz which translates as ‘culture for peace’ and 
not ‘culture of peace’ (Martínez Guzmán, 2001: 319), implying an active attribute to the concept. 
Therefore, perhaps the more adequate term to use towards the building of peace would be ‘culture for 
peaces’. Nevertheless, since the study of the culture of peace has only been delved into very recently 
at the end of the twentieth century (this will be examined in Chapter 3), this thesis embraces the plural 
concept of ‘cultures of peaces’. However, the concept of ‘cultures of peace’ has only been 
acknowledged academically so far by Elise Boulding (2000). Therefore, this paper proposes the 
notion of ‘cultures of peace(s)’ to allow flexibility in the use of the concept.  
Identity and cultures of peace(s) are thus two topics that I kept on learning, studying and 
researching about in the past five years. However, as observed above, it has always been done in 
relation to France. Indeed, I am naturally drawn to France because that is where I come from and I 
 
5 In Spanish, the word ‘peace’ is pluralised (and gramatically correct) from paz to paces, whereas in English it has not 
yet been pluralised (and it is not yet gramatically correct). 
6 Original in Spanish : No sólo existe la paz entendida de una sola manera, sino que hay tantas formas de hacer las 





want my home place to embrace a peaceful coexistence between subjects on the territory regardless 
of how they identify. France has a very special relationship with the identity of the subjects living on 
its soil, whether French citizens or foreigners. France has also its very own approach to peace and, 
therefore, cultures of peace(s). It is thus interesting to study this relationship, this triangle nexus 
between identity, France and peace. Besides, it has never been examined before. 
According to Johan Galtung (1989), identity is one of the four basic human needs, alongside 
survival, well-being and freedom. Identity is the one I want to address, within the context of France, 
towards cultures of peace(s) and through the analysis of the discourse on French identity. Finally, my 
interest in this topic has grown academically while I also was (and keep!) growing spiritually. Eastern 
spiritual influences will be regularly referred to throughout the thesis as it helped me reflect on the 
readings, connect the knowledges and produce a unique work with ‘my own touch’. As such, the Four 
Noble Truths of Buddhism7 as the basis for right action (Nhat Hanh, 2003: 87) are therefore 
representing in a certain way the four below chapters. Amin Maalouf’s 1998 book Les Identités 
Meurtrières (The Murderous Identities) translated as In The Name of Identity: Violence and the Need 
to Belong (2003) also highly influences this thesis. Each part of the Franco-Lebanese author’s book8 
reflects in a way each chapter of this thesis as well. Besides, the book is also a spiritual reflection: 
If in the aftermath of Sept. 11 we want to know more facts, we need political analyses, but we are also 
hungry for general reflection on what human beings are like. ''In the Name of Identity'' bridges these 
concerns. […] His book is a heartfelt meditation on identity that begins inside his soul (Lear, 2001). 
 
This thesis is thus a reflection on identity, based on facts and political analyses combined with a 
meditation on identity led from the heart. I will combine my academic knowledge from peace studies 
to assess the close relationship between identity and France through peace values that allow human 
beings to live in peace. Also influenced by Spanish language, this thesis embodies the process of 
sentipensar.9 It bridges the academic process of thinking (pensar) with the experimental process of 
living and feeling emotions (sentir). Peace studies being less scientific than war studies, the peace 
studies lens of this work reasserts the prevalence of values (that can be linked to emotions) over facts 
 
7 ‘The Buddha always taught that we should practice the Four Noble Truths: 1. There is suffering. 2. There is an origin 
of suffering. 3. The end of suffering is possible. 4. There is a path to the end of suffering’ (Nhat Hanh, 2003: 87). 
8 1. My Identity, My Allegiances. 2. Modernity and ‘the Other’. 3. The Age of Global Tribes. 4. Taming the Panther. 
9 Term coined by Saturnino de la Torre. It is defined as "the process by which thought and feeling are put to work 





and theories (linked to rationality) on which war studies rely. Finally, this thesis epitomises John 
Dewey’s quote that ‘we do not learn from experience... we learn from reflecting on experience’. Such 
reflection will hopefully be useful in order to tackle the ‘wicked problem’ (English, 2014) that the 
discourse on French identity is. As Margarita Quihuis (2013) stated so well, my aim here is to try to 
‘make a dent’ in it. 
 
Contextualisation of the research 
The issue of the discourse on French identity is an old one that originates in the French 
Revolution of 1789 and that has recently emerged due to the waves of immigration and globalisation. 
It has, however, re-emerged in the recent years in relation to topics of terrorism and national sports 
team where the identity of protagonists (or antagonists) was questioned as it affected French people 
of different backgrounds in different ways. I have written on both topics (Ranaivosoa, 2020). 
Nevertheless, questioning the identity of French sports representatives symbolises the underlying 
structural and cultural violence in France that do not conclude in direct violent killings but fuel and 
perpetuate the malaise situation. The debate between Trevor Noah and Gérard Araud, the French 
ambassador to the US, after the French men’s national football team won the 2018 FIFA10 World Cup 
raised such structural issue again (Ranaivosoa, 2020). The exchange between the two men ignited 
online debates regarding the identity of the French national football team players, especially those 
who have various cultural backgrounds. Overall, French identity was questioned, again, as well as 
the political and institutional application of France’s republican approach of ‘blindness’ to colour, 
creed or culture of French citizens, based on Article 1 of the 1958 French Constitution: 
La France est une République indivisible, laïque, démocratique et sociale. Elle assure l’égalité devant 
la loi de tous les citoyens sans distinction d’origine, de race ou de religion. Elle respecte toutes les 
croyances. […].11 
 
In this sense, the ideologies on which the French Constitution bases its approach to identity (no 
distinction between origins, race or religion) dates back to the time of the Enlightenment thinkers 
 
10 Fédération Internationale de Football Association 
11 My own translation: France is an indivisible, laic (secular), democratic and social Republic. It ensures the equality 





(with Les Jacobins in France) and their concept of universality which remains present in the French 
Constitution and institutional features. However, it is often forgotten that this movement had a high 
Christian influence. After the end of the colonization, France had a period where it needed foreigners’ 
help to reconstruct the country. Many people coming from ex-colonized countries migrated to France 
to assist in its rebuilding. At first, these people were meant to stay temporarily but ended up staying 
indefinitely. Therefore, the French population started to diversify with the first generation of 
migrants, but also with the second generation one like myself -or even the third generation one. These 
latter generations may indeed experience the pros and cons of the universality of the French 
republican system which generates a mainstream discourse on French identity in France and abroad. 
Finally, with the UEFA European Football Championship which should have taken place in 
June and July 2020, it would have been interesting to examine the reactions of French politicians and 
citizens on the identity of French players according to their wins, draws or losses. The group stage 
draw having put L’Équipe de France in the ‘death group’ composed of Portugal, Germany and a Play-
Off winner, the uneasy road to a final tournament victory is thus another possibility of stirring up -
French- identitarian issues. Besides, on December 3rd, 2019 Amin Maalouf was awarded the National 
Order of Merit by the French government (Turcev, 2019) for ‘building bridges between East and 
West’ and received his award on February 29th, 2020 (Takieddine, 2020). These couple of events 
combined with the recent Black Lives Matter movement in 2020 shows that this thesis settles in a 
context where the re-assessment of the discourse on French identity is needed. 
 
Research problem and justification 
This thesis aims to extend the already present research on the essentialization problem of 
French identity. The analysis of hyphenated identities which both challenges and fuels the mainstream 
discourse on French identity will be briefly critically assessed. The possibility of including French 
alternative identities -such as postcolonial, hybrid or transcultural identities- in the French context 
will be examined. To deconstruct the statement ‘[…] To us [France], there is no hyphenated identity, 





peace studies perspective. Indeed, the issue of fusing the two concepts of citizenship and nationality 
and the institutional denial of embracing two or more different cultural identities in France has been 
approached from various social fields of study perspectives but not the ‘peace studies’ one. This topic 
is relevant from and for the peace studies’ perspective analysis since the French identity debate is still 
and always ongoing in France. Besides, I believe it is the cultural and structural basis from which 
marginalization remain present in the country. To a further point, the cultural violence and structural 
violence in France may also fuel and be at the basis of direct violence in the country, such as the 
anger of individuals doing terrorist attacks. Direct, structural and cultural violence are three elements 
part of the violence triangle conceptualised by Johan Galtung (1969), where they all relate to each 
other. Direct violence is the type of violence ‘on the surface of the iceberg’. The type that is perceived 
physically and directly. It illustrates an immediate deprivation of life. It is fostered by the two other 
types of violence. Structural violence echoes to systems that allow injustice, discrimination, poverty, 
inequalities, diseases and power imbalance (Akin Ojelabi, 2010: 55) to take place and hinder certain 
human beings to enjoy and develop their humanity in its entirety. It illustrates a slow deprivation of 
life. Cultural violence are the aspects of culture ‘that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or 
structural violence’ (Galtung, 1990: 291). It illustrates the opacity of the morality of certain attitudes 
and beliefs. This topic is thus relevant because the hegemonic and dominant discourse of the French 
republican model has never been approached from the peace studies perspective, to deconstruct the 
types of violence emerging from it. Alternative to the three types of violence are negative peace, 
which is defined as the absence of direct violence; positive peace, which is defined as the absence of 
direct violence as well as the promotion of justice and development to fulfil the basic human needs; 
and the culture of peace. Therefore, this research is an alternative and aims to analyse to which extent 
the mainstream discourse on French identity is promoting cultures of peace(s). Thus, shedding light 
on the nexus identity, France and peace from a peace studies perspective and through the critical 
assessment of the discourse on French identity will extend the academic discussion on 
postcolonialism and cultures of peace(s) in France. This study is also justified by the need of setting 





A personal motivation to undertake this study is my interest to learn and dig deep on how the concept 
of identity is viewed in France and to relate such understanding to the building of cultures of peace(s) 
(or not) in France. It is also a symbolic reflection on and of my personal experience. Indeed, I am 
perceived as a French and Malagasy citizen, enjoying the luck of having two different cultural 
backgrounds I grew up in as a child. However, the organic relationship between such hyphenated 
identity and my personal experience of living, studying and working in various places (France, the 
United Kingdom, Senegal, Vietnam and Spain) may thus be forgotten. As such, it does not reflect the 
hybrid identity that is now shaping the way I think and behave, where all the places and experiences 
where I come from (Selasi, 2014) are considered fully. 
 
Thesis statement and research questions 
 Thesis statement: 
The recognition of French alternative identities dismantles essentialist and colonialist discourses on 
French identity and helps fostering cultures of peace(s) in France. 
General research question: 
In what ways do alternative identities challenge the mainstream discourse on French identity and to 
what extent do they promote cultures of peace(s) in France? 
Specific research questions: 
1- What is identity and what is it composed of? 
2- What are the various discourses on identity and their implications? 
3- What are the discourses on French identity and their impacts in (French) society? 
4- In what ways discourses on French identity reflect a culture of war or cultures of peace(s)? 
5- In what ways do alternative identities reflect and foster cultures of peace(s) and contribute to 
peaceful relationships? 
6- How can alternative identities be institutionally and societally introduced and recognised in France 








Discuss the significant interest in recognising French alternative identities at the institutional and 
societal level to foster cultures of peace(s) in France. 
Specific objectives 
1- Identify the discourses on identity and the implications they have in society. 
2- Analyse and deconstruct the discourse on French identity of the French republican model and of 
French society from a peace studies perspective. 
3- Explore the societal role and importance of alternative identities that reflect and foster cultures of 
peace(s). 
4- Propose ways to introduce the recognition of alternative identities in French institutions and society 
for and from cultures of peace(s). 
 
Aims and outcomes 
The aim of this thesis is to bridge the gap and open connections between various theoretical 
concepts on identity and the related experiences and reflection of individuals on French identity. The 
type of knowledge this research wants to produce is qualitative knowledge that fills the gaps between 
the discourses on French identity and cultures of peace(s) in France. The predicted outcomes of the 
study are: 
1- The various discourses on identity are explained and the concept of alternative identities is 
introduced to readers of the thesis. 
2- It is demonstrated that the current French republican model is based on essentialist and colonialist 
ideologies. It impacts the mainstream discourse on French identity, which is one of the causes of –
cultural– violence in France. 
3- The positive connection between alternative identities and cultures of peace(s) is demonstrated. 
4- Policies and tools to transform the discourse on French identity at the institutional and societal 





5- The thesis lay out the theoretical basis for the transformation of personal and societal conflicts on 
(French) identity. 
6- The thesis lay out the theoretical basis for a critical assessment of cultures of peace(s) in France 
 
Methodologies and methods 
The study will follow a constructionist epistemology and various theoretical perspectives such 
as critical theory, postcolonialism, hermeneutics and phenomenology. The research methodology will 
be qualitative throughout the thesis. Theoretical analysis and literature-based research methodologies 
will be used for the four objectives while critical discourse analysis -of official French sources and 
documents- will also be employed regarding the second objective. The qualitative content analysis of 
academic work (books and journal articles), theories and secondary data on identity, French identity 
and peace knowledge will be reviewed from a variety of field of studies within social sciences 
including peace studies, philosophy, political science, sociology, history, law and psychology. The 
connection between findings of diverse sources and fields of study will emphasise the 
interdisciplinarity of the research. The sourcing of references in English, French and Spanish will 
emphasize its interculturality. The theoretical analysis and literature-based methodology data 
approach chosen in this research is justified by the time limit of the work. The thesis aims at laying 
the theoretical basis for further research -quantitative and empirical- on French identity from a peace 
studies perspective and a future PhD research on cultures of peace(s) in France, hence the absence of 
empirical research. Finally, an acknowledgement and clarification must be made regarding the 
decolonising research methodology. This latter is acknowledged but not used in this research. 
However, postcolonial methodology is. This is due to the peace studies’ methodology employed 
throughout the research and the European context of France. Peace studies as an analytical approach 
uses methods of critical theory, postcolonialism and cultural studies. Thus, although acknowledging 
the decolonising research methodology, peace studies does not challenge the Eurocentric perspective 
that undermines the local knowledges and experiences of the marginalised or indigenous groups but 





create a peace space to develop peace cultures with an improved social situation for all human beings 
affected by the issue in question. Therefore, the methodology employed does not aim for an 
eradication of the current discourse on French identity but for its transformation thanks to the 
dialogical input of various legitimate voices. 
 
Literature review  
This research is placed at the intersection of various fields of study in social sciences which, 
nevertheless, are intrinsically connected to each other in terms of focus and values on which they are 
based on. Peace studies is the main field of study of the references used, alongside critical theory, 
postcolonialism and cultural studies. The location of the present case study also leads to narrow these 
fields of study to the French context.  The field of French studies from an Anglo-Saxon perspective 
with authors on French identity is considered. Social sciences references in French language are also 
used although in a lesser amount. This is due to time constraint, availability of data and also to reserve 
such French bibliography for further empirical research. As mentioned, the peace studies theoretical 
and conceptual framework is the guiding thread throughout the thesis, for critical analysis and future 
proposals around the discourse on French identity. However, peace studies are mainly present in the 
Anglo-Saxon and Spanish speaking academic world but not in the francophone one. Thus, the thesis 
will connect the said fields of study and topics to how they are approached in the French academic 
world, illustrating the interdisciplinary and intercultural methodology used in the thesis.  
The main references used in Chapter 1 encompass authors of postcolonial and cultural studies. 
Classic authors in postcolonial studies include Homi K. Bhabha who worked on the cultural hybridity 
theory in his book The Location of Culture (1994); Gayatri Spivak who is the author of the well-
known essay Can The Subaltern Speak? (1988) and wrote about postcolonialism in France (2013) 
and Frantz Fanon, among others postcolonial French authors, who critically assessed the effects 
triggered by racism and dehumanization due to French colonial domination in The Wretched of the 
Earth (1963). Classic authors in the field of cultural studies that will be recounted are Stuart Hall with 





his book The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double-Consciousness (1993). National identity 
specialists Benedict Anderson, and his imagined communities, and Anthony Smith are also recalled 
to assess the discourses on identity. 
Chapter 2 emphasises French authors that discussed the concept of French identity, starting 
by Ernest Renan’s famous discourse on What is a nation? Various French academics have also 
invested their time in assessing French identity: Patrick Charaudeau (philosophy), Gérard Noiriel and 
Jean-Francois Berdah (history), Simon Patrick (ethnography), Michel Wieviorka (sociology) and 
Catherine Wihtol de Wenden (political science). These two latter have contributed to a 2007 edited 
book by Gino Raymond and Tariq Modood on The Construction of Minority Identities in France and 
Britain. A point to highlight is that French authors do not approach French identity from a 
postcolonial or cultural studies perspective, and neither from a peace studies perspective. 
The third and fourth chapters, however, are focused on examining the input peace studies 
could bring to the current discourse on French identity. Classic authors of the peace studies field 
include Johan Galtung whose theory on cultural, structural and direct violence (1969; 1990) can help 
locate the violence in the French identity issue. Vicent Martínez Guzmán’s philosophy to make 
peaces and his epistemological turn theory (2001; 2005) in peace studies guides the third and fourth 
chapter of this thesis. Francisco Muñoz’s imperfect peace theory (2001) will also have an influence 
in the third and fourth chapter. Paco Cascón Soriano’s education for peace with a socio-affective 
focus (2001) will be a theoretical basis to draft educative proposals to transform interpersonal 
relationships in French society to facilitate the reconsideration of what it means to be French. John 
Paul Lederach’s conflict transformation theory (1995; 1997; 2003) will help conceptualize the path 
French institutions and society needs to follow to transform internal and societal conflicts generated 
by the mainstream discourse on French identity. Elise Boulding 
Authors who have written about the topics of identity, politics and identity politics include 
Amin Maalouf, whose book In the Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to Belong (2003) relating 
the experience of having both Lebanese and French cultural backgrounds counter the Clash of 





contributes to going beyond the mere essentialisation of identities and recommends recognising all 
allegiances and belongings of each human beings. Tzvetan Todorov’s volume The Fear of 
Barbarians: Beyond the Clash of Civilizations (2010), Edward Said’s The Clash of Ignorance (2001) 
and Ramin Jahanbegloo’s The Clash of Intolerances12 all align in the antithesis of Huntington’s Clash 
of Civilizations and will be the basis to theorize the identity issue in the French cultural and social 
context. Recognition theory will, finally, be a principle thoroughly examined in the fourth chapter to 
attempt find path to an inclusive French identity. Charles Taylor’s politics of recognition (1992) and 
Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition (1992) will be thus relayed. The work of my supervisor, Sidi 
Omar (2009), on postcolonial identity also highly influences this thesis as it envisions to go beyond 
the emergence of any type of clash to build a peaceful coexistence. 
The current literature on identity with peace studies, postcolonialism and cultural studies 
perspectives by French authors are scarce and nearly absent. That is where this thesis, and myself as 
an author locate. French identity has only been discussed by French authors in classical social science 
fields of study. In this sense, this thesis will point out for further research by French authors in these 
themes and related to the French context. UNESCO’s work and reports on identity and culture (1999; 
2002) will also frame this thesis to help, as referred by UNESCO’s motto, ‘building peace in the 
minds of men and women’. The classical and updated literature, academic and non-academic work 
will be sourced from three languages (English, French, Spanish), using the original one whenever 
possible to not break the flow of the reading experience. Terms in their original (French or Spanish) 
language will be directly translated into English with the original term referenced in a footnote. This 
will allow to analyse and interpret qualitatively the content with the meaning intended in the original 
language to, then, assess to what extent it relates to or can be applied to another -here, French- cultural 
context. Besides, being fluent -able to read and write academically- in the three languages of research 
allows me also to think in the three languages and grasps concepts -of identity- that do not exist in 
the other two languages. This adds to the richness of this research and to the interconnectedness this 
 
12 The reference in the bibliography is the Spanish translation of the book (Elogio de la Diversidad) as I only had the 
chance to read it in this version. It is interesting to notice the linguistic difference in the translation going from ‘The 





paper aims to epitomise. Finally, this thesis does not only rely on published academic work but is also 
inspired by and continues the research on colonial and identity issues undertaken by ex-Peace Master 
students Célia Demoor (2014), Sibylle Freiermuth (2015) and Wibke Gehringer (2015). 
 
Limitations of the research 
The first limitation of this thesis is the theoretical approach it has. Unfortunately, time and 
space limits do not allow for the recollection of empirical data for qualitative and quantitative 
analysis. However, this is being done on purpose and it can spark further theoretical and empirical 
research based on this thesis. A second limitation is the type of sources and references used in the 
research. The reflection below is based on the readings that I have been able to make in the space of 
the six months in ‘full thesis mode’ added to the eighteen months following the Peace Master’s 
courses and, as a general panorama, the readings and experiences I have made and had in the course 
of my entire life. In this sense, the impossibility of getting some sources, or their unavailability, 
whether physically or online therefore also affects the outcomes of this thesis. Besides, the world 
sanitary condition experienced since March 2020 also added an obstacle to the free flowing of 
information. Moreover, my personal bias, whether willing or not, and which is reflective of my 
conditioning, is also a limitation in this qualitative and theoretical research. This thesis does not 
escape this fact. However, I recognise such bias and I am open to critiques for improvement of this 
research and my own reflection. Finally, peace studies work towards the transformation of systems 
of oppression and discriminations due to ethnocentricity, androcentricity and anthropocentricity. 
Ethnocentricity (especially Eurocentrism) is the notion that this research mainly tackles. 
Anthropocentricity, on the contrary, is not addressed this thesis. In this sense, this research is very 
anthropocentric and focus on an issue -identity- affecting human beings. Therefore, the environment 
and the ecocentric approach of peace studies is not mentioned nor employed in this thesis. However, 
it can be considered in further research. Regarding the gender perspective aiming to tackle 
androcentricity, it is briefly mentioned in the first chapter and sparsely encountered throughout the 





androcentric approach, which may not recollect all the voices needed to transform the discourse on 
French identity. Despite the fact that I am a coloured woman, I have only been made aware quite late 
-to my view- of the gender perspective. Besides, I did not have the chance to take the ‘Development 
and Gender’ module during the Peace Master course before writing this thesis. Thus, I was not able 
to refine my knowledge and academic reflection and writing fully regarding gender issues. 
Nevertheless, I am well aware of this limitative fact that I wish to acknowledge. I also commit to its 
improvement in any of my further research. 
 
Outline of the thesis 
The thesis will be divided in four chapters, reflecting the four objectives. 
Chapter 1 will focus on analysing the concept of identity or, rather in plural, identities. Identity 
is a flexible concept where diverse identitarian elements organically encounter to produce one’s own 
and unique identity as Maalouf (1998) explains. In Chapter 1, identities will be examined through 
their creation process, through the elements composing this process and through the effects it 
generates to people and society. Chapter 1 is the examination of the concept of ‘Identity’ of the 
triangle nexus ‘Identity, France and Peace’ (see below). 
Chapter 2 on French identity is an assessment of the concept of identity/ies as it is approached 
in the French context. The creation process and the elements composing French identity which fuel 
its current mainstream discourse are examined and assessed through a peace studies and postcolonial 
perspective. The impacts on French citizens and French society such mainstream discourse generate 
will also be scrutinised in regards of a peace studies and postcolonial approach. Chapter 2 is the 
examination of the ‘right side’ (see below ‘Identity’ and ‘France’) of the triangle nexus ‘Identity, 
France and Peace’. 
Chapter 3 explores the relationship between the alternative identities of Chapter 1 with the 
peace studies concept of cultures of peace(s). This third chapter aims to demonstrate the theoretical 
and direct link between the two notions. As such, it can be substantially proven that fostering one will 





is the examination of the ‘left side’ (see below ‘Identity’ and ‘Peace’, specifically ‘alternative 
identities’ and ‘cultures of peace(s)’) of the triangle nexus ‘Identity, France and Peace’. 
Chapter 4 builds on the findings of the first three chapters to attempt to sketch the theoretical 
and practical basis for the introduction and implementation of French alternative identities in the 
French institutional and societal contexts. This chapter relies on more ‘practical’ sources than the 
other three as it recollects field practices on cultures of peace(s) and peace education in France. 
Chapter 4 is the examination of the ‘top sides’ of the triangle nexus ‘Identity, France and Peace’ (see 
below). 
The ‘bottom side’ (see below ‘Peace’ and ‘France’) of the triangle nexus ‘Identity, France and 
Peace’ is not specifically examined in this thesis and can also be mentioned as one of its limitations. 
Nevertheless, the quasi inexistence of cultures of peace(s) and peace studies in France is often referred 
throughout the thesis, especially in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4. The need for further practice and 




The thesis embodies the critical and constructive perspectives of peace studies. The critical 
perspective aims to carry out an analysis-diagnosis, make visible and denounce the different types of 
violence that occur in the world: it is exemplified in Chapter 1 and 2. The constructive perspective 
works on the research, visibility and proposal of alternative ways of relating between human beings 





are going from 1 to 4 from the more general to the more specific, the number of pages dedicated to 
each chapter reflecting the refining of the analysis. 
Finally, the general conclusions recall all the findings of each chapter to connect them between 




























CHAPTER 1: IDENTITIES 
 
 
1. My Identity, My Allegiances (Maalouf, 2003) 
1. There is suffering (Nhat Hanh, 2003: 87) 
 
1.1 – Introduction 
The concept of identity has been dealt with since decades by various ‘big’ names of the social 
sciences and humanities fields. The aim of this chapter is to review the work and the advances in the 
identity discussion of some of these recognized authors with the objective of framing the theoretical 
basis on which the rest of this thesis will rely. In this sense, this chapter will lay the foundations of 
how identity is understood in this work and of what it is made and composed of through the micro -
personal- and macro -socio-cultural- levels of identification processes (1.2). A section of this first 
chapter will also shed light on the mainstream illustrations of socio-cultural and political identity 
(1.3). Finally, a last part will examine the emphasis on difference (1.4) emanating from such 
mainstream discourse on identity and relate how such alternative identities emerge from and impact 
the current globalized -places in the- world in which they are found. Therefore, this first chapter is 
conceptualized as the helm that guides the rest of this work in order to settle its theoretical basis, 
delimit its scope and mark the path to be followed. As Hop-o'-My-Thumb13 did by marking his trail 
with stones to not get lost and be able to come back home, here this first chapter marks the theoretical 
trail with identity concepts to not get lost in the immense pool of identity and identities. 
On the fact that one can be lost regarding one’s identity, it means that one does not know 
where one belongs. As such, this is exactly the moment when the questioning on identity rises. 
Zygmunt Bauman (1996: 19) raises this point well when asserting that “One thinks of identity 
whenever one is not sure of where one belongs […]. ‘Identity’ is a name given to the escape sought 
from that uncertainty”. ‘Belonging’ means that a relation with other human beings is thus affecting 
 





the individual in doubt. The location of that individual may positively or negatively alter the 
connections with similar others depending of socio-cultural variables: 
One thinks of identity whenever one is not sure of where one belongs; that is, one is not sure how to 
place oneself among the evident variety of behavioural styles and patterns, and how to make sure that 
people around would accept this placement as right and proper, so that both sides would know how to 
go on in each other’s presence (Bauman, 1996: 19). 
 
Nevertheless, if one does not know where one belongs or places oneself then the question of identity 
could thus turn into the question of identities. Identity can be understood as logical and numerical 
concept or as a qualitative concept (Shoemaker, 2006: 40). However, relating the former 
understanding of identity to the issue of a person not knowing to place oneself can link these two 
notions together, falsely linking identities to a quantitative concept. Indeed, it cannot be understood 
as such since identities are qualitative as well. Therefore, identity and identities are part of the same 
entity that is malleable indefinitely, quantitatively and qualitatively.  
The goal of this first chapter is to decipher the components of identities going from the micro 
level, personal and individual process of identification to the macro level and socio-cultural process 
of identification. It also serves to answer the sub-research questions of our research problem: 
 - What is identity and what is it composed of? 
- What are the various discourses on identity and their implications? 
As Stuart Hall expressed: 
Identity is such a concept - operating 'under erasure' in the interval between reversal and emergence; an 
idea which cannot be thought in the old way, but without which certain key questions cannot be thought 
at all (Hall, 1996: 2). 
 
Here, the concept of identity in this thesis will not be addressed in the ‘old way’. Nevertheless, the 
old ways need to be taken in account to tackle key current issues regarding such concept. 
Besides, as the French linguist Patrick Charaudeau (2009) mentioned, there are various 
approaches to the question of identity. Within the social sciences and humanities fields, identity is 
indeed widely researched in the sociological, cultural, anthropological, psychological, political and 
historical branches; each one having its proper assumptions and methodologies. In this first chapter, 





theoretical basis on which the second chapter will be then explored. The peace studies approach will 
also be present throughout the chapter as a guiding thread. 
To choose to name this chapter in the plural form (‘identities’) rather than in the singular one 
(‘identity’) is done in order to recognize the plurality of types of identities present on earth. The 
amount of diverse identities is, in fact, equating to the number of human beings on this planet if it is 
to be taken in account the plurality of personalities, backgrounds and experiences. Indeed, Amin 
Maalouf states that ‘people’s identity is unique to them as individuals’ (2003: 2). Since both 
Maalouf’s and my statements focus on human beings, such anthropocentric approach will limit the 
scope of this thesis, void of ecocentric perspective nevertheless paramount from a peace studies 
prospect. Identity is, however, closely linked to reflexion from human beings, for human beings and 
on human beings -and on living beings when the purpose serves human beings. In this sense, 
questions of human identities are reflections made to locate the origins, processes of formation and 
transformation of identity. It also reflects on the relationship between each other, between the 
‘postulate’ and the ‘project’ as Bauman mentioned it: ‘[…] identity has the ontological status of a 
project and a postulate’ (Bauman, 1996: 19). In the current state of the question, human identities 
have been critically engaged as a process of transformation by “anti-essentialist critique of ethnic, 
racial and national conceptions of cultural identity and the 'politics of location'” (Hall, 1996: 1). Their 
goal was and still is to reclaim their own identification from their perspectives and experiences instead 
of the colonialist, Eurocentric, patriarchal and, also, anthropocentric dominant discourses, framing 
our understanding of culture and identity (Omar, 2009). In this chapter (and in general in this thesis), 
the “need for a further debate about ‘identity’” (Hall, 1996: 1) is to approach identity and 
identification processes from a peace studies perspective, acknowledging the diversity of experiences 
and understandings on identity, in order to build cultures of peace(s). 
 
1.2 – The identification process 





‘In its primary meaning, the noun ‘identity’ refers to the relation each thing has to itself and to no 
other thing’ […] (Shoemaker, 2006: 40): this is what this following sub-section will examine. The 
relation a person has with oneself and to no other thing or being regarding the concept of identity. In 
this sense, needs are a notion an individual must fulfil for oneself to survive. Identity as a need will 
be explored for this purpose. Then, the notion of the subject will be analysed, especially its agency in 
relation to power. 
 
1.2.1.a – Identity as a basic human need  
This paper will rely on the academic work of researchers from the peace studies and economic 
fields, Johan Galtung and Vicent Martínez Guzmán (peace studies); and Manfred Max-Need, Antonio 
Elizalde, Martin Hopenhayn (economics) to explore the meaning of identity as a basic human need.  
According to Johan Galtung identity is considered as a basic human need, alongside well-
being, security and freedom (1989). Vicent Martínez Guzmán relates these four basic needs as 
mandatory to fulfil to foster a culture of peace and walk away from a culture of violence (2001: 71). 
Identity is also a non-material (and thus theoretical but also spiritual) need (Galtung, 2010) which 
depends on the structure in which it unfolds. 
The economic theorists Manfred Max-Neef, Antonio Elizalde and Martin Hopenhayn have 
developed their proper understanding of fundamental human needs in their 1986 book Desarrollo a 
Escala Humana (Human Scale Development) where they introduce the difference between needs, 
which are constant, and satisfiers of those needs, which are changing. Identity is considered by the 
three theorists as the eighth axiological need, axiological as in based on human values, alongside -
and in this order- subsistence, protection, affection, understanding, participation, idleness, creation 
and freedom. Here, it can be noted that the first two (subsistence and protection) and the last two 
needs (identity and freedom) recall Galtung’s four basic human needs (well-being, security, identity 
and freedom), with the first two being changed to another name. According to the economics 
researchers, identity is a basic human need based on value, on what is right and ought to be. As the 





and satisfiers’ (Max-Neef, Elizalde and Hopenhayn, 1989): being, having, doing and interacting. The 
following needs of existential category -existential referring to the existence of human beings- will 
be delved into throughout this research: the sense of belonging and differentiation (being); language, 
values and norms (having); recognize oneself (doing) and maturation stages (interacting).  
Since this sub-section is examining human needs, it is interesting to briefly mention and 
connect these above two approaches to psychologist Abraham Maslow’s 1943 work on the hierarchy 
of needs. Indeed, since comparation is based on violence, the parallels I want to highlight is the one 
between Maslows’s physiological, safety, love and belonging/esteem and esteem/self-actualization 
needs and Galtung’s and Martínez Guzmán’s respective well-being, security, identity and freedom 
needs. Finally, the ‘Needs Inventory’ of the Center for Nonviolent Communication (2005) does not 
include ‘identity’ as a need in its list. However, it encompasses the needs of ‘connection’ and 
‘meaning’ that may represent the ‘identity’ need. The specific needs of ‘connection’ relating to 
identity are ‘belonging’, ‘community’, ‘to know and be known’, ‘to see and be seen’, ‘to understand 
and be understood’ while for ‘meaning’ it is ‘self-expression’. Here, ‘meaning’ and ‘self-expression’ 
as a need could refer to the fact that the identification process can be a relation of the individual with 
oneself; that one can reflect on one’s own identity, and choose who one is and where one comes from. 
Nevertheless, the ‘connection’ needs listed above demonstrate that, indeed, identity is not only a 
matter of the individual alone. This will be analyzed thoroughly below. Thus, let’s see to what extent 
this individual agency goes. 
 
1.2.1.b – Agency: the notion of subject  
In this part, the examination of the personal identification process will depart from Stuart Hall 
(1996: 2) questioning: ‘to what set of problems, does the irreducibility of the concept, identity, 
emerge?’ Then, his own response to the question also provides a part of the analysis of agency of the 
subject: 
I think the answer here lies in its centrality to the question of agency and politics. […] By 'agency' I 
express no desire whatsoever to return to an unmediated and transparent notion of the subject or identity 






‘Irreducibility’ means to what most little particle or entity can someone’s identity be analysed. In this 
sense, if observed in the microscope, ‘identity’ would, according to Hall, be essentially composed of 
agency and politics. Since essentialism is part of those mainstream discourses on identity, the 
‘irreducibility’ of identity should not be dealt with. However, it is interesting to do so for the sake of 
analysis. Politics is part of the socio-cultural identification process and will be examined below. On 
the contrary, agency departs from the individual (and one’s power) to later being related to others’ 
agency. The importance of the analysis of agency can be related to the concept of subject which, 
according to French sociologist Michel Wieviorka (2007: 41), has ‘been emerging in an increasingly 
forceful way in recent years […] importance of which in the work of the social sciences […]  can be 
placed at the very centre of the analysis in so far as it provides an instrument enabling us to consider 
invention and inventiveness, creativity and involvement’. To invent, to create and to be involved 
means that subject has a certain power to do things. This concept of power applied to the subject was 
discussed by French philosopher Michel Foucault in his book Power/Knowledge, where he asserted 
that ‘individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points of application’ (1980: 98). Therefore, if 
every individual has agency and, by correlation, have a power within, it means they can attract and 
reject. People are and have energies. They interact with each other to find their meaning within the 
world. They thus have to connect to be able to locate themselves as they and others deem right: 
identity being the ‘simple idea’ in which one ‘more or less self-consciously locate’ oneself in the 
social world (Preston, 1997: 4). Such physical -but also theoretical and spiritual- process is also found 
in social psychology in the identity-building mechanism where ‘for there to be an awareness of 
identity, a difference must be perceived and a certain relationship with the other must be 
established’14 (Charaudeau, 2009). The perception of a difference is linked to the phenomenological 
principle of alterity (Charaudeau, 2009) where identity is construed with the acknowledgement of an 
alternative perspective. Such alternative point of view emanates from the ‘attraction’ and ‘rejection’ 
movements with which the relationship is established (Charaudeau, 2009). There is thus an energy 
field between various subjects which influences their own personal identity. This ‘relational’ aspect 
 
14 My own translation. Original quote in French : pour qu’il y ait prise de conscience identitaire, il faut que soit perçue 





of the energy field is expressed when people ‘define themselves in dialogue or in contrast with others’ 
(Belangér and Verkuyten, 2010: 144) so they can be accepted by these others, as well as their potential 
as subjects (Wieviorka, 2007: 41). It is thus a social construction of the concept of identity that is 
taking place. It emanates from the fundamental relationship and interaction between subjects or ‘inter-
subjectivity’ where ‘a subject is seen as a product of social relations whose identity is formed and 
transformed in the context of dialogue and negotiation with others’ (Omar, 2009). Even if it would 
be more in accordance with the peace studies perspective to talk about an identity ‘dialogue’ instead 
of and identity ‘negotiation’ (which will be dealt with in the third chapter), the next chapter will delve 
into the cultural, political and social identification processes. 
 
1.2.2 – At the macro or socio-cultural and political level 
As seen previously, the identification process happens at the micro or personal level. In this 
sub-section, it will be examined how it is taking place at the macro or socio-cultural and political 
level. The macro level of the identification process is limited to these three dimensions as they are 
the ones that are highly influential in the discourse on the French identity (to be analysed in chapter 
2).  Historical or anthropological dimensions of the identification process may also be mentioned but 
would remain in the ‘back seat’ of the analysis. Before delving into such inquiry, it is interesting to 
reflect on the differences between the three but also on their relationship. In this sense, the connection 
between the social and the cultural dimensions manifests as sometimes blurred but nevertheless real, 
as Wieviorka (2007: 36) states it:  
The question [of separation between the cultural and the social] might have remained theoretical if the 
implementation of multiculturalist policies had not provided an answer, or rather, two answers. What 
does this signify? It is a question of knowing  how far the analysis has to distinguish  between 
declarations or demands of a cultural nature (by which I mean, for example, that my identity be 
recognised in the public sphere), and the concerns or  expectations of a social nature (for example, I 
challenge the social inequality to which I am subjected). To amalgamate these two registers is to confuse 
dimensions which everyone, from personal experience, knows very well to be distinct, but to separate 
them completely implies that there is no direct link between them. However, research demonstrates that 
they are constantly linked. 
 
‘Policies’ and thus also politics have been ‘added’ to this relationship mix between the two first 





identification process. Nevertheless, such mix of socio-cultural and political aspects is essential in 
constructing meaningful identities towards cultures of peace(s): 
actually identities are about questions of using the resources of history, language and culture in the 
process of becoming rather than being: not 'who we are' or 'where we came from', so much as what we 
might become, how we have been represented and how that bears on how we might represent ourselves 
(Hall, 1996: 4). 
 
Gender, culture, politics, society and language are elements of the socio-cultural and political 
identification process that will be analysed in this sub-section. However, it is crucial to examine the 
role of intersectionality (of those elements) before studying their features. 
 
1.2.2.a – Intersectionality of identification categories  
 The concept of intersectionality was coined in 1989 by Kimberlé Crenshaw in her article 
‘Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex’. Being a black Afro-American lawyer, feminist 
and critical race theorist, she wanted to pinpoint the consequences emerging from the ‘tendency to 
treat race and gender as mutually exclusive categories of experience and analysis’. According to her, 
the use of an exclusive and ‘single-axis’ analysis leads to a distortion of experiences lived by the 
person -in this case, Black women in America- and their marginalisation (Crenshaw, 1989: 139-140). 
Intersectionality was a term employed at its outset as a ‘metaphor of intersecting categories of 
discrimination’. It was later recuperated by contemporary feminist theory as a paradigm to study and 
stress social phenomena of oppression. Intersectionality answers the theoretical demand and need of 
analysing and reading various categories of oppression simultaneously. It thus ‘captures how 
oppressions are experienced simultaneously’ and ‘theorize the convergence, co-constitution, 
imbrication, or interwovenness of systems of oppression’ (Carastathis, 2014: 307). Although it 
emerged from the experience of oppression, intersectionality also affects the building of one’s identity 
as it stresses the hierarchies of power and privileges among different categories of identity analysis. 
The theoretical metaphor became mainstream between 2015 and 2017 and started to influence activist 
spheres in their practices. Its creator reminded its primary aim of making room for ‘more advocacy 
and remedial practices to create a more egalitarian system’ (Coaston, 2019). Regarding the topic of 





Indeed, with today’s globalisation era and with the emergence of more and more diverse identification 
categories, no human being can state their belonging to only one type of category. Whether it be 
gender, race, class or political affiliation, the intersection of identification categories does influence 
their social locations and, consequently, the processes of identification. These categories are now to 
be examined. 
 
1.2.2.b – Identification categories: gender, culture, society, politics, language 
 The five categories to be reviewed here are all key identitarian marker. Gender being recently 
one of the most voiced about and visible in activist spheres, it however is not a key framework of 
analysis in this thesis. Nevertheless, Judith Butler’s gender performance and gender performativity 
notions will be useful in grasping the mechanisms of identification in the other categories. Culture, 
society and politics are the main framework of analysis of this research. Their intersection will also 
be studied. Finally, language is the category that links all other categories since identity emerges from 
but also construct the lingual way of expression. 
Gender is briefly discussed here considering Judith Butler’s differentiation of gender 
performance and gender performativity. She defines gender in regards of identity as 
in no way a stable identity or locus of agency from which various acts proceede; rather, it is an identity 
tenuously constituted in time -an identity instituted through a stylized repetition of acts (Butler, 1988: 
519). 
 
Gender is thus, according to a constructed identity, fruit of the performance of one’s acts and practices 
presented to the world. Such performance of acts produces effects that reflect an image and 
‘consolidate an impression of being’ a man, woman or any other gender (Big Think, 2011). She 
therefore defines gender identity as ‘a performative accomplishment compelled by social sanction 
and taboo’ (Butler, 1988: 520). Gender identity is thus the product of one’s behaviours (gender 
performance) meeting other human beings interpreting such conducts according to their own 
experiences and framework of gender analysis. Gender identity is therefore the product of a dialogue 
between the encounter of actions and experiences. Today, gender is a key marker in the constructed 





Butler’s gender performance and gender performativity introduces the dialectic crucial aspect of the 
identification process applicable to other identity categories. 
Culture is one of the categories of analysis and also an essential identity element. 
Etymologically, ‘culture’ comes from the Latin verb colere translated as to ‘inhabit’, ‘cultivate’, 
‘protect’ and ‘worship’ (Martínez Guzmán, 2001). Here, the emphasis will be put on the ‘cultivation’ 
meaning since, as Sidi Omar (2009) explains, it ‘refers to something that is created by the intervention 
of humans, and is not something pre-given’. Such ‘intervention’ implies that there is an action or 
actions in the way it is conceived, and that probably such actions are shared or include a relationship 
between the humans involved. The shared part of culture is another feature to highlight. Indeed, 
Vauclair and al. (2014) citing Matsumoto and Huang (2008) recall that ‘culture is usually defined as 
a shared meaning system, in terms of values and beliefs, among members of a cultural group who 
have been subjected to the same cultural socialization experience’. Tzvetan Todorov (2010: 419) also 
indicate such shared characteristic of culture as it ‘refers to common representations, thus shared by 
at least two human beings – mostly, however, by a far larger number of people’. Todorov also points 
out that the ‘spreading’ of culture through communication -thus language- is what makes common 
representations ‘cultural’. He then asserted two characteristics of culture where each subject exhibits 
characteristics of multiple cultures and each culture is subject to change. The cultivation characteristic 
of culture represents the location where cultures meet -within the individual. It then affects the shared 
characteristic of culture, the very content of these cultures being thus influenced by each other and 
within the subject, bearer of cultures and multiple identities. Therefore, these two characteristics of 
culture go against the -somehow quantitative- “‘positivist’ conception that posits culture as a 
catalogue of ideas and a set of conditionings that mould and determine the collective and individual 
identities” (Omar, 2009 citing Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1967). Warren and Fassett (2014: 7), from 
communication studies, mentioned that ‘we each occupy a variety of cultural locations’ and therefore, 
‘all communication occurs within a nested, interwoven system of cultures [global, racial/ethnic, 
economic, sexual, gendered, dis/abled, political, religious, and others]’. It thus seems that cultures are 





gender performance and performativity. French philosopher Etienne Balibar (1994: 57) raised the 
question of such space: 
Would it not then be enlightening to functionally treat notions of culture and, even more so, cultural 
identity, as terms that today designate a form rather than a content or an object? Better still: an empty 
space, vacant for a multiplicity of contents and objects, and determined by the intersection of discourses 
[...]?15 
 
In this sense, there is no ‘pure’ culture and all cultures are ‘mixed’ or ‘hybrid’ (Todorov, 2010: 420) 
and in ‘perpetual transformation’ (Todorov, 2010: 55) within that space. Besides, it is such constant 
transformation that allows cultures to remain alive since it is in an ongoing state of change. Sidi 
Omar’s take on (‘trying to know’) culture can be paralleled to the above analysis of the relational 
aspect of identity when ‘culture(s)’ is replaced by identity in the below quote:  
[…] cultures do not emerge and develop out of some pre-given and fixed essences, but in complex, 
intersubjective (hybrid) and dynamic processes that are embedded in power relations. […] Therefore, in 
trying to know culture, the question should not be what culture is but how the language of culture is 
used and for what purposes, i.e., discourses on culture (Omar, 2009). 
 
Culture and identity therefore unfold in the same manner. They are also intertwined when addressing 
the need for cultural identification (Todorov, 2010: 422), cultural identity being ‘the feeling of 
belonging to a cultural group […] bases on common values, joint history, language and tradition 
(Salo-Lee, 2003 citing Liebkind, 1994). Culture (and cultural identity by the same token) is also 
linked to society and politics. Since culture ‘encompasses diverse practices, social institutions and 
discourses’, it is elaborated in the political sphere of the identification process. As it is ‘cultivated and 
constructed […] shared, dialogical and collective’ (Omar, 2009), it also takes place in the societal 
one.  
Society and culture are thus narrowly connected. They are constructed in relationship to one 
another. Therefore, these two make part of the ingredients constructing the product of identity as well. 
Indeed, cultural identity is linked to moves in society and that is why socio-cultural identity and some 
features of cultural identity may be evoked with regards to the social identity ones (Balibar, 1994). 
Preston defines these moves as the ‘complex series of social process’ to which identity is the outcome 
 
15 My own translation. Original quote in French : Ne serait-il pas alors éclairant de traiter fonctionnellement les notions 
de culture et, plus encore, d'identité culturelle, comme des termes qui désignent aujourd'hui une forme plutôt qu'un 
contenu ou un objet ? Mieux encore : une place vide, vacante pour une multiplicité de contenus et d'objets, et déterminée 





(Preston, 1997:4). Charaudeau defines these moves as the ‘crisis’ that modern societies go through, 
whether identity crisis, cultural crisis, generational crisis, crisis in education, citizen crisis, 
community crisis, etc (Charaudeau, 2009) which affect the construction of socio-cultural identity. 
These moves, complex processes or crisis are the result of the interaction between the collectivity and 
individualism or the ‘increasing desire on the part of individuals to choose their identity, including 
that of community’ (Wieviorka, 2007: 35). Preston reasserts the societal aspect intrinsic to identity: 
Identities are socially made, they are not a private consumer construct from available elements. The 
particular person will confront a dense sphere of relationships with others, and in the background will 
stand collectivity. One could think of identity as a shifting balance between what is privately 
remembered and what is publicly demanded. Identity is thus always shifting. It is never fixed (Preston, 
1997: 5). 
 
Society can be equally defined as community or collectivity. However, the former may be more 
closely linked to society as being cultural, with individuals having common -shifting- features 
between them. The latter may then be more closely linked to society as being political, with 
individuals enjoying collected rights and duties that are publicly expressed and that can also shift 
through times. Such shifts are due to politics and the objectives behind political discourses. 
Agency and politics are, according to Stuart Hall, the irreducible notions of identity. The role 
of politics in the identification process appears thus necessary to analyse. For Hall, politics is “both 
the significance in modern forms of political movement of the signifier 'identity', its pivotal 
relationship to a politics of location - but also the manifest difficulties and instabilities which have 
characteristically affected all contemporary forms of 'identity politics'” (Hall, 1996: 2). Identity arises 
from discourse and the representations stemming out of it. Therefore, since one’s identity is 
constructed within the space where socio-cultural and political elements meet, it is also influenced by 
one or various specific political frames. An individual’s identity is thus 
produced in specific historical and institutional sites within specific discursive formations and practices, 
by specific enunciative strategies. Moreover, they emerge within the play of specific modalities of 
power, and thus are more the product of the marking of difference and exclusion […] (Hall, 1996: 4). 
 
Hall, then, explains further the crucial role of difference (which will be thoroughly examined later in 
this chapter) in identity construction: 
Above all, and directly contrary to the form in which they are constantly invoked, identities are 





only through the relation to the Other, the relation to what it is not, to precisely what it lacks […] (Hall, 
1996: 4). 
 
The discourse on the Other is one of the facets of politics that is detrimental to the constructive aspect 
of identity and may therefore reinforce essentialism in the formation of the concept. The Other is the 
individual that is considered as an object and does not enjoy agency and freedom (Marotta, 2011: 
191). Such Other is constructed via the politics of representation which questions how identities are 
produced through practices of representation (Grossberg, 1996: 90). This representation of the Other 
connotes generally a negative feature of that Other. It is an individual that is feared, hated, and 
resented to the extent that it is preferred to be politically objectified. The individual and socio-cultural 
identity can thus be formed in relation to an ‘enemy’ (Lear, 2001) dictated by political discourses 
essentialising identity. The way identity is approached in the politics of the collectivities in which 
individuals belong is a crucial point in whether fostering cultures of peace(s) or cultures promoting 
hate, indifference and, ultimately, war. Language is essential in cultivating these identity categories 
through a peaceful lens. 
‘Identity in many aspects is shaped by language and conversely, language choices may relate 
to identity’ (Crawford et al., 2014: 88). Language is thus one of these notions influencing who one 
is. It is a system of representation which metaphorically makes accessible the social meanings of the 
world. Culture is transmitted through language and, therefore access to ‘reality’ is permitted. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to wonder of what ‘reality’ it is talked about. Thus, language shapes our 
understanding of the world, and the concepts we use are not only descriptive, but they also imply 
normative judgements. There is a relationship with the other parties we are interacting with through 
language and it forms itself like an agreement. As seen above, meaning is a human need (Center for 
Nonviolent Communication, 2005). Through this relationship created through language, meanings 
are thus socially constructed. Therefore, because of such social construction, the need of meanings 
can also be deconstructed. Language is at the heart of the individual but also the collective 
construction of the subject (Charaudeau, 2009). It is therefore at the heart of the micro level of 
identification regarding agency of the subject. It is also at the heart of the macro level one, linking 





expression is thus closely linked to the performance and utterance of acts creating gender. The 
relationship between language and culture is understood as the former being a part of one’s cultural 
identity and reinforcing the subject’s ‘identification and bond with a particular group’ (Salo-Lee, 
2003). The relationship between language and society is highlighted with respect to the fact that 
language is ‘both personal and social’. Language plays a role in social identity as it ‘denotes the 
various ways in which people understand themselves in relation to others’ (Crawford et al., 2014: 
88). As Preston (1997: 7) notes too, identity and the ‘social construction of complex identities’ are 
respectively carried and accomplished in language and ‘made and remade in routine social practice’. 
The relationship between language and politics is enlightened in the identity role of the former 
through discourse, as Charaudeau (2009) explains: 
Another point of view is based on the idea that language is not the whole of culture. Indeed, one might 
wonder whether language has an identity role or whether what is called discourse, the use that is made 
of language, through the act of enunciation that implements it. Against such widespread idea, we should 
dissociate language and culture, and associate discourse and culture.16 
 
Political discourses on identity are split into a dichotomy: essentialism and constructivism. These 
discourses are at the basis of any conflictive identity situations, whether personal or socio-cultural. 
They are examined in the next sub-section. 
 
 1.2.3 – Essentialism versus constructivism  
After the exploration of the micro and macro levels of identification, one of the common 
features of identity that was acknowledged in each category is that it is a relationship matter between 
a subject and another subject or other subjects as a group. It is thus an ongoing constructing process. 
Nevertheless, the essentialist discourse discards this approach by emphasizing identity as originating 
from few and fixed elements instructed by observed natural and generalised processes. 
Essentialism is the theory built on the belief that each entity possesses a basic array of 
characteristics that if all other superficial or ‘accidental’ (Cartwright, 1968) characteristics were 
 
16 My own translation. Original quote in French: Un autre point de vue repose sur l’idée que la langue n’est pas le tout 
de la culture. En effet, on peut se demander si c’est la langue qui a un rôle identitaire ou ce que l’on appelle le discours, 
c’est-à-dire l’usage que l’on fait de la langue, à travers l’acte d’énonciation qui la met en œuvre. Contre une idée bien 





stripped down, the ‘basic’ ones would remain deep down as the essence.  When applied to identity, 
such theory views the concept as ‘something substancial, pre-given and inmutable’ (Omar, 2009). 
This is a dominant understanding of identity, rooted in biological and cultural essentialisms which 
respectively underline biological differences and an original fixed culture and history from which the 
subject comes from (Omar, 2009). A psychological definition of essentialism qualifies essentialism 
as ‘discrete’ and exclusively binary with impossibility of having a middle ground, even less of a 
blurred in-between state (Crawford and al., 2014: 89). In this sense, looking for the essential aspect 
of an entity is to undertake the ‘quest of the origin’, its ‘authenticity’ as Charaudeau (2009) explicated. 
Nevertheless, he asserts that such ‘quest’ is a dangerous fantasy since 
If, however, there is a collective identity, it can only be that of sharing and therefore of the production 
of a collective meaning, but of a shifting sharing, with blurred borders, a sharing in which multiple 
influences intervene (Charaudeau, 2009).17 
 
Therefore, by going through the ‘quest of origin’ or identity reduced at the core element, the pursuit 
of identity crosses path with many other elements to which it nourishes itself along the way. Marking 
the trail with stones, like Hop-o'-My-Thumb did, allows to remember the elements of one’s identity. 
Sometimes, a certain trail may be stressed with more stones when ‘strategic essentialism’ is taking 
place. This concept was introduced by Gayatri Spivak as she proposed the ‘strategic use of positivist 
essentialism in a scrupulously visible political interest’ (Spivak, 1996: 214). Strategic essentialism 
aims to emphasize an identity category in order to disturb the hierarchies of power and privileges 
emerging from domination of certain facets of gender, race, class or any other identity category. The 
term was coined to define a political practice that could help the struggle against any type of 
identitarian oppression. In this sense, ‘strategic’ essentialism could also be interpreted as ‘pragmatic’ 
essentialism (Eide, 2016). Strategic essentialism thus bases the practice of identity politics and the 
critical and effective actions of marginalised individuals against dominant hegemonic political 
discourses on identity. Strategic essentialism and identity politics can thus be the basis of one’s 
identification process either for a lifetime, or just for a moment. In any way, since many roads will 
 
17 My own translation. French original : Si, cependant, il y a une identité collective, ce ne peut être que celle du partage 
et donc de la production d’un sens collectif, mais d’un partage mouvant, aux frontières floues, d’un partage dans lequel 





be marked by stones throughout one’s lifetime, it is thus an identity map that needs to be drawn and 
built. This constructivist approach to identity permits to lead oneself to one’s various constructed 
emotional, physical or spiritual homes where one is fully recognised. This construction process will 
now be clarified. 
Patrick Charaudeau (2009) stated that ‘language is both at the heart of the individual and 
collective construction of the subject’18 while Sidi Omar (2009) citing Manuel Castells (1997: 29) 
reasserted that all identities are constructed ‘from a sociological standpoint’ (Omar, 2009). Peter W. 
Preston added that 
the social construction of complex identities is accomplished in language, and identity is thus fluid, 
subtle and widely implicated in patterns of thought and action. Identity is not fixed, it has no essence 
and it does not reside in any given texts or symbols or sacred sites. It is carried in language and made 
and remade in routine social practice (Preston, 1997: 7). 
 
Then, Stuart Hall may have resumed and encompassed how the construction of cultures relates to the 
construction of identities in the following quote: 
In common sense language, identification is constructed on the back of a recognition of some common 
origin or shared characteristics with another person or group, or with an ideal, and with the natural 
closure of solidarity and allegiance established on this foundation. In contrast with the 'naturalism' of 
this definition, the discursive approach sees identification as a construction, a process never completed 
- always 'in process'. It is not determined in the sense that it can always be 'won' or 'lost', sustained or 
abandoned (Hall, 1996: 2-3). 
 
It is thus affirmed that identity and identities are created via a constructivist approach, whether it be 
social or cultural. Stuart Hall (1996: 3) also qualified the identification process as ‘conditional, lodged 
in contingency’. Therefore, identity is like an energy always in movement and can also be 
contradictory. Indeed, as Patrick Charaudeau (2009) asserted, identity construction is taking place 
because of the contradiction of an individual between the desire to feel special and unique and the 
wish to belong to a group or a collective. This tension between seeking uniqueness and belonging 
illustrates the attraction and rejection movement mentioned previously. He adds that this paradox is 
built on the premise that ‘we need the other, the other in his-her-their difference, to become aware of 
our existence’19 (Charaudeau, 2009). Nevertheless, as he also mentioned, ‘identity is a matter of 
 
18 My own translation. Original quote in French : langage est au cœur de la construction aussi bien individuelle que 
collective du sujet. 
19 My own translation. Original quote in French : Nous avons besoin de l’autre, de l’autre dans sa différence, pour prendre 





permanent construction against a backdrop of history’20 (Charaudeau, 2009). In this sense, colonial 
history may sometimes, if not always, influence the subject and his-her-their agency. The purpose of 
the ‘identity-construction process’ analysis is thus here stated by Sidi Omar (2009): 
The key question, however, is whence, why and for what purpose identities are constructed. This means 
that the recognition of the constructedness of identity is not necessarily the end of analysis, and what is 
needed is an investigation of the power relations involved in identity-construction processes. In other 
words, emphasis should be laid on the social construction of identity, and primarily the social, cultural 
and political contest for identitarian hegemony, whereby social groups strive with one another to 
articulate, rearticulate, appropriate, contest or have control over certain identity definitions and 
interpretations.  
 
The power relations in favour of a hegemonic and essentialist identitarian construction process is 
what postcolonial theory on identity seeks to engage with by reviewing the concept of an ‘integral, 
originary and unified identity’ (Hall, 1996: 1). 
 
1.2.4 – Extending the constructivist approach: postcolonialism 
Postcolonialism is defined as the ‘caesura left after the brutality of colonial rule and 
decolonisation wars’ (Spencer: 2006: 134). It intervenes in the cultural, political and social spheres 
of identity formation and sheds light on the Other who, in fact, holds a more complex identity than 
presupposed by the essentialist thinking (Spencer, 2006: 121). This complexity arose because 
postcolonialism unlocked the possibility of approaching identity experiences and representations 
through a non-Western lens: the ‘Oriental’ one. Edward Said’s theory on Orientalism (1978) came 
into friction with Western essentialist and, also, constructivist perspectives on identity. Indeed, he 
initiated the reflection on the origins of knowledge in the colonial context. Traditionally based on 
Western epistemology, identity representations of colonial subjects were now to be dealt with taking 
into account their personal experiences (Bhambra, 2014: 116). Thus, even if postcolonialism is an 
extension of constructivism, it embodies a contestation of such approach based on Western views and 
its hegemonic discourse. Postcolonialism goes against essentialism and proposes to go beyond 
constructivism by interrupting and contesting Western discourses of modernity. It does so through 
the establishment of other forms of narratives and enunciation based on the experiences of the 
 





colonised subject (Bhambra, 2014: 116-117 citing Bhabha, 1994). As such, a re-articulation of what 
modernity is and its political outcome emerges (Bhambra, 2014: 117) and constructive processes of 
identity are rearticulated by the same token. The emergence of postcolonialism thus implies an 
encounter of supposedly opposed perspectives, discourses and, therefore, identities. However, by 
‘going beyond’, postcolonialism does not discard the contribution of constructivist process of 
identity. It considers it and the subject’s postcolonial experience is inserted in the process to produce 
a new identity mix from such tension. Thus, postcolonialism asserts the unfixed, shifting, fluid and 
hybrid facets of identity (Bhabha, 1994; Omar, 2009). It also permits to examine the concept of 
identity taking into perspective the in-between and blurred space that essentialism and constructivism 
do not allow. The influence postcolonialism has on the strategic social positioning of the subject 
(Hall, 1996: 3; Omar, 2009) may however upset or generate a profound reflexion process within such 
subject, especially when one is located in a Western context where mainstream discourses on identity 
prevail. 
 
1.3 – Mainstream illustrations of socio-cultural and political identity 
The principal constituents of identity regarding cultural, social and political spheres have been 
inspected in the past section. These three domains have been chosen for analysis as they will guide 
this research in critically assessing the mainstream discourse on French identity in the next chapter. 
Indeed, socio-cultural identity is one of the main facets of how French identity is conceptualised with 
the features of language, culture and society administered by the political entity of the centralised 
state. This section will thus analyse four illustrations of socio-cultural identity: national identity, 
citizenship, ethnic identity and hyphenated identity; with a sub-section in the middle examining the 
co-terminality of national identity and citizenship. The political aspect linked with these identities 
will also be stressed in regard to the peace studies perspective. These four examples are considered 
as ‘mainstream’ as they can be encountered in the majority of the current (nation-) states in the world. 
‘Mainstream’ as possessing one type of these identities, or the other, or both may influence the 






 1.3.1 – National identity or nationality 
 Examining what national identity is means that what a nation is must first be inspected. This 
will then allow to understand what national identity is. The critical assessment of this latter concept 
ends this analysis. The work of Benedict Anderson in 1983 Imagined communities : reflections on 
the origin and spread of nationalism will be recalled in the definition of a nation, while Anthony D. 
Smith’s 1991 book National Identity will be the basis for an understanding of the components of 
national identity. Finally, the critical analysis of nationality (and of citizenship and ethnicity by the 
same token) by Tharailath Koshy Oommen in his 1997 book Citizenship, nationality, and ethnicity 
will lead the take of this paper on such concept.  
 According to Anderson (1983), the definition of a nation is ‘an imagined community’. Finite 
boundaries, sovereignty and deep and horizontal comradeship are the basic elements of the national 
imagined community (Preston, 1997: 35 citing Anderson, 1983) with the ‘vernacular print language’ 
being the basis of a nation (Preston, 1997: 10-11). In a 2006 revised edition of Anderson’s book, 
nation was defined as ‘an imagined political community’. ‘Political’ implies that a nation is thought 
in the aim of administering a group of people in a certain way to achieve certain goals based on certain 
values. It is ‘imagined’ as those people gathered under a same political project ‘will never know most 
of their fellow members’ (Anderson, 2006). Therefore, a nation is an abstract concept that attempts 
to bring to people’s realities the -imagined- veracity of common features. Some of these features such 
as language can narrowly link diverse people, as ‘[…] the essence of a nation is that all individuals 
have much in common’ (Anderson, 2006: 6 citing Renan, 1882). Nevertheless, it is quite restricting 
to reduce it to features that cannot transcend physical or emotional realms and reach the spiritual one 
as stated by Ernest Renan in his 1882 lecture ‘What is a nation?’. Taking into account Anderson’s 
definition of a nation, the identity of individuals belonging to an ‘imagined political community’ may 
thus seem as abstract as what a nation is. According to Smith (1991), national identity is defined by 
the grouping of a number of characteristics such as a historic territory, a mass culture, common myths, 





myths, memories, values and symbols in the constitution of a national identity (Smith, 1986). The 
political aspect of national identity can be sensed by the ‘narrative of conquest, defence, liberation 
and loss’ implied by the historic territory and common myths where the “‘Others’ play a role” 
(Dijkink, 1996: 11). The construction of national identity can thus be understood as arising from war, 
blood spilled and trauma resulting from confrontation with other nations of people (Dijkink, 1996; 
Charaudeau, 2009). A pattern of national identity is that it is also ‘continuously rewritten on the basis 
of external events’ (Dijkink, 1996: 5). Therefore, it is constantly (re)constructed. From ‘mass culture’, 
it can also be deducted that national identity is a source of cultural identity. For some people, national 
identity signifies ‘home’ or ‘roots’ as well (Salo-Lee, 2003: 250). Home and roots suggest that there 
is an emotional bond between the individual and the nation, whether it be through the historic 
territory, the culture, the myths or the rights and duties. Tharailath Koshy Oommen in his 1997 book 
Citizenship, nationality and ethnicity intended to reformulate such definition of national identity and 
nation. According to him, nation is a territorial entity where the people living on it have an emotional 
attachment. Such territory is thus an ancestral or adopted territory that the inhabitants would call 
‘homeland’. In this sense, nationality is the representation of a collective identity, and communication 
-through a common language- is necessary to sustain such nation. A nation is thus the combination 
and the fusion of a delimited territory and a common language. A national of a place is thus a person 
that morally identify with such territory and language, but also overall to its culture. Oomen (1997: 
22) finally concludes that ‘if a group of people feel that they are a nation, they make one’. However, 
in the present day, national identity is often confused with citizenship. The elements of citizenship 
will be examined in the next sub-section while the amalgamation of both nationality and citizenship 
concepts will be scrutinized in the one afterwards.  
 
 1.3.2 – Citizenship or civic identity 
While nationality is the inclusion in a cultural community, citizenship represents the 
belonging to a political collectivity (Alfonsi, 1997: 53), therefore revealing Anderson’s redefinition 





elements of citizenship means the need to define what a state is and the relationship it has with its 
civic subjects. The state is an entity legally constituted providing its residents protection in terms of 
internal security and against external aggressions (Oomen, 1997: 33). According to international law, 
a (sovereign) state must possess a permanent population, a defined territory, a government and the 
capacity to enter into relations with other states (Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of 
States, 1933). Since it is first and foremost a legal entity, it thus theoretically does not include a moral 
component -contrary to a nation that is culture-based. However, since objectivity is only viable until 
a certain point, moral attributes are, of course, included in the process of a state creation and the 
elements of a civic attitude. Citizenship is the membership of an individual to a community of political 
equals (Preston, 1997: 10-11 citing Meehan, 1993). ‘Permanent population’ being cited before 
‘defined territory’ implies that citizens define the state prior to territory and therefore have an 
ascendant legitimacy in its making. Tzvetan Todorov (2010: 82) specifies the straightforwardness of 
what citizenship or civic identity is with the fact that an individual is either a citizen of a country or 
is not, which does not apply to cultural traditions (nation) or spiritual values (religion). This objective 
clarity of the definition of citizenship can nevertheless be today blurred and romanticised through 
confusion with nationality, especially within states built as nation-states. Such amalgamation will 
now be scrutinized.  
 
1.3.3 – The (con)fusion between national identity and citizenship 
 The main (con)fusion in mainstream discourses on identity is the one between nationality and 
citizenship. Indeed, this (con)fusion will also be scrutinized in Chapter 2 where French identity will 
be critically assessed and deconstrued. This amalgamation is due to the interchangeability of the 
concepts of nation and state. While their common feature is territory, a nation is a moral entity –a 
‘psycho-cultural’ concept- and a state is a legal entity -a ‘politico-legal’ concept-. Both can exist 
without the other but when the two coincide they form a nation-state (Rejai and Enloe, 1969: 143). 
The concept of nation-state originates from Western Europe where ‘political programmes of 





contemporary and modern era (Preston, 1997: 33-34). The co-terminality between nationality and 
citizenship rose because of these intellectual elites which interpreted ‘nationality’ in the aim of 
constructing a state where the mass population had little influence but could identify themselves to 
common language, myths and symbols (Alfonsi, 1997: 61). In Chapter 2, I will examine how these 
commonalities were mainly imposed in the French case. This fusion between nation and state is thus 
undertaken in order to merge and homogenise the concepts of culture and state. Indeed, according to 
Etienne Balibar (1994), cultural identity is often mistaken for national identity, and it is particularly 
visible within the discourses of international institutions which define identity through nation and 
culture. As such, governmental institutions’ goals in doing so is the standardisation of their population 
to maintain and expand their control over it. However, some nations do not always seek the state they 
have been linked to and some nations may renounce to become states (Oomen, 1997: 16). It is, 
nonetheless, impossible to deny that the co-terminality between nationality and citizenship is 
nowadays a part of everyday life: co-terminality being used at the institutional, academic and societal 
levels (Oomen, 1997: 14). Indeed, the idea of one nation, one state -thus the fusion of nationality and 
citizenship- has become hegemonic. Oomen’s analysis of the actual reality of population’s -cultural- 
feelings of belonging within states permits to realise that the nation-state and thus the linguistic fusion 
of national identity and citizenship is a means to pursue the domination of certain -Western- elites 
and their colonialist, imperialist and capitalist projects. Indeed, very few states -if not none- can claim 
that they are composed of one nation. Since ‘a nation is a community in communication in its 
homeland’ (Oomen, 1997: 33), nationals of the ‘imagined communities’ that do not know and thus 
cannot communicate with their fellow members would therefore not even be able to agree on a 
legalisation of their nation as a state. Therefore, it is more accurate to use the qualification of one 
state, several identity groups -whether being nations, tribes, religions or collectivities. As Oomen 
(1997: 34) stated, ‘most states today are multi-national, poly-ethnic, or a combination of the two; 
these states are communities of citizens’. The issues that are at stake with the concepts of nation and 
states are the notions of identity and equality. Both are deemed as human needs and the generation of 





need, it can also be exclusive and generate inequality whereas ‘citizenship can essentially be 
inclusionary and equality oriented’ (Oomen, 1997: 35). When nation is being conflated with the 
concept of ethnie (fusing nationality and ethnicity), the notion of race subsumed to ethnicity (Oomen, 
1997: 13) thus enters the equation of identity and equality where race could be defined as nation. 
Oomen adds on the trickiness of the issue of reconciliating identity with equality:  
The pursuit of equality and identity co-exists and competes, and the real issue is how to reconcile the 
two. […] If nationality and ethnicity are essentially group identities, citizenship is an individual identity. 
But very often, group identities (race, caste, religion, language, region) are invoked as the basis for 
acquiring citizenship identity. Reconciling these competing perspectives -the individual and group bases 
of citizenship- poses a durable challenge in the contemporary world (Oomen, 1997: 35). 
 
Ethnicity or ethnic identity will now be examined. 
 
1.3.4 – Ethnic identity 
 A very brief paragraph will be devoted to the analysis of the ethnic identity stemming from 
the people group entity of ‘ethnie’. Indeed, in the case of France, national identity and citizenship are 
the two most referred mainstream representations of French identity. Ethnic identity and ethnicity are 
rarely mentioned since French laws forbid to classify publicly French people with an ethnicity. Only 
within the private realm of informal conversations that any ethnic belonging is referred to, for instance 
when the ‘origins’ of a French person is asked. Anthony Smith (1986) cited six characteristics of an 
ethnie: a collective name, a common myth of descent, a shared history, a distinctive shared culture, 
an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity. These features parallel the moral 
component of the definition of a nation (Oomen, 1997: 19-20). Oomen (1997: 20) also asserts that 
‘ethnie is a passive nation and nationality is active ethnicity’. This implies that, according to the 
concept of an ethnie, the grouping of people does not need an active agent for the individuals to feel 
part of such group. The ‘common myth of descent’ (emphasis is mine) and the ‘sense of solidarity’ 
are the variant aspects to the concept of nation. ‘Descent’ and ‘solidarity’ are indeed spiritual and 
moral attributes that lack in the definitions of national identity and citizenship. These missing features 
could well indeed be the ‘glue’ binding individuals beyond the sole physical and symbolical traits of 
national identity and citizenship. Alike nation, ethnicity is also a facet of cultural identity. When one 





Malagasy descent like myself), the intersection of cultural belonging and civic identity may unfold in 
various ways within the individual -especially when backed up by political and moral ideals 
(Todorov, 2010: 52-54). The emergence of hyphenated identities is an illustration of this. 
 
1.3.5 – Hyphenated identity  
‘Hyphenated identity’ is a term coined by Horace Kallen in his 1915 essay ‘Democracy 
Versus the Melting Pot’ (Forna, 2016) when he mentioned the term ‘hyphenated’ American. Hyphen 
is the link between two cultural identities: self-identified by or imposed on a subject. It can be used 
to refer to nationalities, citizenships or ethnicities identity categories. The hyphen can link two 
identities from a same category or from two categories. It can also be used in reference to a 
membership to a religious community or other cultural groupings. However, its use is nearly always 
used in relation to two belongings that are supposedly opposed and not compatible. Recalling Samuel 
Huntington 1993’s essay, hyphenated identity is applied with two civilizations that apparently clash. 
Ayse Caglar qualifies such usage as an assumption of conjunctions that are ‘potentially conflictual 
and problematic’ with a “dual cultural ‘membership’ […] source of dual ‘loyalties’”. Such 
hyphenation of various cultural memberships is based on ‘the most basic identities that people 
possess’ (Caglar, 1997: 175) that can range from ethnic identities, nationalities (whether confused 
with citizenship or not) or religious. Therefore, conflictual cultural belongings are illustrated by 
hyphenated identities such as French-Algerian/Franco-Malagasy (or any ex-French African colony), 
British-Pakistani (or any ex-British non-Caucasian colony), German-Turk, European-Muslim or 
Afro-American. These examples illustrate an underlying political domination affecting the social and 
economic wellbeing of the members of one culture over the other. Indeed, a Franco-British, a Franco-
German or a Franco-American may consider oneself hyphenated more for cultural than political 
reasons. Such underlying political domination of a Western cultural background over a non-Western 
one requires the hyphenated individual to employ ‘some specific forms of double-consciousness’ 
(Gilroy, 1993: 1) of one’s position according to the social context in which one is. Nevertheless, 





1997: 175). It reduces the individual to belonging to two cultures that that person may legally and 
visibly demonstrate. It does not take in account the variables that affect this person’s other cultural 
belongings, such as spending an extended amount of time in another cultural setting or following a 
religion that is not related -or that can supposedly also be conflictual- to the two hyphenated cultures. 
Thus, while aiming to reflect the constructive approach to identity, hyphenated identity, on the 
contrary, essentialises it to a certain extent. This essentialisation has, however, been used as a first 
step to support political purposes of ‘de-essentialising’ the very much essentialised concept of 
nationality -often confused with citizenship and ethnicity. It helped resisting a dominant group 
insisting on assimilation of a dominated group. It also allowed individuals to reject ‘the dichotomizing 
pressures of choosing between nationalities’ (Hamann and England, 2011: 208). People with self-
asserted hyphenated identity may therefore be governed by biculturalism, which would be illegitimate 
to assume when hyphenated identity is imposed. Biculturalism is ‘an understanding and competencies 
in two cultures’ (Vauclair and al., 2014 citing Nguyen and Benet-Martínez, 2007). It generally is 
illustrated by being fluent in two languages and being able ‘to behave appropriately in two different 
cultural settings’ which stem from the strong identification of the subject to both cultures’ values and 
beliefs (Vauclair and al., 2014). Therefore, a difference can be noticed between the behaviours of the 
subject according to the environment experienced. Differences per se do not have any positive or 
negative essence. They just are. It is the way they are perceived and acted upon by a human being, a 
group or an entity that can affect positively or negatively other human beings. When differences are 
emphasized, they are put under spotlights. This can have, as said, positive or negative results. Such 
emphasis on difference and its political impacts will be scrutinized in the next section to, then, stress 
the importance of going beyond it. 
 
1.4 – The emphasis on difference 
 The title of this section originates from Stephen Spencer when he asserted that: 
The movement towards more individualistic and fragmentary views of identity has 






‘Individualistic and fragmentary views of identity’ depict an approach void of peaceful values, 
therefore not fostering cultures of peace(s). The concepts of cultural difference and cultural diversity 
will be first examined before examining the political impacts of the emphasis on difference. Then, 
analysing the distinction of the prefixes of ‘multi’ and ‘inter’ taking a peace studies perspective will 
lead to explore alternative identities that go beyond the emphasis on difference. 
 
 1.4.1 – Cultural difference and cultural diversity 
 The distinction between the two concepts has been addressed by Homi K. Bhabha in his 1994 
book The Location of Culture: 
Cultural diversity is an epistemological object – culture as an object of empirical knowledge – whereas 
cultural difference is the process of enunciation of culture as ‘knowledgeable’, authoritative, adequate 
to the construction of systems of cultural identification. If cultural diversity is a category of comparative 
ethics, aesthetics or ethnology, cultural difference is a process of signification through which statements 
of culture or on culture differentiate, discriminate and authorize the production of fields of force, 
reference, applicability and capacity (Bhabha, 1994: 34). 
 
Here, it is observed that there is a substantial distinction on the approach of the variety of cultures. 
Diversity views culture as an object but difference views it as a process. Diversity regards culture as 
epistemological and empirical while difference regards it as enunciative. Diversity considers culture 
as a knowledge whereas difference considers it as knowledgeable. It is highly important to underline 
such interpretative distinction as the choice of words and language used constructs our understanding 
of the world. Cultural difference viewing culture as knowledgeable means that some cultures are thus, 
on the contrary, not knowledgeable and therefore less valuable. Eduardo Galeano’s poem Los Nadies 
(The Nobodies) reflects this differential and judgemental approach when qualifying The Nobodies 
(and by extension their culture) as those: 
[…] Who are not, even when they are. 
Who don’t speak languages, but rather dialects. 
Who don’t follow religions, but rather superstitions.   
Who don’t do art, but rather crafts. 
Who don’t practice culture, but rather folklore. […].21 
 
 
21 Original version is in Spanish. Available on: http://www.losnadies.com/poem.html 
[…] Que no son, aunque sean. 
Que no hablan idiomas, sino dialectos. 
Que no profesan religiones, sino supersticiones. 
Que no hacen arte, sino artesanía. 





This value judgement is not present in cultural diversity where cultures are only understood as 
knowledge. They are taken as they are. They are unprocessed. Therefore, there is no production of an 
‘enunciation of culture’ that can refer to a discourse on cultures. When such discourse becomes 
authoritative and dominant, it favours ‘cultural supremacy’ that is ‘produced only in the moment of 
differentiation’ (Bhabha, 1994: 34) and thus fuels the mainstream discourse on identity, based on 
cultural differences. As such, the mainstream discourse on cultural differences maintains the 
dichotomy and the hegemony between cultures: 
The enunciative process introduces a split in the performative present of cultural identification; a split 
between the traditional culturalist demand for a model, a tradition, a community, a stable system of 
reference, and the necessary negation of the certitude in the articulation of new cultural demands, 
meanings, strategies in the political present, as a practice of domination, or resistance. […] The 
enunciation of cultural difference problematizes the binary division of past and present, tradition and 
modernity, at the level of cultural representation and its authoritative address. (Bhabha, 1994: 35) 
 
Cultural diversity is thus preferable to encourage since it recognises ‘cultural contents and customs’ 
and foster ‘cultural exchange’ and the ‘culture of humanity’ (Bhabha, 1994: 34). Nevertheless, alike 
previously mentioned hyphenated identity, cultural differences may also, at times, be employed to 
support political purposes of resistance to a dominant order. The topic of culture in international 
relations theory may also be perceived as a challenge or hinderance to diplomacy between countries. 
In this sense, cultural difference may as well fuel the cliché illustrations and behaviours of countries’ 
representatives, thus, contributing to the mainstream discourse of the representation of such or such 
country. Michel Wieviorka considered cultural difference as an issue that had become prominent in 
many societies and that, in some cases, it even was ‘in a position to challenge world order, and the 
functioning of many countries, possibly even of many regional or local political systems’ (Wieviorka, 
2007: 33). Next will be examined some of the political impacts of the emphasis on difference on 
identity. 
 





It is known from the feminist argument that the personal is political22. Therefore, the personal 
matter of identity is political. Since it is also a social and cultural matter, ‘a work in progress, a 
negotiated space between ourselves and others’, it is thus ‘intensely’ political (Spencer, 2006: 26). 
Identity is political because it is a reflection of power relations and the emphasis on difference may 
enhance or weaken a status of domination. The section below discusses a selected number of political 
impacts of the emphasis on difference influencing the way people approach and conceive their 
identity. Given the postcolonial scope of the paper, the examples considered relates to impacts 
emanating from colonial and imperialist political assumptions. 
 
1.4.2.a – Political-cultural identity 
 Political-cultural identity is a conception of identity encountered in the work of Peter W. 
Preston which provides ‘a particular answer to the wider question of the relationship of individual 
and collectivity’: 
The idea of political-cultural identity expresses the relationship of individual selves to the community 
considered as an ordered body of persons. In schematic terms, we are looking at the way in which private 
identity is expressed within the public world, with thereafter a broad concern for how we acquire such 
an identity, how it changes and at what costs (Preston, 1997: 9). 
 
In this paper, this concept is employed to recall but not analyse the relationship the individual has 
with the community nor how does personal identity -though intrinsically linked to socio-cultural 
identity- manifest in the public and political sphere. The concept is, however, taken in account to 
emphasize the critical role politics play in the building of one’s identity, in regards of culture. Indeed, 
culture affects politics but also -if not mainly- politics affect culture. Politics impact how culture is 
lived and experienced whether in joy, sorrow or struggle. Therefore, politics of peace, cooperation 
and living together in relation to the topic of identity (and, also, in general) are more desirable in 
building cultures of peace(s). It is thus reminded through political-cultural identity that cultural 
identity is political and, to a further extent, that identity, in all its facets, is political. The next part will 
review three effects of the politicisation of identity. 
 







1.4.2.b – Identity politics, diaspora and fragmentation 
 First on the line to be examined is identity politics which is expressed as ‘an appreciation for 
politics as the art of living together’ (Phelan, 1989: 170 cited by Spencer, 2006). In less romanticised 
terms, identity politics is a term referring to a political approach emphasizing a prioritisation of 
concerns most relevant to one’s particular facet of identity: cultural, social, racial, ethnic, religious, 
sexual or other. Such prioritisation leads the subject to form political alliances with other subjects 
having the same priority concern. The promotion of their identity politics may in this sense sometimes 
discard the ‘bigger picture’. The interests of a larger community than theirs may be put on hold until 
this identity politics group’s demands are satisfied. To a certain extent, interests and consequently 
needs of humanity as a whole may be dismissed by identity politics. This paper joins Sidi Omar 
(2009) in acknowledging that identity politics embraces ‘an essentialist attitude in projecting and 
promoting the identities of its constituencies’ -reminding Spivak’s strategic essentialism. Indeed, 
even if identity politics is employed to support political purposes of resistance to a dominant order, 
as stated previously with hyphenated identity and cultural differences, asserting and demanding the 
recognition of the authenticity of an identity (Omar, 2009 citing Kruks, 2001: 85) is a case of an 
essentialist approach to identity. In this sense, by categorising human beings as subjects of one, two 
or more countries but in exclusion of the other ones, the world states system combined with 
international relations theory remains a mainstream approach to identity, despite being based on 
constructivist approach. 
 Second effect to be examined of the politicisation of identity is the concept of diaspora. 
Diaspora is defined as ‘a group of people who spread from one original country to other countries’ 
(Cambridge Dictionnary) or ‘people settled far from their ancestral homelands’ (Merriam-Webster). 
The politicisation within the diasporic identity lays in the reasons why diaspora people spread and 
settled far from their original homelands. Cohen’s five types of diaspora -victim, labour, trade, 
imperial and cultural diasporas (Cohen, 1997)- demonstrate that colonialist and capitalist aspects were 





favours a group of population over another. Therefore, the existence of a diaspora can be viewed, in 
a sense, as the healing of a wound that such population in its ancestral lands has suffered. The 
‘intentionality of identity’ of diaspora expressed by Lawrence Grossberg (1996: 92) shows that 
moving from an original land can be a political choice. Since, as he continues, ‘diaspora links identity 
to spatial location and identifications’, it is a field where supposedly conflictual cultural identities 
may meet and, perhaps, consequently disturb the political agendas of the political elites of the 
‘receiving’ countries. Spencer expresses it well: 
The ‘diaspora space’ is a critical concept created by the tensions of power between old and new 
identities, in which the parameters of inclusion, exclusion, otherness and belonging are challenged 
(Spencer, 2006: 191). 
 
The third and final effect of the politicisation of identity to be examined is fragmentation 
bringing forth the presence of multiple identities (Grossberg, 1996: 91). According to fragmentation 
theory, identities are composed of partial fragments of several identities of the individual or of the 
different social categories of which the individual belongs to, as well as the combination of the two 
(Grossberg, 1996: 91). This theory has been, however, thoroughly criticised. An example that has 
gone beyond the mere fragmentation of identities leading to the observation of multiple ones is the 
‘Third Space’ (Bhabha, 1994) where an energy field of forces permits various elements to come and 
transform together. These elements thus go beyond their mere ‘combination, accumulation or 
synthesis’ (Omar, 2009). Amin Maalouf (2003: 2) also negated the compartmentalisation of elements 
of identity and superposition or addition of diverse affiliations. However, an intersection between the 
elements can be observed. It is their hybridity in coming together that critically reassess 
fragmentation. While hybridity is an alternative identity that will be analysed below, the emergence 
of multiple identities due to fragmentation is the approach generally mentioned by mainstream 
discourses on identity. Next part will cover two political impacts of the emphasis on difference that 
may turn out in complicated or negative experiences for the subject. 
 





 Situational ethnicity is the conduct of choosing to embrace one’s identity in the way that it 
will not affect the wellbeing of oneself. It is principally linked to people who could identify 
themselves as hyphenated. Hamann and England gave it a clear description: 
[…] individuals can also choose to change identities (or at least to attempt such a change) to avoid the 
hazards, real or perceived, that come with not doing so. Making such situational identity shifts involves 
a kind of realpolitik orientation - in brief, "because I cannot change the inequality of statuses available 
to me, I will seek to be identified with the one that is least disadvantageous." The use of situational 
identity is an adaptation to the hierarchical political ecology of identities rather than a contestation of 
them (Hamann and England, 2011: 206). 
 
This situational identity allowing to embrace one’s ethnicity or other type of belonging may affect 
the subject in various ways. It is first an extra (demanding) effort to think, feel and act on the need of 
switching one’s behaviour according to the context in which one finds oneself. When acted upon, it 
can turn out positively in the fact that the individual may feel more at ease with the identity chosen 
to be embraced in any given environment. Nevertheless, it can also turn out negatively as it can lead 
to acculturation. Indeed, as Belangér and Verkuyten (2010: 143) expressed, ‘changes in self-
definition and identification are considered a salient aspect of the acculturation process’. 
Acculturation is the assimilation to a culture different than the one of the individual, culture that is 
generally dominant. Therefore, when one favours one facet of one’s identity according to one’s 
surroundings, one represses one’s whole identity. Such repression depicts a form of cultural violence, 
having its origins in the societal and institutional structures in which the individual is. ‘Intercultural 
positionality’ between the contact zones of one’s various cultural belongings (Gilroy, 1993: 6) can 
allow one to occupy the space between identities falsely painted as mutually exclusive, even if it is 
viewed as ‘a provocative and even oppositional act of political insubordination’ (Gilroy, 1993: 1). 
Nevertheless, when an individual stays for a long time in the same environment, it is hard to extricate 
oneself of the -long- homogenic and hegemonic process of assimilation that rejects the use of any 
multicultural or intercultural matters acknowledging diversity. 
 
1.4.3 – Prefixes ‘multi’ and ‘inter’ 
 This sub-section will briefly highlight the signification of the prefixes ‘multi’ and ‘inter’ from 





While the prefix ‘multi’ means ‘many’ or ‘several’, the prefix ‘inter’ can mean ‘between’ and ‘among’ 
but also ‘mutually’, ‘reciprocally’ or ‘together’. 
‘Multi’ is thus a prefix that discerns the variety of any matter, for instance as in a 
‘multidisciplinary field of study’ or a ‘multicultural country’. Here, the prefix only recognises the -
passive- presence of diverse aspects. Such recognition, however, depending on the way it is acted 
upon can connote a subjective signification which can result in either positive or negative but tangible 
effects affecting people. For example, a multicultural country bears several cultures. However, the 
way the government of such country handles how people from several cultures can live together 
defines the extent to which this government embraces more the cultural differences concept or the 
cultural diversity one. It is when multiculturalism is not handled well by a country’s government or 
by entities dealing with a multiculturality of individuals or groups, that I agree with Dutch 
conservative politician on the fact that multiculturalism usually ends up being a major theme of 
political disagreement (Baudet, 2015: 270). However, I believe it is possible to practice the alternative 
of interculturalism to go beyond such mere political disagreement. 
The prefix ‘inter’ goes beyond the state of acknowledgement of diversity by making the 
diverse entities interact between themselves. The -active- mutuality, reciprocity and togetherness 
embodied in this prefix connotes the will to ensure that all matters work out fine as an ensemble. 
‘Interdisciplinarity’ and ‘interculturality’ thus means that the several disciplines and cultures found 
in the ensemble interact among each other in order to build positive and tangible effects affecting 
people. For instance, the field of peace studies is based on interdisciplinarity and interculturality since 
there is no one discipline nor culture that has more legitimacy over the other to define what peace is 
(Martínez Guzmán, Comins Mingol and París Albert, 2009: 95).23 In this sense, Ramin Jahanbegloo 
(2007: 18) also stated that no one culture could neither explain the whole reality, since there is only 
a plurality of realities conditioned by particular interpretations within a given social and historical 
context. Thus, peace studies aim to transform the realities of conflicts through the interactions of 
 
23 My own translation. Original in Spanish: […] no hay una única disciplina ni una única cultura que tenga la 





cultures, disciplines and people in order to build cultures of peace(s). This ‘intercultural paradigm’ is 
a sine qua non condition (Jahanbegloo, 2007: 18) for a united humanity in diversity. 
When applied to culture, this linguistic analysis permits to realise the slight difference between 
multicultural/ism/ity and intercultural/ism/ity. While the former can emphasize the ‘tension between 
equality and difference’, the latter can foster ‘the reconciliation of the right to be different with the 
right to be equal’ (Caglar, 1997: 178). Besides, as interculturality may sometimes be deemed as a 
threat to national pursuits (Salo-Lee, 2003: 250), intercultural contact between diverse people may be 
weakened for national governments to keep a hold of its population. We are all multicultural and thus 
have multicultural -not multiple- identities. Going beyond such mere realisation –or as Gilroy (1993: 
7) stated: ‘Getting beyond these national and nationalistic perspectives’– to build cultures of peace(s) 
requires interactions between these multicultural subjects. Such interculturality can transform 
conflictual and violent societies into peaceful societies. It can also transform the individuals’ own 
assumed mainstream identities into alternative identities that goes beyond emphasising difference by 
celebrating it instead.24 
 
1.4.4 – ‘Going beyond’ the emphasis on difference: alternative identities 
 The action of ‘going beyond’ a given, assumed or mainstream identity implies a will to 
reconstruct such identity that was critically assessed and deconstructed beforehand. Indeed, from a 
peace studies perspective, it is essential to consider both the critical and the constructive perspectives 
since there is a possibility that it results in a reverse effect if only the former is taken into account. 
The constructive approach gives the incentive to go beyond and engage with what supposedly is from 
an external subject/entity point of view of a matter to, then, acknowledge and recognise what really 
is from the subject’s own experience of the matter. The process of ‘going beyond’ and engagement 
with mainstream discourses on identity will be examined through the concepts of ‘Third Space’, ‘in-
betweenness’, ‘suture’ and ‘intersection’ suggesting the existence of a specific field where identities 
are produced. Two alternative identities outcomes of such engagement will be then analysed: hybrid 
 
24 Celebration of differences and of ‘each person’s gift to humanity’ are part of the ‘formula for peace’ alongside 





identity and transcultural identity. This paper limits its analysis to these two alternatives since they 
are currently the most academically referred to, until perhaps other alternative cultural identities come 
to the fore. Finally, societal and institutional impacts of the existence of alternative identities will be 
briefly assessed, both in theory and on the ground. 
 
1.4.4.a – Specific fields: Third Space, suture, in-betweenness, intersection 
 The dichotomy of the discourses on identity between essentialism and constructivism at the 
basis of any conflictive identity situations mentioned above has been critically assessed by 
postcolonial thinkers. After the end of the colonial era and due to mass human migration movements 
and the explosion of technological advancements linked to globalisation, it has been suggested that 
identities would be generated not from the dichotomy but through other fields of creation. Homi K. 
Bhabha talks of such a ‘Third Space’ where the meaning of identity is produced through enunciation 
between the sender and receiver of the message: 
The pact of interpretation is never simply an act of communication between the I and the You designated 
in the statement. The production of meaning requires that these two places be mobilized in the passage 
through a Third Space, which represents both the general conditions of language and the specific 
implication of the utterance in a performative and institutional strategy of which it cannot ‘in itself’ be 
conscious (Bhabha, 1994: 36). 
 
The intervention of a Third Space of enunciation, which makes the structure of meaning and reference 
an ambivalent process, destroys this mirror of representation in which cultural knowledge is customarily 
revealed as an integrated, open, expanding code. […] It is that Third Space, though unrepresentable in 
itself, which constitutes the discursive conditions of enunciation that ensure that the meaning and 
symbols of culture have no primordial unity or fixity; that even the same signs can be appropriated, 
translated rehistoricised  and read anew (Bhabha, 1994: 37). 
 
‘Third Space’ is thus not only an alternative space (‘passage’) where identities are generated. It is 
also an alternative discourse (‘enunciation’) that allows a freed, ‘ambivalent’ -but also polyvalent-, 
‘open’, ‘expanding’ interpretation and constitution of identities where the cultures are not 
essentialised (‘no primordial unity or fixity’). Cultures and their meanings are in constant building 
and reconstruction (‘rehistoricised and read anew’) in such specific field where the subjects can unfurl 
their identities at peace. Bhabha’s specific field of ‘Third Space’ echoes a(n inner) peace space, where 
one’s identitarian belongings meet, dialogue, recognise and care for each other actively. ‘This is 





 The concept of ‘suture’ developed by Stuart Hall (1996) also refers to this specific field. He 
alludes identity to ‘the meeting point’ or ‘the point of suture’ of the dichotomy between discourses 
and processes to which the social and cultural subjects are and take part (Hall, 1996: 5-6). Identity is 
thus the result of discourses and processes which are sewed together. In medical terms, suture is the 
action of stitching together the edges of a wound. In this sense, identity is the result of the sewing or 
bridging of culture(s) that seemingly may not coincide or be in harmony in the way they are taught 
or practiced but may find edges to be brought together. Culture paralleled to a wound25 is a reflection 
out of the scope of this paper, but identity paralleled to the creation of bridges between cultures is a 
reflection that I have already initiated (Ranaivosoa, 2020). This suture or identity bridging diverse 
cultures together thus generates alternative identities within and by being such specific field of 
production of identities. This concept is however to be taken with care as suture, ‘identity’ or 
‘belongingness’ may stay in the theoretical field and not impact the reality of people: 
[…] even if the belongingness, the 'suturing into the story' through which identities arise is, partly, in 
the imaginary (as well as the symbolic) and therefore, always, partly constructed in fantasy, or at least 
within a fantasmatic field (Hall, 1996: 4). 
 
 ‘Third Space’ and suture are two concepts elaborated by two great thinkers in postcolonialism 
and cultural studies fields. They, however, represent a rather theoretical approach to the specific field 
of identity generation. With the notion of ‘in-between’, Homi Bhabha also conceived another 
representation of such specific field: 
This ‘part’ culture, this partial culture, is the contaminated yet connective tissue between culture – at 
once the impossibility of culture’s containedness and the boundary between. It is indeed something like 
culture’s ‘in-between’, bafflingly both alike and different (Bhabha, 1996: 54). 
 
By reformulating the ‘connective tissue between culture’ as the ‘idea of living between cultures’ 
(Marotta, 2011: 192), the concept of ‘in-between’ or ‘in-betweenness’ may be employed to 
linguistically make the specific field more tangible to popular wisdom. ‘Between’ is the adverb 
defined as the space separating two entities. Therefore, ‘in-betweenness’ is generally supposed to be 
happening with two cultures: the host society and the country of origin (Marotta, 2011: 193). Within 
a host society, such ‘in-betweenness’ can nevertheless be perceived negatively as even if migrants 
 





‘feel comfortable moving between cultures, their sense of difference is heightened in social situations 
in which they are in the minority’ (Marotta, 2011: 193). Thus, ‘in-betweenness’ embodies the feature 
of the specific field where alternative identities are generated. However, it seems to be limited to the 
‘movement’ of the subject going from culture to culture, hence reflecting in a way fragmentation and 
multiple identities. Indeed, to move from one culture to another may make oneself dizzy in switching 
instead of stitching cultures and, consequently, provoking internal violence and not inner peace. 
Indeed, ‘the inner war inside each individual […] is the seed from which all other conflicts grow’ 
(Chopra, 2005: 222). Nonetheless, ‘in-betweenness’ can turn out useful in slowly mainstreaming and 
making it easy for the general population to understand the concept of the specific field of alternative 
identity generation: 
This movement between here and there illustrates that […] cultural identity is not confined to a specific 
place or time. The in-betweenness of […] identity makes home a transnational experience (Marotta, 
2011: 194). 
 
 Perhaps the specific field that may be more easily popularised is intersection, reminding the 
theoretical framework of intersectionality. Here, ‘intersection’ implies ‘intersection of discourses’ 
where an ‘empty’ and ‘vacant’ space is created to host and be filled with a ‘multiplicity of contents’ 
as Balibar expressed (1994: 57). Nevertheless, the intersection space differs from the ‘Third Space’. 
Indeed, intersection is blank, clear and void, waiting for content to be placed into it while the ‘Third 
Space’ is a process where the content is performatively uttered. Intersection is passive while the 
‘Third Space’ is active. 
Thus, while the differences between the conceptual depth of these four specific fields may 
seem minor, the alternative identities generated within them are important to know and understand to 
analyse the extent to which they reassess mainstream discourses on identity. 
 
1.4.4.b – Hybrid identity 
 In biology, hybrid is the noun of the offspring coming from the mix of two species. As an 
adjective, hybrid is defined as of mixed character and coming from different elements. The biological 
perspective calls to mind the essentialist one where confronting two aspects which merged in one 





-or not- to the context. Here, the term will be approached from postcolonialism, as an adjective 
completing the noun ‘identity’ and highlighting the mix character of cultures within it. This paper 
will also align its understanding of hybrid identity to French philosopher Bernard Andrieu’s one. 
Before addressing the postcolonial perspective, the examination of hybrid identity from a sociological 
approach is interesting to take into account, in particular the work of Anthony Giddens and Vince 
Marotta: 
Local traditions are joined to a host of additional cultural forms from abroad presenting people with a 
bewildering array of lifestyle options from which to choose […] established identities and ways of life 
grounded in local communities and cultures are giving way to new forms of 'hybrid identity' (Giddens, 
2001: 64). 
 
These new hybrid identities are not fixed, but fluid, and they are strategically used to negotiate life in 
global and multicultural societies. Over the last two decades, scholars in cultural and ethnic studies have 
used the term 'hybridity' to explain and interpret the experiences of those who live across two or more 
cultures (Marotta, 2011: 190). 
 
Hybridity assumes a free-floating actor who voluntarily chooses between identities and positions; being 
and representing her or himself as hybrid, as the 'remix generation' is doing, is seen as one choice among 
many (Marotta, 2011: 196-197). 
 
The nexus between agency and hybridity is analysed in these above paragraphs. Indeed, the subject 
has various options to voluntarily choose from in a strategic way to negotiate his-her-their identities 
and positions as hybrid. Agency is ‘the ability of people individually and collectively, to influence 
their own lives and, the society in which they live’ (Marotta, 2011: 197). The agency and choice 
factors of the individual in defining oneself as hybrid is eminent in these sociological approaches to 
hybrid identity. I argue that such denominator is neither fully right nor fully wrong. It depends on the 
goal and/or the situation intended for a hybrid identity to flourish. Indeed, embracing hybrid identity 
as a choice is a means of resistance against mainstream discourses on identity. The concept of ‘hybrid’ 
may thus parallel the concept of ‘queer’ or ‘no label’ within gender studies. Besides, hybridity is one 
of the key elements of postcolonial studies where identity is defined as fluid, free from being rooted 
in any given cultures (Spencer, 2006: 191-192), such fluidity taking place in the ‘Third Space’. Sidi 
Omar’s take on hybridity from a postcolonial perspective asserts the need of ‘going beyond’ the 
emphasis on differences of mainstream discourses as it 
contribute[s] pedagogically and critically to constructing new forms of belonging and identification that 






Going beyond hegemonic discourses means that it must be understood and embraced by individuals 
the fact that subjectivities (in thoughts or experiences) are not ‘ontologically essential’ but ‘mere 
social constructions’ purposely (my addition and emphasis) labelled as innate and natural (Omar, 
2009). Indeed, hybridity is the result of ‘profound changes that have taken place as a consequence of 
cross-cultural interaction, colonialism, globalisation and growing migration’ (Omar, 2009), changes 
that have affected some populations and thus individuals more negatively than others. Therefore, this 
construct and theorisation of hybrid identity and all terms that represent this free mixing of cultures 
within one human beings -syncretism, creolisation, métissage, mestizaje (Gilroy, 1993: 2; Omar, 
2009)- is one of the many ways to free oneself of the constraining demand of fitting into a box and, 
consequently, resisting to hegemonic classifications. As Caglar (1997: 172) expressed it, hybrid 
identity is one of the ‘revolutionary antidotes to essentialist constructs of culture, identity and 
ethnicity’. Hybridity interpreted as an ‘analytical tool and a critical approach’ as well as ‘an 
educational strategy that seeks to interrogate and overcome essentialist discourses on identity and 
culture’ (Omar, 2009) are also other elements that sustains the agency factor present in having -and 
choosing- a hybrid identity. 
When hybrid identity is not the result of a choice but of a state resulting from the free and 
flowing being and mixing of people and cultures, it illustrates what any human being is, even if one 
does not reclaim nor realises it. When one’s identity is reclaimed and chosen by the person, it is then 
fine to leave them be identified as such. It is fine as well to propose the possibility of being identified 
as having a hybrid identity and let the dialogue be open, discarding the result-oriented process of 
negotiation. This such free, flowing and malleable approach to hybrid identity reminds Bernard 
Andrieu’s perspective on hybridity as the ‘uncertainty in being’ where identity is ‘provisional’, and 
the norm is ‘culturally unstable’ (Andrieu, 2011: 22). To accept and be comfortable with uncertainty 
and nonattachment26 thus characterise hybrid identity. By being fluid but also sometimes ‘troubled’ 
(Andrieu, 2011: 24), -hybrid- identity may be compared to water. It is vital. Hybridity allows to 
embrace the changes according to context and the pressures that are being experienced without having 
 
26 Spiritual state defined as ‘a state of freedom that preserves and even increases your love for another’ (Chopra, 1997: 





to feel any violence and naturally, such as when liquid water transform in gas at over 100 degrees 
Celsius or in ice at under 0 degree Celsius. The water metaphor illustrates such easiness of adaptation 
to changes.27 This metaphoric approach of identity as water reminds Paul Gilroy’s ‘Black Atlantic’ 
(1993). The ‘Black Atlantic’ being the ocean of identities where ships can be equated to individuals. 
These individuals are the mobile elements navigating in such shifting watery space, connecting and 
intersecting the fixed places of identities (de Certeau, 1984: 117; Gilroy, 1993: 16-17). This watery 
space is the specific hybrid space where one’s identity can surf, travel and change directions according 
to the experiences one goes through.  Nevertheless, as Andrieu stated, hybridity is a ‘utopic’ concept 
to be accepted as social norm (Andrieu, 2011: 27). In any case, hybridity is not seeking to be 
normalised but seeks to reinvent normality in its everyday constructive process (Andrieu, 2011: 31).  
As mentioned, hybrid is an umbrella term like queer. However, cultural origins of a subject 
may be more visibly and in practice salient than gender and sexual expressions. The transition towards 
global acceptance is far from achieved from both alternative concepts. In regards of identity 
approaches, perhaps the concept of transcultural identity can be the first step to help recognise the 
validity of alternative identities as well as their mainstreaming in popular wisdom. 
 
1.4.4.c – Transcultural identity 
Before delving into what transcultural identity refers to, the linguistic meaning of the prefix 
‘trans’ will be highlighted to, then, interpret and analyse the discourse on transcultural identity. 
‘Trans’ comes from Latin and signify ‘across’, ‘beyond’ or ‘through’. The prefix ‘trans’ thus 
also embodies an alternative to the prefix ‘multi’ as it does not equal to only the sum of the ‘multi’ 
parts. The ‘transdisciplinarity of peace studies’ is an example of such feature (Galtung, 2010: 24). 
Transcultural identity thus linguistically fits as an alternative identity that goes beyond the 
emphasis on difference as one’s identity is seen through the crossing and intersection of diverse 
cultures. Transnational (identity) may at times be used as a synonym of transcultural (identity). 
 
27 This easy adaptation to changes is also epitomised in a famous quote by Bruce Lee: ‘You must be shapeless, formless, 
like water. When you pour water in a cup, it becomes the cup. When you pour water in a bottle, it becomes the bottle. 





However, this paper is not using the transnational wording as it inevitably connects it to nations and 
states. It thus can engender a generalisation due to the discourses on national identity and citizenship, 
hence minimising the role of culture (thus language and customs) in shaping one’s behaviour. The 
analysis of transcultural identity will be undertaken from Vauclair and al. (2004) work on 
transculturalism, which is exemplified by ‘individuals with multicultural experiences’. Such 
occurrence takes place due to the increase in intercultural contacts linked to globalisation and human 
migration and generally within culturally diverse Western societies. Vauclair and al. (2004) define 
transculturalism as ‘the notion that people can develop an understanding of culture that transcends or 
goes beyond specific cultures by combining elements of more than one culture’. Indeed, intercultural 
contacts take place in that (‘Third’ or specific) space where individuals from diverse cultures meet. 
These people are being transformed in such space. Their understanding of cultures, identity and, to a 
larger extent, meanings in life are being challenged in this fluid and malleable energy field where 
various cultural elements encounter. These understandings continue to be put in question while the 
individuals multiply intercultural contacts and keep being internally challenged. When these 
individuals realise such occurrence, they evolve in the understanding of themselves and on the fact 
that their cultural identity is and will remain in a perpetual change throughout their life. Indeed, it is 
more a personal aspect of identity that is stressed in transculturalism and not a social one: 
In terms of identity, transculturalism results not so much in a social, but a personal identity based on the 
multiple intercultural contact experiences that can have a long-lasting effect on a persons’ values and 
worldview (Vauclair and al., 2004). 
 
In this sense, focusing on the personal development of identity of each individual may be a first step 
in transitioning to a more popularised understanding of alternative identities: 
In sum, it is rather a personal than a social identity because multiple cultural experiences result in a self-
definition in terms of personal beliefs, norms and values rather than in identification with a particular 
group (e.g., in terms of nationality) that indicates group belongingness and differentiation from 
dissimilar others […] (Vauclair and al., 2014). 
 
Indeed, with hybrid identity being closely linked to postcolonialism, it may repel fierce, explicit or 
implicit hegemonic and colonial discourses on identity professed by individuals that may or may not 





identity are, however, theoretical concepts with which subjects can identify themselves. The next part 
will assess to which extent this theories impact people’s reality. 
 
1.4.4.d – Impacts of ‘going beyond’: reality of alternative identities 
 Claiming to be or have an alternative means not fitting in the box or not following the general 
rules. At times, the minority of people claiming so have been labelled as anarchist, communist, 
witches, wanting to ‘divide and conquer’ or even mentally ill. For such claim, some of these 
minorities have been cut off society or persecuted. Hybrid and transcultural identities are alternatives 
to mainstream discourses on identity. They generally do not fit in institutional and societal rhetoric 
on the matter, due to the prevalence of national identity, citizenship and ethnic identifications relying 
on essentialist features. Institutionally, national identity is a means to undo hybridity (Andrieu, 2011: 
193). Therefore, as long as national identity and citizenship (and ethnic belongings in some countries) 
will remain mainstream ways of identifying oneself, alternative identities will persist in the 
background of the identification process when not given legal acknowledgement. Indeed, hybrid or 
transcultural identities are not accepted institutionally but they are also rarely recognised nor 
understood by society, whether asserting a hegemonic discourse or ethnic and communitarian 
separatism (Spencer, 2006: 192). Alternative identities are considered threats to essentialist 
discourses, whether mainstream or not. However, some critiques on hybridity have asserted that it 
supported an essentialist thinking since it ‘implicitly legitimates race thinking’ (Spencer, 2006: 193-
194 citing Young, 1995) or “encourages the view ‘that all group-based identities are essentialist’” 
(Spencer, 2006: 193-194 citing May, 2004: 133). To my view, it is understandable to base the 
approach of hybrid from essentialist features since it has to start from somewhere to construct the 
hybrid identity. As the goal is to ‘go beyond’ essentialism and the cultural difference approach, it is 
that aim towards which hybrid identity -and alternative identities in general- tends to that values said 
identity. Chapter three will explore to which extent such goal is analogous to the building of cultures 
of peace(s). Thus, the real and tangible positive impact of alternative identities is still to be observed 





the subject to blossom, especially when encountering other subjects alike in an open-minded and 
open-hearted society. On the contrary, realising such internal changes may challenge the subject when 
confronted to an external unsupportive environment, whether it be family, community, society or 
country. While it may be personally -though not socially yet- fulfilling and interesting to reflect 
theoretically on the process of alternative, hybrid and transcultural identity construction, it must not 
be sat back on these advancements (Spencer, 2006: 194). Indeed, theory must be followed by practice 
with, then, practice re-nurturing theory and continuing indefinitely this cycle. However, perhaps the 
finding that theorists on alternative identities could always rest on to argue their point is that hybridity 
is a fact and not just an intellectual construct as it addresses the reality of human beings being 
inextricably intertwined (Spencer, 2006: 194 citing Back, 2000: 450). Besides, the world in which 
we are living is a social environment of hybridisation and cultural mix with a constant transformation 
of identities (Jahanbegloo, 2007: 30). 
 
1.5 – Conclusion 
 The development of this thesis’ first chapter on ‘Identities’ provided answers to the sub-
research questions that seek to know what identity is, what it is composed of and the implications of 
the various discourses tied to it. This chapter permitted to, first, demonstrate that identity is a human 
need. It is thus mandatory to have it fulfilled for human beings to feel at peace with themselves and 
the environment that surrounds them in order for them to generate cultures of peace(s). This feature 
of identity is crucial to address and emphasize. Indeed, the search for identity, what one is capable of 
doing for it and keeping it is the foundation and underlying reason of many wars, novels and movies 
plots. Therefore, the neglect of the fulfilment of this human need can foster violence. 
The chapter then developed identity as a process: the identification process activated by the 
agency of the subject. The composition of this process regarding cultural identity at the macro-level 
encompasses the intersectionality of various identification categories. Five are examined: gender, 
culture, society, politics and language. All categories intersect and interconnect. Such movements 





discourses shape it. When it is shaped by essentialist views, identity is claimed as stable. However, 
when a constructivist approach shapes identity, it is formed with the interactions of the above-
mentioned categories and formatted to change. By ‘going beyond’ the mere interaction within a set -
Western- context, postcolonialism discourse acknowledges the diversity and relativity of experiences 
impacting how one identifies. Indeed, the essentialist mainstream discourse on identity leads to 
mainstream types of identities with which subjects may not actually identify with. The neglect of such 
identity need for some subjects generates tension and resistance in the societal field. The claim for 
recognition of the diverse experiences impacting identity generates alternative types of identity based 
on the alternative discourses which foster cultures of peace(s). The following table summarises the 
findings of this chapter. Other alternative discourses, geometrical dimensions and energy have been 
purposely included in this table for further reflection. Indeed, the identity space is infinite and the 
identification process is ongoing in an individual’s existence as Bhabha observed the ‘dimension of 
depth that provides the language of Identity’ emerging from an acknowledgement of one’s 
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What are the impacts of 
discourses on identity?
Internal identity conflicts due to external environment pressure
Political movements of resistence and revendication
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The next chapter will examine Identities in the French context, scrutinizing the discourses on 






























CHAPTER 2: FRENCH IDENTITY 
 
 
2. Modernity and ‘the Other’ (Maalouf, 2003) 
2. There is an origin of suffering (Nhat Hanh, 2003: 87) 
 
2.1 – Introduction 
The concept of identity has been explored and examined thoroughly in the last chapter with 
the aim to understand its formation, composition, the various discourses related to it and their impacts 
in society. The aim of this chapter is to focus on the formation, composition and discourses on identity 
in relation to the French context. As such, an analysis of French identity through the perspective of 
peace studies will be undertaken. Such approach is indeed pertinent since the matter of French identity 
-and even rather French national identity- has been dealt with previously by French academics but 
mainly in the areas of history (by Gérard Noiriel and Jean-François Berdah), anthropology (by 
Christian Bromberger), sociology (by Dominique Schnapper, Michèle Lamont and Pierre Birnbaum), 
politics (by Michel Giraud and Patrick Weil28) and philosophy (by Étienne Balibar and Michel 
Onfray29). It is however important to highlight that these mentioned academics all come from a 
Western and Caucasian cultural background. In this chapter my aim is to bring new reflections on the 
discourses on French identity from a peace studies approach, with an eye to laying theoretical basis 
to consider the construction of French identity towards cultures of peace(s). First, a section of this 
chapter (2.2) will explore the origins of the mainstream discourse on French identity. It will review 
the historical origins of the current mainstream approach of French identity then examine the various 
aspects that unification and universalism features bring to it. The current mainstream discourse on 
French identity is based on a construction dating back to the eighteenth century. Nevertheless, it also 
mainly stems from events from the twentieth century. Key dates and discourses expressed in this 
 
28 He is a French historian and political scientist, author of the book ‘Être français : Les quatre piliers de la nationalité’ 
(Being French: The Four Pillars of Nationality). I am not using this book as a source to my work as I did not have a chance 
to have access to it. 
29 He participated to a debate on national identity on French TV (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s-





latter century will be chronologically scrutinized. This section (2.2) will, in a sense, reply to 
Bromberger (1993) when he wondered if there was a ‘specifically French way of posing the problem 
of identities, whether territorial, social or ethnic’.30 Another section of this chapter (2.3) will assess 
the implications of this mainstream discourse. The paradox observed in respect of French identity 
will be critically analysed on its theoretical grounds and the visible impacts it causes. Scrutiny of 
what Frenchness means will demonstrate to what extent it is linked to the neglect of a postcolonial 
approach in the construction of French identity. This section will, in a sense, reply to Bromberger 
(1993) when he wondered how to finally ‘give an account of the paradox that characterizes the 
contemporary French situation’31 in regards to French identity. Finally, another section will look at 
the alternative discourses on French identity (2.4) by academics, French institutions and society. It 
will then explore the concept of a hybrid French identity. 
The goal of this chapter is thus to briefly recount the historical, cultural and social construction 
of French identity to, then, critically assess the impacts of characteristics emanating from a past 
context when applied to the present globalized French context. These impacts will be approached 
from a peace studies perspective throughout the chapter to assess if they display features of a culture 
of war or cultures of peace(s). By extension, it will be assessed whether French identity stems from 
and promotes cultural violence or cultural peace. Therefore, this chapter allows to answer the sub 
research questions of our research problem: 
- What are the discourses on French identity and their impacts in (French) society? 
- In what ways discourses on French identity reflect a culture of war or cultures of peace(s)? 
 
2.2 – Origins of the mainstream discourse on French identity 
2.2.1 – Historical origins: the Jacobins 
 
30 The question in his article is ‘Has there been a specifically French way of posing the problem of identities, whether 
territorial, social or ethnic?’. My own translation. Original in French: Y a-t-il eu une manière proprement française de 
poser le problème des identités, qu’elles soient territoriales, sociales ou ethniques ? 
31 The phrase in his article is ‘Finally, how can we account for the paradox that characterizes the contemporary French 
situation’. My own translation. Original in French : ‘Comment rendre compte enfin du paradoxe qui caractérise la 





Going back in history to try to find out the origins of the mainstream discourse on French 
identity will not constrain this research to go back in Antiquity times where Gaul was ruled by the 
Roman, nor the following period when Charlemagne (Charles The Great) was ruling the Franks, 
neither the Medieval Ages or the Renaissance. At the earliest, the mainstream discourse on French 
identity may be related to the ideas that arose during the Age of Enlightenment, from 1715 to 1789. 
This latter year witnessed the period of social and political upheavals in France leading to the French 
Revolution from which the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen was born. Indeed, the 
current mainstream discourse on French identity is based on the ideas purported by the political group 
of the Jacobins during the French Revolution which promoted the Jacobinism ideology. The historical 
analysis undertaken here will thus begin from the end of the eighteenth century. Before delving into 
the analysis, it is interesting to reflect on Christian Bromberger’s assertion in 1993 that historical 
concept is not in favour of the acknowledgement of identities. This would imply that the social 
sciences field of history and their specialists exclude the concept of identity. However, the peace 
studies and philosophy for peace approach of Martínez Guzmán (2001: 113) acknowledges human 
beings’ competencies to pursue war, violence and exclusion but also how to make peaces. Therefore, 
the study of history is of value in building cultures of peace(s). In this sub-section, a brief review of 
the links between the French revolutionary period, Jacobinism ideology and the current mainstream 
discourse on French identity will be undertaken. The mainstream discourse will also be critically 
assessed in regard of a peace studies approach.  
Before 1789, the Ancien Régime was the political and social system that was in order in the 
Kingdom of France since the late fifteenth century. There was no national identity nor citizenship 
during this period, but every individual was a subject of the king of France. The individuals’ rights 
and status stemmed from the clergy, the nobility and the Third Estate. The French Revolution was 
stimulated by a vehement movement against the connection between the Catholic Church and the 
Ancien Régime. A philosophical vision stemming from the French Enlightenment theorists that also 
prompted the French Revolution was the will to live together (Jeannot, Tomc and Totozani, 2013: 66 





movement of the French people as a French nation. The Jacobins was a political movement that 
became very influential during the French Revolution. It was founded by anti-royalist individuals and 
then it expanded as a national republican movement. The fact that its functioning period covered the 
Reign of Terror may also be a hint to understand the extent to which such movement was based on a 
culture of war and cultural violence. Jacobinism ideology imposed the ‘rule of central government on 
political constituencies and peripheral groups’ (Wieviorka, 2007: 33). Modern France has been 
constructed and based on this ideology which fought against local particularisms that established the 
idea of nation in other places in Europe. Therefore, ‘state supremacy’ and the ‘abstract equality’ of 
individuals was promoted by such political vision, rejecting the ‘community roots’ of the subjects by 
the same token (Bromberger, 1993). Nevertheless, here, the imposition of an ideology which only set 
up an abstract concept (equality -that thus may not be applied nor observed in reality in the 
individuals’ daily life) and also favoured the rejection of a part of identity of the subjects illustrate 
the neglect of alternative ways of thinking or identification. The expression of these alternative and 
different life aspects was confined to the private sphere (Bromberger, 1993). People expressing their 
different aspects were even persecuted when denounced or outed in public during the period of the 
Terror where anyone not loyal to the revolution and Jacobinism was arrested and executed. A first 
step to erase diversity among French people was to homogenise the communicative ways, by turning 
the nation monolingual. This desire to standardise the French language was not a stand-alone feature 
of Jacobinism. The unification of language, culture and France as a nation was part of the wider goal 
to unify France under a Republic that would treat equally its citizens and enable them to enjoy more 
freedom. Having common features such as language, culture or feeling as one in the nation of France 
would, supposedly, foster fraternity between the French subjects. These three elements are examined 
in the next sub-section. 
 
2.2.2 – Unification: language, culture, nation 
 The unification of France through language, culture and as a nation was an objective of the 





customs and their own rules’ and, therefore, their own language (Wihtol de Wenden, 2007: 48). 
French language was promoted as the representative of the Republic, the new political and social 
system put in place by the proponents of the Revolution: 
The French language […] was intrinsic in defining the republic during the French Revolution. In 
particular, language functions as a strong symbol of national identity because it was viewed as a means 
of unifying the French people at a time when the nation and nationalism were being defined (Cohen, 
2012). 
 
There is indeed a link between French language and national identity within the historical 
emergence of the idea of a French nation. Since it is through common shared characteristics 
individuals are meant to identify as members of one community, here French language is 
distinguished to be the ‘vehicular language’ of the French nation (Jeannot, Tomc and Totozani, 2013: 
65). French language was used as ‘the central instrument in evoking a unified citizenry to build a new 
national identity for the republic’. French was the only official language in the centralised Republic. 
Therefore, any provincial languages were forbidden to not foster internal incongruences or 
distractions to the objective of building a unified nation (Cohen 2012). Such repressive and 
suppressive measure of this period, however, amounts to a form of cultural violence when considering 
nowadays’ peace studies perspective. As of today, even if the French current Constitution from 1958 
in its article 75-1 (Conseil Constitutionnel, 2009) recognises regional languages as France’s heritage, 
there are remnants of this invisible cultural but also structural violence. Indeed, regional languages 
are only promoted by the state and the regions to a certain extent. Unlike in Spain32, they are not used 
in the daily lives of citizens and mainly serve as touristic attractions. There are no issues per se with 
the state of regional languages in France, but it is interesting to wonder the reasons why of their legal 
status, especially in relation to cultures of peace(s). 
Besides the homogenisation of the language in France, culture was also to be unified to become 
one French culture. Regional cultures present before the Revolution such as the Bretons, the Normans, 
the Alsatians, the Corsicans, the Occitans or the French Basques -to only name a few- were to be 
relayed to the background, while ‘French culture’ placed in the foreground. This construction of 
French culture was, sadly, carried out violently: 
 





The existing “hexagon” was the result of a long series of wars and conquests involving the triumph of 
French language and culture over what once were autonomous and culturally distinctive communities. 
The assimilation of Gascons, Savoyards, Occitans, Basques, and others helped to sustain the myth that 
French overseas expansionism in the nineteenth century, especially to North and West Africa, was a 
continuation of the same assimilationist project (Fredrickson, 2003). 
 
Thus, although widely known as stemming from the colonial era of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, the ‘assimilationist project’ may have actually started within France itself during the 
Revolution with the intent to build a homogenous French culture. It may not be acknowledged as 
such but assimilationist policies towards French regional cultures were adopted by the French 
Republic during the Revolution. Fresh French ideas, culture and administration were therefore first 
enacted on the national territory before aiming to export them abroad, first in Europe then in colonial 
territories (Kumar, 2006: 422). 
In this way, the building of the French nation is the result of two unifications (language and 
culture), delimited on a given territory (France) and covered by an imposed ideology (Jacobinism and 
its centralised strong and powerful republican state). It is interesting to also mention the 1882 lecture 
of Ernest Renan, ‘Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?’ (What is a nation?), to examine the components of the 
building of a nation and here particularly of the French nation. The analysis Krishan Kumar does of 
Renan’s lecture highlights the prominence of war in building the nation: ‘But it is not just triumphs 
and glory but also, and perhaps more so, defeats and trials that make the nation’ (Kumar, 2006: 415). 
In this sense, Renan (1882) wrote: 
One loves in proportion to the sacrifices that one has committed and the troubles that one has suffered. 
 
“Suffered together”, I said, for shared suffering unites more than does joy. In fact, periods of mourning 
are worth more to national memory than triumphs because they impose duties and require a common 
effort. 
 
The influence of war and suffering in the building and unification of the French nation is thus an 
aspect that points out the violent basis on which the French nation and, consequently, French national 
identity are established. This French belligerent element rose first within its own territory to then help 
build ‘French national consciousness’ through neighbouring countries such as Spain or Germany 
(Kumar, 2006: 416). 
Finally, the colonial period continued this ‘tradition’ which still impacts the current mainstream 





alternative ways to unify other than war and mourning, but rather unify in diversity (and not 
differences) through peaceful interactions, dialogue and joy. As mentioned by Renan in 1882, 
approaching the concept of nation -and consequently national identity- as ‘a soul’ or ‘a spiritual 
principle’ is perhaps an aspect to reconsider from a non-Western approach to work towards cultures 
of peace(s). Nevertheless, in his same lecture, he also declares that: 
The modern nation is therefore the historical result of a number of facts that have converged in the same 
direction. Sometimes unity has been achieved by a dynasty as was the case in France (Renan, 1882). 
 
The Jacobins ‘dynasty’ has indeed left the republican ideology to the current French state with its 
core concept of universalism, which will be examined in the next sub-section. 
 
2.2.3 – Universalism: the republican ideology  
 After having focused on the original ideology (Jacobinism) that generated the unification of 
the French nation through a common language and a common culture, I will now examine the French 
republican ideology that stems from Jacobinism. The concept of ‘universalism’ which is a flagship 
of the French Republic will also be deciphered as the ‘descendant’ of the unification process. 
 A first characteristic to note regarding the concept of Republic in France is that by unifying 
language and culture to build a nation under the legal framework of a Republic, the Jacobins wanted 
to build a French nation-state. The co-terminality between nation and state is built by interpreting 
nationality in a broad sense where ‘those who resided within the territory of the state and accepted 
integration into the cultural community of France, for instance by adopting the French language, were 
given French citizenship’ (Alfonsi, 1997: 63). As such, the connection between republicanism 
(citizenship) and nationalism (national identity) was built socio-psychologically but not conceptually 
(Alfonsi, 1997: 70). The objective of the Jacobins was to fuse in the minds of Frenchmen and 
Frenwomen the concept of being French as having the same roots, language and culture. This would 
‘naturally’ be translated in the acceptation of the republican ideology of state supremacy and 
universalism. This was strengthened throughout the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries: 
The French Revolution, the First and Second Empires, and the Third Republic went on reinforcing a 
unified state and republican ideology tried to impose the political myth of the citizen, defined by his/her 
political contract with the nation state, free and equal with regard to their rights, independent of any 






The French citizen is therefore the basis of the French republican ideology. It is still reflected today 
in the second article of the current French Constitution of the fifth Republic where the principle of 
the Republic is ‘government of the people, by the people and for the people’ (Conseil Constitutionnel, 
2009). It is a ‘contractual conception’ and not ethnic or cultural conception of the nation (Bromberger, 
1993) that highlights the specificity of the French Republic. The citizens are the ‘logs’ that are needed 
to maintain the Republic -the ‘fire’ in the chimney- alive. However, as explained above, citizens had 
to be formatted via the common moulds of language and culture to fuel the republican ‘political 
common project’ (Schnapper, 1991 cited by Bromberger, 1993). This original policy was developed 
by the intelligentsia of the Jacobins, who disregarded regional characteristics and the richness of 
diversity findable in France, to conduct an integration process towards the ‘fabrication of French 
people’ as united citizens supportive of a ‘common republican project’ (Bromberger, 1993). A 
common political project must be accepted by the totality of the population to be called common. 
When it is imposed, even in the aim of a common or universal good, it cannot be deemed peaceful or 
based on cultures of peace(s). At its outset, the republican ideology promoted equality amongst its 
citizens although such equality applied only to a certain type of people at the time (such analysis is 
out of the scope of this paper). 
Uniformizing linguistic, cultural, social and political systems was the way to achieve such goal. 
Then, other values became also advocated: 
The ideology of the Third Republic went on to popularise the civic value of freedom, equality, fraternity 
and justice, thanks to educational reform […] and to military service (compulsory for all in 1907), an 
enterprise of national amalgamation blurring internal borders and the differences developed (Wihtol de 
Wenden, 2007: 50). 
 
With military service being compulsory, war has effectively been a dominant feature of the republican 
ideology of building a French nation-state. However, the most effective way to reach uniformity was 
through the implementation of a compulsory, free, public, secular (laïc) and culturally neutral school 
system that provided universal language and culture. The universal school institution was also a 
proponent of a meritocratic ideology (Wihtol de Wenden, 2007: 51), that supposedly allowed all 
French citizens to have a chance to climb up the social and/or political ladder if it was their personal 





equality, neutrality, compulsory requirement and gratuity of its social features and public sphere. As 
a result, it consigned any type of differences to the private domain. A culture-blind, creed-blind and 
‘colour-blind basis’ was hence operated in the Republic (Silverman, 2007: 65). This colour-blindness 
and universality of features continued to be the foundation of the Republic beyond the Third Republic 
until the present days. During the colonial times, it also ‘served as the basic template for moulding 
the French citizen model at home and in the colonies’ (Kumar, 2006: 422). Here, a change of 
geographical context of the application of French republican values must be thoroughly scrutinized 
as it reinforced the ‘visibility’ of a double standard of the actual implementation of these values (see 
next section). This impacted and still affects the actual acknowledgement of a French identity, 
whether as a citizen, a national or both. There was indeed already a twofold application of the rights 
and duties of citizenship within metropolitan France before colonisation by excluding women from 
enjoying some rights that men did. This dualism or double standard of universalist discourse on 
French identity has changed and developed due to historical evolutions linked to the postcolonial era, 
immigration movements and globalisation. The next sub-section will recall these key dates. 
 
2.2.4 – Key dates leading to the current mainstream discourse on French identity 
In the past three sub-sections, I highlighted the unification process of the French nation 
combined with its formalisation illustrated by the universalism of the French Republic. These aspects 
established the basis of the mainstream discourse on French identity at the end of the eighteenth 
century. Nevertheless, from the nineteenth century until today, the notions of nationality and 
citizenship have gone through some legal and conceptual changes which affect the institutional and 
social reception of what it means to be French today. 
The chronological changes of the concepts of French nationality and citizenship during the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries will be briefly discussed to pinpoint the periods where French 
identity was constructed towards the domination of some French people over others. Indeed, ‘national 
homogeneity’ of the French people lasted little after the start of the second colonial empire, after the 





‘immigration, Europe and globalisation imposed other issues, such as multiculturalism and cultural 
differences as new values’ (Wihtol de Wenden, 2007: 48). Nonetheless, the ‘French ideal of equality 
and citizenship’ where ‘the state refrain from making distinctions based on race or ethnicity’ is a 
principle that is both found in the 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen and 
in the current 1958 French Constitution (Oppenheimer, 2008: 736-737). The work of French historian 
Jean-François Berdah on ‘Citizenship and National Identity in France from the French Revolution to 
the Present’ (2006) will be recalled to briefly highlight the changes underwent by citizenship, 
nationality, equality and universalism. 
From the French Revolution to the end of the nineteenth century, the republican principle of jus 
soli, the right of soil, granted French nationality to any individual who was born on French territory. 
The end of the nineteenth century saw the French government considering extending French 
citizenship to foreigners:  
the government and members of Parliament were particularly interested in the question of foreign 
concentration in France and the opportunity of incorporating immigrants in the French nation in order 
to revitalize both the French nation and the French army (Berdah, 2006: 145). 
 
As mentioned previously, such move to enhance the French military demonstrates that French identity 
was and continues to be based on war needs, moving away from a peaceful way of acquiring it. The 
French Foreign Legion which permits foreigners to obtain French citizenship after a certain number 
of years of military service is an illustration of such process. Besides, despite acquiring French 
citizenship through the military or the legal process dictated by French nationality law, immigrants 
were considered French nationals only to a certain extent. Indeed, in 1889, the Third Republic’s 
Parliament reinvented the republican principle of jus soli by adopting the double jus soli where ‘a 
foreigner born in France automatically obtained French citizenship if one of his parents was also born 
in the country or through majority if neither of them was born in France’ (Berdah, 2006: 145). Then, 
after the end of the Third Republic and during the dictatorship of Marshall Pétain in the Second World 
War, the principle of jus soli was put into question (Berdah, 2006: 147). The discourse on French 
identity was on its way towards the institution of a double standard. 
The Fourth Republic fostered foreign immigration to encourage the reconstruction of the 





age’ thanks to the ‘Glorious Thirty Years’ of economic development. Foreign communities were 
rapidly integrated. The republican school system also allowed foreigners to socially climb the French 
ladder (Berdah, 2006: 150). This social and economic harmony ceased with the Algerian war of 
independence (1954-1962) which prompted the repatriation of the French community settled in 
Algeria since 1830, as well as with the unemployment that resulted from the economic crisis in 1973. 
Political debates on whether immigrant workers had to return to their countries of origin were taking 
place, with the argument that French citizenship had to be reassessed since the already present 
‘unemployed poorly qualified workers’ were not able to integrate (Berdah, 2006: 150-151). 
Nevertheless, changes in French nationality law were refused until 1993 when a new nationality code 
was issued which also put sand in the wheels of French naturalisation process: 
Naturalization became more difficult to acquire and absurd situations arose with French citizens of the 
second and even third generation being forced on many occasions to prove their citizenship, as for 
instance individuals belonging to old French families who were born in the colonies before 1958 or 1960 
(Berdah, 2006: 151). 
 
As Wihtol de Wenden stated, despite the fact that ‘republican values [universalism, equality] have 
been reasserted in the criteria and conditions for integration’ and the acquirement of French 
citizenship and nationality, ‘new challenges emerged when France realised progressively that it was 
a country of settled immigration, rooted in Europe and in a globalised landscape’ (Wihtol de Wenden, 
2007: 52). While writing these lines, I am realising that if I was born only a few months earlier, I 
could have not enjoyed French citizenship and nationality until my majority which could have 
affected my personal and professional trajectory. Indeed, I was born in France in May 1992 and my 
Malagasy parents obtained French citizenship in March 1992. If they had obtained it after my birth, 
I would have had to wait until my eighteenth birthday to enjoy French citizenship. Therefore, my 
childhood experiences may have been different from what I actually had. It may also have had 
constructed my personality in other ways -or maybe not. In any case, this is a reality that many French 
citizens may not realise if a thorough critical reflection on their own identity, others’ identity and on 
the French -republican- history is not engaged with. 





Since the late nineteenth century, the nationality code has combined the right of birthplace (jus soli) 
and right of blood (jus sanguinis) […]. […] The key concept behind the attacks against the nationality 
code is that citizenship should reflect and foster national sentiment (Simon, 2013: 211). 
 
While ‘right of blood’ reminds here the essentialist conception of identity, ‘right of birthplace’ can, 
on the contrary, echo a quite impartial and objective way of acquiring French identity. Both 
approaches are indeed found in the two opposite poles of the nationality spectrum. ‘Mixing’ the two 
may have been the French way of having a fair system to allow foreigners to obtain French 
citizenship. Nevertheless, it does not take in account the French society’s opinion on the matter and 
can thus foster a double standard found in the republican principles. The creation of the Ministry for 
Immigration, Integration, National Identity, and Codevelopment in 2007 may have wanted to redefine 
what ‘being French’ means, but the negative reactions from the French society ensured its abolition 
in 2010. Nonetheless, the launch in 2009 of a national discussion on national identity can be 
considered as a tool to take in account any French citizen’s opinion on French national identity, its 
formation and scope. It can also serve to highlight the ‘prominence to the question of loyalty, which 
weighs constantly on immigrants and their descendants’ in the answers (Simon, 2013: 203) which 
may emanate from the unification process undertaken in the past. The rigidness of the discourse on 
French identity remains thus the same mainstream one, despite the ‘hyper diversity’ of its members: 
[…] the French national identity remains more or less unchanged. In 2012 it is still expected that cultural 
identities will remain settled in the private sphere of life without the need for public or political 
recognition. The recent debate on national identity and the 2012 presidential campaign have clearly 
shown that the definitions of “Frenchness” that have been most heatedly promoted do not, unfortunately, 
offer an inclusive perspective for ethnic minorities, but instead stigmatize those who allegedly are not 
“French enough” and who are threatening the national cohesion by their “broken Frenchness” (Simon, 
2012: 14-15). 
 
Therefore, the integration process of foreigners is essential in the attempt to build a unified French 
nation (Berdah, 2006: 152). However, this republican model of integration is rarely critically assessed 
and even less reconsidered. Besides, the academics who addressed French national identity and the 
contested concept of Frenchness have ‘paradoxically ended up locating the essence of French culture 
in chateaux, monuments, literature, and revolutionary events’ (Hecht, 2001). This generalisation of 
what Frenchness and the French nation are may even at times become visibly illogic -if not comic-
when French citizens proceeding from French ex-African colonies are taught ‘our ancestors the 





This paradox thus witnessed is the reflection of an incongruence between what is theoretically 
praised and what is practically experienced. The interview of a French man of Algerian origin by 
sociologist Jean Beaman exemplifies such incongruence: 
There’s the theory and there’s the practice. . . . There was a French philosopher named Renan who said 
that every day you have to want to be French. You accept living together. It’s a community of the future. 
. . . For me, being French is a desire, a desire to live together despite our origins. That is the theory, but 
in practice being French when you are of immigrant origin . . . of Swiss or Swedish or British origin, 
there isn’t a problem. You’re viewed as French, and no one talks about integration. However, if you’re 
of maghrébin origin, that’s different. There are barriers. And in the eyes of others, you see that you are 
not always considered French (Beaman, 2017: 66). 
 
Barriers and the lack of consideration are some implications of the mainstream discourse on French 
identity. These implications will now be scrutinized. 
 
2.3 – Implications of the mainstream discourse on French identity 
 The past section brought to the fore the Jacobins revolutionary ideology and the unification 
process used to set up the concept of universalism which founded the origins of the mainstream 
discourse on French identity based on the republican ideology. Finally, a chronological review of the 
formation of current mainstream discourse on French identity demonstrated that societal implications 
arose due to a double standard emanating from the application of the republican ideology of the 
French Revolution within present day French globalised context. This section will delve into the 
societal impacts of such paradox, both theoretically and practically. It will also examine Frenchness 
or the idea of a French identity neglecting postcolonial -and, thus, peace studies- perspective(s). 
 
2.3.1 – Theoretical paradox between past origins and present situation 
This sub-section will confront the foundational concepts supported by the republican 
ideology, universalism and unified national identity in France, with the realities of the privileges 
enjoyed by a certain type of French culture and the effects of immigration. To a certain extent, this 
sub-section is taking into account Tzvetan Todorov questioning ‘how can various cultures coexist 
within a single State? […] In more concrete terms: what place should be allocated to minority cultures 
within a country such as France?’ (Todorov, 2010: 422). While universalism was examined in the 





analysis of the incongruence between the correlation of mainstream French national identity and 
immigration. 
 
2.3.1.a – The double standard of the republican ideology 
This double standard of the French republican ideology originates from the universalism it 
aimed to build at its premises. Universalism reversed itself by implementing the discrimination it 
fought against. The interesting critical aspect to examine is whether it did so knowingly or not; 
however, it is out of the scope of this research to delve into this issue. Nevertheless, since Jacobinism 
and the republican ideology emerged from a homogenised intelligentsia of rich, bourgeois, white 
French men, it is clear that ideas that have emerged of the Jacobins may have only taken into account 
their members’ experiences and overlooked the opinions of poor, peasants, coloured and female 
French people. This double standard or ‘particular paradox’ of republican ideology is predominantly 
unrecognised by politicians, academics or within the French school and military system but has still 
been critically assessed in recent years (Silverman, 2007: 63), especially in the activist sphere. 
Nonetheless, it remains to be critically analysed towards building and reconstructing French identities 
and society from a peace studies and cultures of peace(s) perspectives. Indeed, the double standard 
of the French republican ideology emerged especially during and after the colonial period, where the 
visible diversity was turned into visible and excluded differences: 
It is little understood, however, that the Republic’s cherished values of secularism and freedom of speech 
historically have a darker side. The civil liberties which are now idealised emerged during a period of 
colonial rule. […] France’s iconic law on the freedom of the press passed in 1881 and still enforced 
today, was designed in part to exclude France’s Muslim subjects. The law protected the rights of all 
French citizens, explicitly all those in Algeria and the colonies but excluded the subjects who were the 
majority of the population. […]. In colonial Algeria […], “citizens” were all those who were not 
Muslims and the term musulman or indigène usually overlapped (Ghilès, 2014: 2). 
 
This conception was to have significant consequences for debates about citizenship and nationhood in 
the post-imperial period, with the arrival of millions of non-European former subjects into the home 
country as immigrants. French governments of virtually all political persuasions insisted that immigrants 
should conform to the basic model of secular republican citizenship; religious symbols and practices, 
especially non-Christian ones, were to be kept private, away from the public realm, including that of 
public education (Kumar, 2006: 422). 
 
The double standard of the republican universalism of the French state will be critically assessed 





Double standard of French republican ideology is one of the issues that highly affects current 
French citizens coming from a religious and/or cultural background different from a Caucasian 
Christian one. Indeed, France and its governments pride itself of having a neutral culture, free from 
religious influences, thanks to the 1789 Revolution. However, French governments keep financing 
religious institutions deemed as belonging to the French cultural heritage (Baudet, 2015: 363). Thus, 
if in practice, religious entities are supported on such premise, it means that, in theory, the French 
Republic also validates such premise. In this sense, ‘equality’ and ‘freedom’ -the two first French 
motto words- could also be examined and critically assess in regard of a possible double standard in 
the implementation of the republican values. 
Secularism and laïcité are both synonyms of the principle of separation of the government of a 
state with religious institutions. Nevertheless, laïcité is a specific feature of the French Republic and 
stems from secularism. Laïcité is only observed in France and not in secular states. For instance, 
France is a secular or laic (laïc) state whereas the United States is only secular and not laic. The work 
of Tarik Modood and Riva Kastoryano (2007) on secularism will be recalled first to highlight its 
features relating to the characteristics of laïcité. 
Secularism is a feature of Western societies and, as being thought as a defining aspect of 
modernity, it has widely become hegemonic in those societies (Modood and Kastoryano, 2007: 13). 
It separates the public realm of policies applying to citizens against the private realm of belief and 
worship followed by them (Modood and Kastoryano, 2007: 14). Secularism arose from the Western 
states’ wish to break their long relationship with religious entities (mainly Christian ones) in order to 
move from a powerful religious community structure to a modern, legitimate and universal political 
community (Modood and Kastoryano, 2007: 18). As Modood and Kastoryano emphasize:  
The ‘universality’ of secularism lies in the principle of equality according to which there is no 
domination of one religion (the majority, therefore the national) over other religions in a de facto 
minority situation (Modood and Kastoryano, 2007: 19). 
 
Such universality is thus a principle in secularism that compels the state to remain neutral in the face 
of religious matter and treats its citizens equally in the public realm -especially in relation to religious 
concerns. However, it is crucial to point out that the idea of a state neutrality and public equality is a 





private/public or state/religion distinction is drawn differently in France from other secular states, 
with the concept of laïcité. 
Laïcité is the ‘fuel’ nourishing the French republican ‘fire’ by burning its citizens ‘logs’ against 
each other. I already analysed this concept in a work of mine (Ranaivosoa, 2020) where I stressed 
that laïcité was generated during the Enlightenment era but differs from secularism with its active 
substance: 
secularism is usually described as more tolerant towards public visibility of religion; a secular state plays 
a passive role and allows religious symbols in the public domain. In laicism the state plays a more active 
role by excluding religious symbols from the public domain and thus confines religion to the private 
domain (Tarhan, 2011). 
 
The features of French laïcité is thus an active specificity of the country compared to other secular 
states. Indeed, According to Modood and Kastoryano (2007), in France:  
[…] the state actively promotes the privatisation of religion (Modood and Kastoryano, 2007: 16) 
 
and 
[…] religion is (pace republican ideology) one of the fundamental cleavages in French society and its 
social, cultural and institutional representation (Modood and Kastoryano, 2007: 28). 
 
In France, a republican state does not just separate itself from civil society but it leads civil society by 
creating a political culture that is opposed to clericalism, or perhaps even to ‘Catholic culture’ (esprit). 
For the French Republic, laïcité is considered an active movement from a community ruled by the 
Church to a society ruled by law, and thus integral to modernity (Modood and Kastoryano, 2007: 17). 
 
In this above quote the public structure has ‘a hand on’ the private one. It actively leads and dictates 
what is and how should the private -religious- sphere be. Besides, religious structures (private sphere) 
and state (public structure) rely on each other: 
Furthermore, if the public and private spheres mutually shape each other in these ways, then however 
‘abstract’ and rational’ the principles of a public order may be, they will reflect the ‘folk cultures’ out 
of which that particular order has grown. If this is the case, then there can be no question of the public 
sphere being morally, ethnically or, indeed, religiously neutral. Rather, it will inevitably appeal to points 
of privately shared values and a sense of belonging found within the (religious and non-religious) 
communities that make up society, as well as to the superstructure of conventions, laws and principles 
which regulate it (Modood and Kastoryano, 2007: 21). 
 
If we recognize that the public sphere is not morally neutral, that the public order is not culturally, 
religiously or ethnically blind, we can begin to understand why oppressed, marginalised or immigrant 
groups may want that public order […] to ‘recognise’ them, to be ‘user-friendly’ to the new folks 
(Modood and Kastoryano, 2007: 22) 
 
There is an institutionalisation of difference even though the republican ideology is meant to be 





Since 1990, following the passionate debates concerning the place of religion in French society aroused 
by the headscarf affair, successive interior ministers, who are at the same time ministers of religion from 
both the Left and the Right have worked to create representative Islamic institutions (Modood and 
Kastoryano, 2007: 27). 
 
Through the creation in 1991 of the Council of Thought on Islam or in 2003 of a French Council of 
the Muslims Faith, French governments have ongoingly tried to institutionalise difference, especially 
regarding the religion of Islam. It is thus an institutionalisation of difference that also somehow 
echoes an ‘Orientalist’ behaviour. On the contrary, an institutionalisation of diversity, recognising 
the legitimacy of religions and cultures, would echo an inclusive approach proper to cultures of 
peace(s). This principle of laïcité is an illustration of the differentiation between the public and private 
sphere, the former one priming in the republican ideology. 
The public sphere includes the legal domain, representing the equality principle, and the social 
domain which is contained within the legal framework but is not reduced to it. An individual’s cultural 
and collective identity belongs to the social rather than the legal order (Todorov, 2010: 423). Thus, 
what signs of cultural identity are acceptable in the public sphere that are not offensive to ‘secular 
eyes’? (Silverman, 2007: 59). Then, this would mean who is that person having the ‘secular eyes’? 
This reminds the ‘Orientalist’ glasses of Edward Said (BBC, 2018). According to Max Silverman 
(2007), “France continues to ‘veil’ itself in a mythical past concerning the Republic and race’ and 
there is a ‘need to demythologise republican memory and expose the hidden mechanism [and hidden 
ideology] of the [French] republican model for a proper understanding of the present’ (Silverman, 
2007: 61). Silverman explains Shmuel Trigano’s essential paradox of Enlightenment universalism 
(1982) as such: 
In other words, by attempting to convert the other into the same, the boundaries of the other are, 
paradoxically, fixed ever more firmly. Hence, the very fact that the Jew [or someone having any other 
cultural background today] must undergo the process of transformation and assimilation in order to 
become a citizen […] is a permanent reminder of the essential difference between Jews [or someone 
having any other cultural background today] and ‘natural’ Frenchmen and women in the first place […] 
(Silverman, 2007: 61). 
 
He then claims that ‘it could be generalised to explain a fundamental paradox concerning the French 
republican model of the nation’ (Silverman, 2007: 61) since it could also reflect the same model 





dehumanizing gaze at the heart of French universalism’ (Silverman, 2007: 62). This addresses the 
issue of race within the French republican ideology: 
‘Race’ […], from the outset, was built into the very fabric of republican nation and returns in distorted 
form today, particularly in debates on immigration, […], national identity and so on (Silverman, 2007: 
62). 
 
The ‘double discourse of republican law’ (Silverman, 2007 citing Bancel, Planchard and Vergès, 
2005) echoes the double standard that is found in laïcité and other areas of the republican public 
sphere, such as the concept of freedom of expression (Ranaivosoa, 2020). This cleavage between 
what is allowed in public and what remains in the private sphere parallels the division between what 
is neutral and subjective. The French Republic claims to treat equally and neutrally all its citizens. 
Indeed, the French citizen is universal and identitarian belongings and allegiances presumably 
belongs to the subjective and intimate sphere (Simon and Zappi, 2005: 5). However, as the intimate 
touches the personal, denying such subjective belongings and allegiances characteristics of the 
universal French citizen would mean denying their need of connection and, in the end, their humanity. 
Any suppression or denial of human needs amounts to a form of cultural violence. 
As mentioned above, the public sphere includes a social order. Such order amounts, however, 
not to equality but to a sort of ‘superiority’ as those who are -truly- deemed as French may be in 
reality those who are more loving and loyal to French culture (Todorov, 2010: 423). Indeed, in the 
republican model in France, ‘different cultures, in the sense of national or ethnic belonging, are not 
on the same footing’. French culture and traditions are privileged than those of coming from 
minorities (Todorov, 2010: 422). Even though the public sphere is universal and indifferent to 
subjectivities and leans towards neutrality, it contains assumptions of how such universality and 
neutrality looks like, due to the context in which these values have emerged from (Simon and Zappi, 
2005: 5). Indeed, in the Revolution, the pre-defined mould of a French citizen was a white upper-
middle class man while today it officially encompasses any person holding a French identity card. 
Nevertheless, ‘behind the indifference to differences lays in fact a hostility to expressions of those 
differences’33 (Simon and Zappi, 2005: 6). Such paradox is stated well: 
 
33 My own translation. Original in French : Derrière l’indifférence aux différences pointe de fait une hostilité aux 





In other words, the more the state insists on uniformity and the neutrality of the public sphere, 
paradoxically the more it renders visible the very differences it wishes to erase; the more it insists on 
invisibility, the more it construct the visibility of particular differences (Silverman, 2007: 67). 
 
‘The opposite of love is not hate, but indifference’ – Elie Wiesel. Therefore, by choosing indifference 
to diversity, the French republican system is not basing its values on love and, therefore, not on the 
understanding34 of the differences. Consequently, the absence of understanding cannot stem from and 
foster cultures of peace(s). Indeed, the French republican laws determine who are French subjects. 
However, having a French citizenship does not ensure one’s full acceptance, institutional and societal, 
as a French person (Beaman, 2017: 69). There is indeed a discrepancy between the ideal French 
person of the Republic and how such concept historically evolved. The sources of such inconsistency 
lie in the domination relationship of the pioneers of the Republic -and its upholder today- over the 
minorities found in it. As such, the French Republic amounts to a hegemonic ideology (Simon and 
Zappi, 2005: 7). This domination relationship becomes thus the basis for identitarian strategies, being 
the product and support of identity struggles (Giraud, 1987: 65). The double standard remains the 
principal unacknowledged paradoxical issue of the French republican ideology. It reflects Samuel 
Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations (1993) when dealing with identity and nationality matters, 
especially when it supposedly conflicts with recent movements of immigration. 
 
2.3.1.b – The nexus between national identity and immigration 
 As recalled in the previous section, the unification process in France undertaken during the 
French Revolution aimed at building a French nation, united under a common culture and language. 
The French citizen of the Republic was to be the representative of this unification, each citizen being 
equal in rights and duties in the French nation-state. Nevertheless, this is a theoretical ideal. The 
nation-state is a theoretical ideal where the citizens affiliated to it are also theoretically ideal. Joining 
such ideal of united members of a nation-state is, however, a challenge in practice, especially in 
Western ‘theoretical’ nation-states where high volumes of immigrations (for any reasons) is 
 
34 This reflection is based on Zen Buddhist master Thich Nhat Hanh’s teachings where ‘understanding is the foundation 





observable. In the French case, a paradox emerges from the nexus between national identity and 
immigration. 
The term citizen primarily defined one’s allegiance to France from the Revolution to the 
1970s. The French postcolonial writers and thinkers could evidently stress the present double standard 
between a French citizen of Caucasian descent and one from a non-Caucasian one. However, during 
the 1970s, the concept of a ‘French national identity’ emerged. The link up of identité and nationale 
(identité nationale) is a recent francisation coming from the United States (Mauger, 2007: 79). 
Identité nationale was, at its premises before its paradoxical relation with immigration, an illustration 
of the political divide between working class citizens and the alliance of dominant elites from opposite 
political camps (Mauger, 2007: 80). Such hierarchy among members of French society was pursued 
in the nineteenth century since national identity was a means to generate ‘cohesion by incorporating 
individuals through citizenship, while at the same time excluding other individuals’. Citizens and 
non-citizens were the main legal divide followed by the paradoxical but unacknowledged hierarchy 
among French citizens based on gender, ethnicity and race (Simon, 2013: 204). Identité nationale 
today represents one of the pillars of the far-right political party in France. It is linked to the national 
security discourse where any miscellaneous events involving (non-Caucasian) foreigners is deemed 
as a threat (Mauger, 2007: 82). When brought together, identité nationale and immigration produce 
a negative discourse on immigration and permit to leave in the background social issues in France 
(Mauger, 2007: 82). In this sense, such delamination exemplifies the structural and cultural violence 
present in social issues in France with the absence of policies based on cultures of peace(s). Since in 
the 1970s immigrants were welcomed in France mainly for labour reasons but not to be considered 
future members of the French nation. Immigration had and continues to have difficulties in being 
legitimated and, consequently, the recognition of diverse belongings as well (Wihtol de Wenden, 
2007: 53). The nexus between national identity and immigration illustrates the paradox of the co-
terminality of nationality and citizenship (Alfonsi, 1997: 65-66). 






 2.3.2 – Practical illustrations of the paradox 
 The societal and practical implications of the institutional and theoretical paradox are 
illustrated by the unification policies of assimilation and integration, which nevertheless keep on 
maintaining a double standard applied to members of French society. 
 
2.3.2.a – The ambivalence of the integration policy 
 French republican model was essentially assimilationist during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries where French culture and customs were spread in French territory (metropolitan or not) and 
had to be adopted by the individuals that wished to be considered French citizens. This assimilationist 
policy was abandoned in the 1970s for an integration policy aimed at the high number of immigrants 
that stayed in France after filling the shortage of labour they had primarily came for. This policy 
intended to allow immigrants to obtain French citizenship with a view to discarding the colonialist 
aspect the assimilationist policy held. However, although not openly acknowledged as such 
institutionally and even societally, the French republican approach to integration is considerably 
influenced by assimilationism (Simon, 2013: 208) of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
French demographer Patrick Simon attests of the ambivalence of the policy of integration by 
its colour-blindness, stemming from the double standard of the republican ideology, that stigmatizes 
expressions of diverse cultural belongings: 
The problem lies in the restrictive definition of this national identity: it ends up excluding visible 
minorities and Muslims from the national community. The French model of integration pretends to be 
colorblind and to ensure cohesion through a process of soft assimilation, that is, civic integration and 
cultural convergence to the mainstream (Simon, 2012: 15-16). 
 
The discourse underlying integration policy rests on an ambivalent vision of the ever more visible signs 
of the multicultural character of French society. The concrete signs of belonging to ethno-cultural or 
religious minorities in the public arena are rapidly stigmatized as an expression of ‘communitarianism’ 
and such minorities receive injunctions to return to the collective norm (Simon, 2013: 209). 
 
Besides, the means to achieve integration (Simon, 2013: 209) illustrate a way to homogenise the 
members of the French nation-state, recalling the assimilationist policy and therefore a culturally 
violent way of acquiring French identity. First, proficiency in French remains an essential element to 
become French. Second, the dispersion of immigrant population and the gradual weakening of 





community or religious origins. Since connection is a human need, breaking it amounts to its denial 
and therefore to structural and cultural violence. The emphasis on the individualised relationship with 
the state as a citizen, finally, embodies the universalist ideology. The homogenisation process 
undertaken by integration policy is a hidden assimilationist process since it believes that by breaking 
the connections with one’s cultural origins, one will more easily embrace and integrate in -thus 
assimilate- French culture, customs and practices. 
The school system in France is considered as one of the crucial institutions of integration 
where members of minority groups can converge, ‘melt and dissolve’ within the majority population 
(Simon, 2013: 210). Therefore, even if France is a multicultural society, the republican model of 
integration lacks the flexibility needed for diverse cultural groups to harmoniously live together. 
Minority practices are tolerated but to the extent that they do not disturb the majority population way 
of life (Simon, 2013: 210). 
The discourse on national identity coming from the far-right is at the basis of the ambivalence 
of the integration policy. Far-right discourses on national identity started to be mainstreamed by right 
wing President Nicolas Sarkozy before and after his elections and continue to hover French national 
identity debates. The update of the concept of identité nationale stemming from a peace culture 
approach is needed for inclusive and non-discriminatory French institutions and society. To move 
from an integration to an inclusion policy would illustrate such change.35 This integration policy was 
aimed in the 1970s at first generation immigrants. Nowadays, the French born children of these 
immigrants, whether they were born of foreign or naturalised French parents, are undoubtedly French 
citizens. However, in practice they may still be subject of hidden double standards arising from the 
contradiction of feeling French but not looking French. 
 
2.3.2.b – Pluri-affiliations dilemma: feeling French but not looking French 
 The identity focus of the paper point towards multiple allegiances and belongings. However, 
in the French context, affiliations are generally geared toward people having a ‘double identity’ 
 






stemming from a double cultural heritage which are supposedly contrasting. This supposition fuels 
the theoretical paradox which emerge in practice through the presumed, ‘problematic’ and 
‘pathological’ cultural conflict that would divide an individual inside (Giraud, 1987: 59). As such a 
conflict within an individual would mean that one would not be ‘stable’ in honouring their citizen 
part of the republican contract. That citizen could fail in remaining loyal to the ‘nation of France’. 
Nevertheless, recalling Huntington’s terminology, there is no ‘clash’ of affiliations within the person, 
but questioning may arise to that person due to the way French institutions frame French identity. It 
is up to French institutions and society to accept and embrace the fact that it is not a contradiction, 
but an irreversible process with the globalised state of the world. Giraud’s denial of the possibility of 
mixing foreign and French cultures within an individual (Giraud, 1987: 62) grounds the pluri-
affiliation dilemma stemming from such essentialist approach. 
Even though pluri-citizenship is allowed under French nationality laws, the republican 
institutions have a fear of dual loyalty as a hindrance to national cohesion. Such fear is unfounded 
and emanates from the ambivalent integration model which is challenged by institutional and societal 
discriminations (Simon, 2013). Indeed, even if these individuals enjoying pluri-affiliations are legally 
French and internally feel French, external perceptions of French identity -based on the concept of 
national identity examined above- reminds them that certain visible and audible attributes make that 
they do not look or sound French. As such, they are not regarded as ‘being French’ (Simon, 2013), 
both surreptitiously by French republican system and institutions and sometimes openly by members 
of French society. The institutional denial of the concept of ‘hyphenated identity’ in the French 
context illustrates this phenomenon. Hyphenation has indeed been publicly rejected by Gérard Araud, 
French ambassador to the US, when he dismissed the plurality of affiliations of the French members 
of the French national football team after their FIFA World Cup win in July 2018, even if those 
members actually combined and openly -but not publicly- expressed multiple belongings and 
allegiances (Ranaivosoa, 2020). However, French men’s national football team members are famous 
figures representing France on the international plane and are mostly referred to as French in public 





paper’ (Français de papier) or ‘involuntary French’ (Français malgré eux) in contrast to those 
defining themselves -and popularly ending up being defined as- ‘ethnic French’ (Francais de souche). 
Consequently, visible difference leads to an ‘ethnicised practice of relations’ in French institutions 
and society such as frequent targeted identity controls, institutionalised racism, amalgamations of the 
cultural group as a homogeneous group or the refusal of opportunities to individuals as a result of 
group stereotyping (Wihtol de Wenden, 2007: 55). Frantz Fanon asserted such institutionalised 
racism decades ago as part of the French collective unconscious with ‘the myth of the bad nigger’ 
(Fanon, 1986: 92). The emphasis on -cultural- difference reasserts the -perception by others of the- 
‘Otherness’ of an individual thwarting his-her-their Frenchness. When one is permanently asked 
where one is ‘from from’ (Tazzy Phe, 2016), implying the request to know the origins of one’s 
ascendance, it may raise inside oneself questionings about one’s identity. With a French person with 
pluri-affiliation, the question of one’s Frenchness is raised and the mismatch between the -practical- 
reality and factuality of French identity and its -theoretical- idea emerges. 
 
2.3.3 – Frenchness or the idea of a French identity 
Frenchness today is closely linked to the notion of what it means to be French, and 
 
What it means to be French today is inextricably linked with some notion of what it means to be worthy 
and unworthy and with how these definitions of worth are articulated around notions of morality, culture, 
socioeconomic status, race, and nation (Lamont, 1995: 364-365). 
 
Since French Revolution, the French Republics have intended to spread France’s language and 
culture, whether within metropolitan France or abroad in its colonies, as part of a missionary purpose 
where the idea of a ‘mission civilisatrice’ emerged (Kumar, 2006: 422). France has indeed a specific 
idea and a high esteem of the role it holds of itself regarding other countries, ‘civilisations’ or cultural 
groups. The notion of idea is pivotal here in understanding the conceptual framework from which 
French identity originates. It can indeed draw back to when Karl Marx expressed that ‘France is the 
only country of the ‘‘idea’’; that is to say, the idea it has of itself’ (Kumar, 2006: 426 citing Rubel 
1960: 139). Such idea emanates from the imagination of the members of the French ‘imagined 
political community’ or nation. It emanates from the image the French nation has of itself, which can 





Pierre Birnbaum book titled La France imaginée (literally ‘The imagined France’, officially 
translated as ‘The Idea of France’) or President Charles de Gaulle having ‘a certain idea of France’ 
shows the ‘continuing stream’ of works and discourses on the idea of France illustrating the extent to 
which it is imprinted and imagined in French minds (Kumar, 2006: 426). Consequently, such idea of 
France is reverberated in the idea of a French identity or what is Frenchness. In this sense, French 
culture, its survival and stance compared to others is what is at stake. As it is believed to be a ‘high 
culture’, Frenchness or French identity expresses a ‘cultural superiority complex’ as France struggles 
to compete with other nations in the political or economic spheres (Cohen, 2012).  
France aims thus to establish French culture as an internationally valued feature first by 
promoting and cultivating French language, which is nowadays overcome by English even if it 
remains the working language of many international institutions (Cohen, 2012). Nevertheless, this 
will and idea of shining internationally hides the double standard of the republican ideology. Indeed, 
the attempt to ‘export’ French culture and language abroad to counter American hegemony is 
hypocrite when compared to the protection of the neutrality of the public sphere from cultural 
diversity with the ban on headscarves in French schools (Silverman, 2007: 60). 
Frenchness or the mainstream discourse on the idea of French identity is all about sticking to 
the power France have or had at the international level. Therefore, the use of other languages or the 
celebration of cultural belongings reflecting other allegiances threaten the unity that France is trying 
to maintain to stay within countries that culturally dominate the world. The neglect of the postcolonial 
perspective of what Frenchness is may thus be a feature of the idea construction of French identity. 
 
2.3.4 – Neglect of the postcolonial perspective 
 This sub-section will briefly examine to which extent the little or repressed presence of French 
postcolonial academic literature reverberates in the discourses on French identity. The following 
citations introduce the place postcolonialism holds among French academics: 
In mainstream hexagonal theory, there is a degree of resistance to what is perceived as postcolonial 
theory (Spivak, 2013: 223). 
 






The French intellectual tradition enjoys an ambiguous status in postcolonial studies these days (Taoua, 
2003: 149). 
 
These above citations do not imply that French academics supported colonial project. On the contrary, 
these sentences omit to mention that French thinkers addressed the colonial ideology with other 
theories such as poststructuralism or postmodernism (with the work of Michel Foucault, Gilles 
Deleuze, François Lyotard, Jacques Derrida and Jacques Lacan) which questioned the issues of 
agency, subjectivity, hegemony and discursive practices (Taoua, 2003: 149). Even if the classification 
of these thinkers is considered as ‘post’, their questioning of going beyond ‘structuralism’ or 
‘modernism’ instead of ‘colonialism’ may underline why France has not moved on completely yet 
from its colonialist and imperialist attitudes towards its ex-colonies. 
These above French thinkers differ from French writers coming from the ex-colonies (such as 
Frantz Fanon, Aimé Césaire and Léopold Sédar Senghor) who prompted the pan-African 
independence movements and were animated by an anti-colonial thought. Therefore, the contestation 
of the colonial project by French intellectuals holds the names of other theories than postcolonialism, 
as in poststructuralism, postmodernism or anti-colonial thought. Indeed, ‘the most influential cultural 
pioneers in postcolonial studies have been active in English departments’ (Taoua, 2003: 149). Since 
the concept of identity has mainly been addressed by these Anglo-Saxon thinkers, it logically follows 
that the concept of French identity has not been investigated as profoundly from the postcolonial 
theory. Besides, as little is written about the francophone Caribbean and ex-colonies in Africa 
compared to the anglophone ones, ‘French literary studies have been slower to become cross-cultural 
and interdisciplinary’ (Taoua, 2003: 150). This parallels the fact that the mainstream discourse on 
French identity struggles to recognize the multiculturality of the members of the French Republic. It 
also demonstrates the institutional, societal and academic lack of interculturality and 
interdisciplinarity necessary for the building of cultures of peace(s) (Martínez Guzmán, Comins 
Mingol and París Albert, 2009: 95). 
The republican and imperialist narrative on French identity has been accounted and 
established as the ‘normative one’ (Spivak, 1988: 25) and became inherent to the understanding of 





hegemonic discourse on French identity. The building of cultures of peace(s) must endeavour to 
introduce alternative discourses on French identity in popular wisdom to transform such cultural 
violence. 
 
2.4 - Alternative discourses on French identity 
 This section will recollect some attempts by academics, French institutions and society of 
reconsidering and reframing the discourse on French identity that tackle the mainstream approach, by 
considering the plurality of voices and experiences of the French citizens.  
 
2.4.1 – Postcolonial and French civil society inputs 
Despite the absence of significant postcolonial French thinkers, considering postcolonialism 
theory in the reframing of French identity -alongside anti-colonial thought or poststructuralism and 
postmodernism- is critical. Indeed, postcolonialism not only opposes and resists colonialism but it 
attempts to go beyond it. The voices and experiences of the colonised are considered to let themselves 
be defined according to their views: 
Post-colonialism is a complex field of discourse, constituted by responses to colonialism, slavery and 
the master discourses of empire […] It is the voice of the oppressed emerging and talking back with 
well-chosen words – a critical assault on the western conceit that it can constitute the colonial Other in 
its own form (Spencer, 2006: 122). 
 
Since postcolonialism is mainly present within Anglo-Saxon world, postcolonial identity regarding 
the French context will be approached from postcolonial thinkers that have endeavoured such 
reflection. 
The work of Gayatri Spivak on the concept of the ‘subaltern’ and on Postcolonialism in 
France is an effort that needs to be considered for alternative discourses on French identity. Indeed, 
within the homogeneous, hegemonic and universalist French republican system, French citizens must 
be referred as only French. Therefore, heterogeneous, alternative, minoritarian and particular 
contributions are rejected. In the French case, immigrants in the 1970s -the ‘subalterns’ today- that 
came to support the French economy are, however, not welcomed to contribute to the diversification 





subaltern subject is irretrievably heterogeneous’ (Spivak, 1988: 25). Nevertheless, even though 
Spivak speaks of a subaltern ‘position without identity’ (Spivak, 2013: 236), I argue that they do have 
one, but they first must recognise it themselves to be later acknowledged institutionally. The 
possibility to think and speak for themselves is perhaps, however, a first issue to work on. 
Regarding French thinkers’ alternative discourses on French identity, it must be highlighted 
that even if French postcolonialism is lacking, francophone Caribbean Frantz Fanon’s book The 
Wretched of the Earth (1963) may be deemed as ‘the birth of post-colonialism’. Fanon’s reflection 
addressed the identity struggle of the colonial subject (Spencer, 2006: 123). Fanon’s perspective has, 
however, been considered at times as ‘militant’ and ‘antiFrench’ thus against the republican discourse 
(Hannoum, 2019). 
French civil society inputs on alternative discourses on French identity were, however, the 
most outspoken in the recent years. The rejection of -neo-colonial practices of the French Republic 
and to be recognised postcolonial subject with full French citizenship are claims made by Les 
Indigènes de la République (The Indigenous of the Republic), a call which converted into an 
association and a political movement. It formalised as a political party in 2005 (Hannoum, 2019). 
Their demands embraced ‘a postcolonial critique of French national identity, Republicanism and 
ethnic relations policies’ (Grewal, 2011: 222), which the French government attempted to fulfil. 
 
 2.4.2 – The attempt by the French government 
 The briefness of this sub-section will illustrate the insubstantiality of the French government 
attempts to open the dialogue to transform the mainstream discourse on French identity. 
The creation of the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and 
Codevelopment in 2007, embodied the then conservative French government’s will to initiate a 
debate with French citizens on the theme of national identity. In November 2009, a circular officially 
launched ‘the great debate on national identity’ mainly held on internet and among focus groups 
throughout the country, with the leading question: ‘What does it mean to be French?’ (Jeannot, Tomc 





interesting involvement, it only served as a platform for participants to express their point of view 
without actual interactions between them. Consequently, it was not used in order to draft new 
approaches to French identity that could be embodied in a law. Such platform thus did not amount to 
an active ‘Third Space’ where elements could meet each other and interact. It only served as a passive 
stage to recollect the diversity of opinions of French citizens, which nevertheless turned out as an 
engaging process of reflection. Connection and interaction between these opinions was the missing 
piece of the French government endeavour. It may, however, have been successful in the focus groups 
that were conducted.  
Nevertheless, this attempt by the Sarkozy government to engage with the topic of French 
national identity was as hypocrite as the Republic it represented in regard of the denial of the French 
colonial past and therefore its impact on French identity of current French citizens: 
And for those who claim different memories, Sarkozy reminds them they don’t have to “stay in the 
national territory.” In other words, there is no room or even tolerance for redefining the nation or 
citizenship, and there is no place for subaltern recollections. The colonial past is what it is – grandiose 
and worthy of pride. And if some people do not like it, they should leave. The condition for staying, in 
the final analysis of citizenship, is the acceptance of the collective memory (Hannoum, 2019). 
 
This attempt by the French government can metaphorically refer to Rosa Freedman’s section ‘Look! 
We did something: [South-Africa and Israel]’ in her 2014 book Failing to Protect: the UN and the 
Politicisation of Human Rights. A parallel may thus be made with the failure of the French 
government to thoroughly redefine French identity. 
Changing the educational program in the school system by recognising alternative memories 
of the colonial past would be one of the more effective way to reconsider French identity from cultures 
of peace(s) at the institutional level. In the meantime, members of the French society are taking 
actions to do so at the personal level. 
 
 2.4.3 – By individual members of French society 
 The recurring conflicting matter in regard to French identity is the duality of loyalties that 
some French citizens may have when they proceed from a cultural background different from the 
Caucasian and Christian one. By duality, I mean that in France hybridity is a concept that is far from 





sense, double identity, dual citizenships or hyphenated identity could be already considered as a kind 
of alternative discourses within the French context; even if, as explained in the past chapter, they may 
be mainly used to claim the improvement of one’s condition linked to identity matters: 
Per this lens, we can consider self-asserted hyphenated identity as an agentive response on the part of 
the immigrant to contest rather than accept the assimilation policies of a nation or a school. (Hamann 
and England, 2011: 208) 
 
Indeed, the mere double allegiance that one could express can be bothering for some segments of 
French institutions and society. On the contrary, this double loyalty may be deemed ‘complementary’ 
by the ones holding it. However, it is ‘a privilege attached to the condition of migrants’ and the 
immigration movement which not all French citizens proceed from (Simon, 2012: 9). Here, the word 
‘privilege’ is utilised. Despite the negative connotations and experiences that can stem from such 
condition, privilege must be approached positively to be able to transform the mainstream discourse 
on French identity towards an alternative one. Thus, the criticisms on dual 
nationality/citizenship/cultural belonging being in competition due to the assumed cultural ‘clash’ 
must be transformed into ‘a new paradigm’ (Simon, 2012: 9) to 
provide a resolution to the problem of determining whether one is from "here" or from "there," replacing 
it with "both" (Hamann and England, 2011: 208) 
 
Such change must be taken at the personal level where one recognises and accepts who one is. 
The recollection of definition of what ‘French is’ or what ‘French ain’t’ by Jean Beaman (2017) 
based on views and experience of individuals having French and Maghrebin belongings shows a 
diversity in the expression of French identity:  hyphenated and combined identity (French and 
Maghrebin), neither French nor Maghrebin and only Maghrebin. It is interesting to note that no 
section of her work highlights expression of French identity as ‘only French’. Indeed, these 
individuals may not feel ‘French French’ and may always have to reassert their French status if asked 
where they are from -from- (Beaman, 2017: 72-73). Nevertheless, the various types of expression of 
French identity collected shows that when given the reflexion opportunity, the recognition and 
acceptance of one’s identity is asserted, although influenced by the cultural roots in which one grew 
up. Having the possibility of reflexion, here, joins Spivak thought on whether one can speak for 





the identity of the individual is never totally imposed on oneself from the outside, by the existing people 
within the context in which one finds oneself. It is always the expression of a subject’s choice (Giraud, 
1987: 62).36 
 
Therefore, there are pre-imposed identities, but when the capacitating and liberating conditions 
are reunited, the subject can have the possibility to choose and formulate one’s own identity. Such 
choice should be respected by the institutions and society. Nevertheless, such breach in the 
mainstream discourse on French identity can only grow when interactions and connections happen 
between the individual members of French society. This next step for transformation could take place 
at the local and community level, such as it took place with the focus groups of ‘the great debate on 
national identity’, in order to build strong links between French citizens regardless of but in 
recognition of their cultural proceedings. In France, this transformative step was proposed and 
introduced by youths proceeding from immigration and living in metropolitan suburbs: 
However, some new topics, mostly brought by the beur movement, have been introduced in the debate: 
plural citizenship, collective identities, dissociation between nationality and citizenship (the so-called 
‘new citizenship’, established by participation in local life, here and now, independent of nationality 
[…]) (Wihtol de Wenden, 2007: 54). 
 
The recognition for plural and ‘new’ citizenship, collective identities and what is experienced in local 
life may call to go beyond the mainstream discourse and considerate a hybrid type of French identity. 
 
2.4.4 – Going beyond: hybrid French identity 
 The recognition of the hybrid identity of (some) French citizens is far from being 
acknowledged at the French institutional and societal level; it may, however, have some seeds to grow 
from at the personal level. 
French philosopher Bernard Andrieu resumes well how hybridity is considered at the 
institutional and societal levels:  
By destabilizing the being installed in an identity stasis and remaining the same, the being comes to 
consider the hybrid as an intruder, a danger or a virus. This produces an alien hunt, hunting the mutant 
and the monster in order to maintain the social body in what would be its pure identity. [...] The hybrid 
could be considered as a lesser being because its essence is shared, and its body divided. In a hierarchy 
 
36 My own translation. French original : L'identité de l'individu ne lui est jamais totalement imposée de l'extérieur par 





of living beings, its downgrading, if not its ontological stigmatization, would find a direct echo with the 
mestizo as a mixed, impure being (Andrieu, 2011: 28).37 
 
Nevertheless, a possibility to go beyond the mainstream discourse on French identity, whether it be 
essentialist or constructivist, may be perceived at the personal level. The experiences recounted in 
the ‘Neither French nor Maghrebin’ section of Jean Beaman article (2017) illustrate features of 
hybrid identity addressed in Chapter 1: 
Travel to Algeria influenced his view of himself as neither French nor maghrébin, but rather an occupant 
of some space between the two (Beaman, 2017: 79). 
 
Their sense of otherness leaves them between two cultures (Beaman, 2017: 79). 
 
“We are sitting between two chairs” (Beaman, 2017: 79). 
 
The repetition of ‘between’ in these three examples recalls the specific field of ‘in-betweenness’ 
where identity is generated. The presence of ‘some space’ between the two French and Maghrebin 
identities allows to sense a hypothetical ‘Third Space’. The point would be for the subjects to 
appreciate it. By realising it, they may even be able to undertake a suture of the two identities, thus 
generating the hybrid French identity. However, it is critical to tread lightly with the likelihood of 
feeling as not fitting into French or Maghrebin society: 
“You are never 100 percent either way” (Beaman, 2017: 79). 
 
In contrast to Diana, who claims a combined French and maghrébin identity, Ahmed feels he has none 
(Beaman, 2017: 80). 
 
While cultural belongings are only recognised within the private sphere and hyphenated identity 
is rejected institutionally, hybridisation of culture has been considered in France: 
It does indeed present the dual politico-ideological advantage of enabling the discussion of cultural 
identities while at the same time promoting mixing or hybridisation and therefore the dissolution of 
minorities or constituted groups […]. The reference to hybridisation involves the recognition of the 
existence of processes of cultural innovation; we observe the existence of cultural actors but actors who 
have no propensity whatsoever to form groups or minorities which are likely to demand collective rights 
or multiculturalist type of policy (Wieviorka, 2007: 40). 
 
The attention paid to hybridisation thus amounts to a certain extent to the policy of integration, with 
the aim of diluting remnants of cultural affiliations not aligning with the republican mainstream 
 
37 My own translation. Original in French: En déstabilisant l’être installé dans une stase identitaire et en restant le 
même, l’être en vient à considérer l’hybride comme un intrus, un danger ou un virus. Ce qui produit une chasse à 
l’étranger, au mutant et au monstre afin de maintenir le corps social dans ce qui serait sa pure identité. […] L’hybride 
pourrait être considéré comme un moindre être, car son essence est partagée et son corps divisé. Dans une hiérarchie 
des êtres vivants, son déclassement, sinon sa stigmatisation ontologique, trouverait un écho direct avec le métisse 





discourse on French identity. Indeed, hybridity and hybrid identity from the peace studies and cultures 
of peace(s) perspectives acknowledge and embody the full mix of both -or all- identities to generate 
something unique, that combines ‘the best from all’ (Galtung, 2010: 30 and 2011: 5) :  
Maybe I am asking for too much, wanting to be both 100 percent Algerian and 100 percent French. But 
I can’t choose between them. I want to combine the best parts of both into something great (Beaman, 
2017: 79). 
 
Learning to appreciate one’s own and others’ particular and beautiful features is essential to foster 
peace culture. Formal and informal education on identity is a long-term work to undertake to generate 
identities stemming from and working towards cultures of peace(s). 
 
2.5 – Conclusion  
This second chapter permitted to shed light on the prominence of the French republican 
ideology on the current mainstream discourse on ‘French Identity’.  
The republican discourse in France mainstreams French identity under its principal feature: 
universalism. When applied to the notion of French identity, universalism of the republican ideology 
only recognises French citizens. These subjects who hold a legal allegiance to France, however, have 
been historically moulded into the French citizens the Jacobins and their ideology had in mind at the 
dawn of the French Revolution: abled, wealthy, white men. Nevertheless, the universalist ideology 
that aimed to unify the French language and culture to build the nation of France today did so under 
an essentialist discourse on identity, since regional particularities were to be erased. The fusion of the 
concepts of national identity and citizenship is another example of such unification process. The 
French colonial era continued such unification stream. When colonisation ended, the universalist 
discourse on French identity persisted and evolved by emphasizing differences. The prominence of 
the separation of the public and the private sphere is exemplified in the French notion of laïcité. 
However, this generated a paradox in the conception of French identity and double-standards 
applicable to certain (classes of) French citizens. The institutionalisation of difference changed visible 
diversity into visible excluded difference. The institutional rejection of hyphenated identity and other 
pluri-allegiances that are publicly expressed demonstrates firm position of the French republican 





attempted and still attempts to dissolve these differences. Although in doing so, the universalist 
republican ideology keeps ‘eating its tail’. Therefore, if metaphorically the animal representing the 
French Republic is a snake, it would perpetrate the vicious circle of the mainstream discourse on 
French identity impacting negatively French society and the daily experiences of some of its 
members.  
Another discourse linked to the universalist republican one is the historical and substantial 
discourse which emphasizes the symbolic feature of French identity. Frenchness or the idea that is 
made of French identity is based on past glories and defeats that reassert the grandeur and superiority 
that France has of itself and, consequently, French people have of themselves and of France. The 
Enlightenment and the French Revolution, from which the seeds of the current framework of 
universal human rights were planted, or Napoleonic wars, are historical events that fuel such 
discourse. The internationally assumed and nationally cultivated features of French language and 
culture also feed the high value of Frenchness. 
These two above types of mainstream discourses on French identity largely reflect a culture 
of war and violence where diverging cultural belongings are held in conflict and competition. The 
following features illustrate the violence present in the construction of French identity before the 
colonial era: the Reign of Terror (direct violence), the imposition of an abstract equality that rejects 
particularism (structural violence), homogenisation of language and culture (structural and cultural 
violence), nation built on (the Napoleonic) war(s) and defeats (direct violence) and the institution of 
the military service (structural violence). The colonial era per se is a clear example of the three types 
of violence, while ongoing colonialism nowadays pursue these kinds of violence through ‘reinforcing 
police effectives, bringing up troops, and setting a reign of terror which is better adapted to its interests 
and its psychology’ (Fanon, 1963: 208). After the end of colonisation, culture of war and violence of 
the mainstream discourse on French identity is reflected by the indifference to cultural diversity of 
the universalist Republican ideology. It is ‘blind’ to difference and neglects the various possible 
experiences that French citizens may have regarding the formation of their identity. The assimilation 





cultural violence. The critical assessment undertaken in this chapter however proved the contrary. 
Mainstreaming French identity under a past ideology that was exclusive implies impacts in the current 
French context reflecting cultural and structural violence: a hegemonic definition of French identity 
which may discriminate and a negative security discourse focused on -supposed negative impacts of- 
immigration which impede the positive transformation of social issues in France. 
Finally, a commonality of the above discourses on French identity is the disregard for a 
postcolonial discourse on identity. Even though such alternative discourse is present -although to a 
limited extent- in French literature, it is not popularly promoted and may even be negatively perceived 
as demeaning French grandeur. In 2009, French government’s attempt to redefine French national 
identity may only have been pursued for political gains -and for the sake of redefining it without the 
will to have real, legal and societal impacts. The substantial alternative discourses on French identity 
for now can only be promoted by civil society and via the individual reaffirmation of the uniqueness 
of the French identity of each French citizen. Thus, this chapter can be resumed as such: 
What is at stake is indeed a redefinition of the nation, a questioning of the Republic, and, with it, 
citizenship in a postcolonial France where descendants of a colonial history live now as citizens and not 
subjects. The context is no longer that of a postwar France, but a multicultural one where the concept of 
“Frenchness” itself needs to be redefined (Hannoum, 2019).  
 
However, instead of encouraging a ‘multicultural’ France, working towards an ‘intercultural’ one will 
foster alternative identities stemming from and contributing to cultures of peace(s). The next chapter 





















CHAPTER 3: THE NEXUS BETWEEN PEACE AND ALTERNATIVE IDENTITIES 
 
 
3. The Age of Global Tribes (Maalouf, 2003) 
3. The end of suffering is possible (Nhat Hanh, 2003: 87) 
 
3.1 – Introduction  
The concepts of identities and French identity have been respectively dissected and inspected 
in the past two chapters, focusing on the features of identity’ and France and the ‘right side’ of the 
nexus identity, France and peace. This chapter will focus on the ‘left side’ of the nexus by delving 
into the relationship between identity, here more specifically alternative identities, and peace, here 
more specifically cultures of peace(s). The objective of this chapter is thus to explore the societal role 
and importance of alternative identities in fostering cultures of peace(s). It also aims to find out if 
alternative identities emerge from the presence and implementation of cultures of peace(s). The sub-
research question that will try to be answered is the following: 
- In what ways do alternative identities reflect and foster cultures of peace(s) and contribute to 
peaceful relationships? 
The central theme of this chapter is therefore the study and examination of peace in all its facets, 
various notions, and associated fields of study. Such analysis will always be done with having in mind 
the framework and characteristics of alternative identities. The analysis of the relationship between 
the concepts of peace and alternative identities can be undertaken from two perspectives: which 
features of alternative identities relate to and are found in the notions of peace, cultures of peace(s) 
and peaceful relationships (and vice versa), and which features of alternative identities do not embody 
these peace-related notions (and vice versa). In other words, the two possible approaches are resumed 
as such: 
- In the characteristics of alternative identities, what amounts or what does not amount to 





- With the features of (cultures of) peace(s), what is or what is not related to alternative 
identities? 
The hypothesis in this chapter suggests that alternative identities reflect and promote cultures of 
peace(s) and contribute to peaceful relationships more than it does not. Therefore, the focus of the 
analysis will examine the aspects of alternative identities that relate to these peace notions. Such 
positive approach stems from the finding of chapter 2 where the mainstream discourse on French 
national identity amounted to a culture of war and conflict. It thus logically follows that the absence 
of institutionally recognised and societally widely acknowledged alternative identities (whether 
hybrid or transcultural) in France is linked to the absence of implemented cultures of peace(s) in the 
country. This positive approach is also taken to step away from such finding in Chapter 2. 
 This Chapter 3 is structured as such: a first section will delve into what peace is and its features 
(3.2) by analysing characteristics of peace studies and peace research (3.2.1), cultures of peace(s) 
(3.2.2) and peaceful relationships (3.2.3). A second section will assess more deeply the features of 
alternative identities (3.3) which will take into account findings of Chapter 1 and examine 
characteristics of international identity. A third section will then examine the nexus, the relationship 
and similarities between peace features and alternative identities ones (3.4). The fourth section will 
afterwards aim at ‘verifying’ the findings of the third section: it will analyse how conflict features 
(and what amounts to war) cannot be related to alternative identities (3.5). Finally, the last section 
will conclude on this chapter’s findings (3.6). 
 
3.2 – Peace features 
 
 In his 1992 book Peace: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, Anatol Rapoport listed six 
conceptions of peace and their concomitants: peace through strength, balance of power, collective 
security, peace through law, personal pacifism and revolutionary pacifism (Rapoport, 1992: 162). 
The latter three conceptions embody the characteristics of Galtung’s positive peace, which goes 
beyond the mere absence of the three types of direct, structural and cultural violence (Galtung, 1969). 





needs and foster the restoration of justice and peaceful relationships amongst other. The culture of 
peace (also called peace culture or cultural peace), alternative to cultural violence (Galtung, 1990), is 
a feature of positive peace and will be examined below. 
‘Violence and war, conflict and peace, all have one thing in common: they are relational’; 
with peace taking place ‘between actors, as a peace structure, with peace culture’ (Galtung, 2010: 
21). Analysing peace studies and peace research characteristics is to assess the actors and the structure 
while analysing cultures of peace(s) is to assess peace culture. Peace is also the condition of 
possibility of human relationships and, at the same time, a goal to be reached. It is a ‘transcendental’ 
condition realised through ‘human interrelation’ (Martínez Guzmán, 2006: 348). This supports the 
examination of peaceful relationships features. A nexus with peace knowledge (Reardon, 2000), the 
holistic interrelation (Segal de la Garza, 2019) between peace studies, peace research, peace education 
and peace action (Jenkins, 2019) can be done in regard to alternative identities. Peace action embodies 
the blossoming of peaceful relationships, peace education characterises the development of cultures 
of peace(s) and peace studies and research equals what follows in next sub-section. 
 
 3.2.1 – Peace studies and peace research 
 Within peace knowledge, peace studies and peace research amount to the academic and higher 
education area (Segal de la Garza, 2019). Therefore, it may sound more appealing to a more closed 
circle of peace workers, perhaps, even a more elitist one. However, these two facets of peace 
knowledge allow to draw theoretical understandings of the concept of peace. This sub-section will 
focus on three theories of peace studies and peace research that may enlighten the relationship 
between alternative identities and peace: peace seen as the successful transformation of conflict as 
theorised by Johan Galtung and John Paul Lederach, the features of an imperfect peace brought out 
by Francisco Muñoz and the crucial epistemological turn in peace studies of Vicent Martínez 
Guzmán. 
The transformation of conflict and the ‘transconflict actions’ (Prera-Flores and Vermeren, 





studies is about repairing relationship on all levels, moving beyond conflict resolution and shifting to 
teaching and practice of conflict transformation and reconciliation (Barash and Webel, 2013: 22). 
According to Lederach, ‘conflict transformation is a way of looking as well as seeing’ (Lederach, 
2003: 9). It allows a new perception of the conflictual situation based on dialogue, exchange and 
active listening which brings together individuals and/or groups with divergent interests. Conflict 
transformation allows recognition of the existence of a variety of truths, reflecting the diversity within 
society and subjectivity of the conflict actors (Gatelier, Dijkema and Mouafo, 2017: 58-59). The 
transformation of a conflict, instead of its resolution or management, involves its stakeholders in 
actions and tasks that are meant to transcend the conflict (Prera-Flores and Vermeren, 2001: 33). This 
conception of peace aims to work the ‘constructive perspective of social transformations’ and the 
elimination of the structural causes of the conflict (Gatelier, Dijkema and Mouafo, 2017: 56). The 
prefix ‘trans’ emphasised in this approach to peace is used to go through and beyond the conflict by 
creating something new with the input of the stakeholders to the conflict. The name of Galtung’s 
peace network ‘Transcend International’ reflects this aim of bringing a more peaceful world and 
transforming conflicts non-violently (TRANSCEND International). This transformative aspect 
parallel the way Lederach sees peace as not merely ‘a stage in time or a condition’ but ‘a dynamic 
social construct’ (Lederach, 1997: 20). However, the dynamic aspect of peace means that it is also 
changing and imperfect. 
As Francisco Muñoz recalled, conflicts are an ‘inevitable social and biological reality’ and it 
contributes to the dynamics of human history by having been present ‘in all societies and human 
activity’. Conflict stimulates the ‘search for solutions’ and is a ‘source of creativity and constant 
renewal’ (Muñoz, 2006: 46). In this sense, if conflict is defined as such, then peace also bears the 
same features. Using the adjective imperfect to qualify peace understands it as ‘unfinished’ and 
‘procedural’, with peace being a ‘presupposition that is both recognised and built from day to day’ 
(Muñoz, 2001). Peace is thus constructed and constantly in construction. The peace experienced at a 
moment X may be way different from the peace of the moment Y (or moment X +1 





This approach enables to achieve various objectives. Firstly, it affords us a global – not fractioned – 
understanding of peace. Secondly, it facilitates access to all its realities. Thirdly, it opens up better and 
greater research possibilities: it explicates them, explains them and gives them greater relevance; it 
makes them more accessible. Fourthly, it allows a greater promotion of ideas, values, attitudes and 
conducts of peace. Last but not least, it serves as a guide on the practise of peace, its enhancement and 
the advancement of its power (Muñoz, 2001). 
 
‘Imperfection’ allows us to approach the humane, where positives and negative aspects, along with 
successes and errors, can coexist (Muñoz, 2001). 
 
Finally, we believe that imperfect peace could be a useful instrument for allowing peace researchers to 
join the debate and the construction of new paradigms through which to comprehend and construct more 
peaceful, just and enduring worlds (Muñoz, 2001). 
 
This latter quote bases some of the characteristics of peace research as being a transdisciplinary field 
establishing multi-disciplinary links by adopting a worldview approach (Muñoz, 2006: 51).  Besides, 
the inter- and transdisciplinary nature of peace research methodology allows the ‘construction of a 
new paradigm that surpasses the partiality and fragmentation imposed by distinct disciplines […] to 
study the moments of peace and the forms of violence manifested in contemporary societies’ which 
requires the ‘development of new epistemological strategies’  to transform and turn what is into what 
ought to be (Muñoz, 2006: 51). 
Vicent Martínez Guzmán’s epistemological turn in peace studies is contributing to this 
paradigm change. Researcher in the field of philosophy for peace, he asserted that as humans and 
from a transcendental perspective,  
we are capable of reconstructing these moral intuitions that we all have about what would be the 
alternative conditions that would make possible the transformation of conflicts with a decrease in all 
levels of violence (direct, structural and cultural) and with an increase in the levels of positive peace, 
that is, of justice38 (Martínez Guzmán, 2001: 44). 
 
He thus listed fourteen points of the epistemological turn based on his philosophy of peace studies as 
being the reconstruction of the human capacities to make peaces (Martínez Guzmán, 2001: 112). All 
fourteen points are significant in fostering and building peace (knowledge). However, only six will 
be highlighted here. They will be helpful in understanding the relationship between alternative 
identities, including the ‘hybrid identities’ which ‘serve to cover how unique and diverse we are 
personally and collectively’ (Martínez Guzmán, 2001: 328), and (cultures of) peace(s). Those six 
 
38 My own translation. Original in Spanish: […] somos capaces de reconstruir estas intuiciones morales que todos 
tenemos sobre cuales serían las condiciones alternativas que posibilitarían la transformación de los conflictos con una 
disminución de todos los niveles de violencia (directa, estructural y cultural) y con un incremento de los niveles de paz 





points are: moving from objectivity to intersubjectivity and mutual interpellation [point 1]; the 
knowledge shift from being a relation between subject and object into a relationship between subjects, 
between peoples, who can have their own say [point 3]; the shift from neutrality regarding values to 
an epistemology committed with their interaction and acknowledgement of the different ways of 
peaceful coexistence [point 5]; the acknowledgement of humans’ possibility and capacity of doing 
things in different ways and to reconstruct these competencies to live in peace, which make pacifists 
the true realists [point 7];  the rejection of the false dichotomy between reason and care to overcome 
the hegemony of the use of reason by talking about feelings, emotions, care and tenderness [point 8]; 
the shift from a ‘neutral’ justice to a solidary and ‘caring’ one where people relate with multiple 
identities. Indeed, the old social contract denied diversity and saw every being as formally equal. The 
new contract allows for each and everyone to be considered in the plurality of one’s identity [point 
9]39 (Martínez Guzmán, 2001: 114-115). Martínez Guzmán’s fourteen points demonstrate the 
philosophical reconstruction of the possibilities of shifting from a culture of violence and war to 
cultures of peace(s) (Martínez Guzmán, 2001: 264). In relation to identity, he also characterises a 
dynamic and shifting sense of what it means to be oneself as it is embodied within ‘a bunch or bundle 
of peculiarities’ (Martínez Guzmán, 2005) and not as a static essence. 
Philosophical approach of peace has also been researched by other peace researchers. Here 
will be briefly mentioned the work of Wolfgang Dietrich on transrational peace philosophy. He 
categorised four peace families (the energetic, the moral, the modern and the postmodern). These 
peace families allow to view peace in a holistic manner and trans-rational way where rational aspects 
of modern science on peace is transgressed to acknowledge all kinds of interpretations of peace 
(Dietrich, 2014: 48).  
Thus, what these peace theories all agree with is that (social) conflict and peace must not be 
understood from a ‘single theoretical approach’ but also practically and from multiple disciplines 
(Lederach, 1996: 9). The plurality of peace studies and research consequently reverberate on the 
 
39 Translation based on Egidio de Bustamante’s translation of Martínez Guzmán’s 14 points of the epistemological turn. 
Translation can be found in the Covid-19 Slack of the online and ultimate intercultural seminar of the UJI Peace Master 






plurality of cultures of peace(s) and societies. Pluralism, whether in society or peace, equals to 
openness and require a voluntary and reciprocal recognition based on the dialectic. This process 
stems from a deep consensus aimed at transforming conflict. Thus, plural societies and cultures is 
‘not mere fragmentation’ but is made up of voluntary and multiple associations and affiliations 
(Martínez Guzmán, 2003: 26). An illustration of this pluralist feature linked to peace knowledge is 
cited by Elise Boulding (2003: 87-88) where she recommends three dimensions of citizenships to 
achieve by 2032: the local or ethnic/cultural, the national and the international. Since there is still 
twelve years to go to reach this deadline, the focus today, in 2020, in this paper will first be to delve 
into and thoroughly understand what culture(s) of peace(s) is/(are). 
 
 3.2.2 – Culture(s) of peace(s) features 
 As acknowledged in the introduction of this thesis, the inclusive approach embodied by this 
paper is the recognition of cultures of peaces, based on Elise Boulding work on Cultures of Peace -
that inspired the peace psychology take on building cultures of peace (De Rivera, 2009)- and Vicent 
Martínez Guzmán’s philosophy to make peaces. In this sense, this research aims to manifests a 
pluralist perspective. Nevertheless, this sub-section will both examine the cultures of peaces from 
this above-mentioned approach and the United Nations and UNESCO’s culture of peace. Indeed, the 
former approach was fostered and reflected upon the latter one. Besides, United Nations and 
UNESCO’s culture of peace is the institutional tool that most probably can be recognised and 
promoted by sovereign states, such as France. In this regard, it is also crucial to highlight that, in this 
paper, culture of peace is not taken from a state-based approach because the State[s] builds a ‘peace 
fortress’ within its borders and ‘the peace provided by the State[s] is not opposed to the use of force’ 
(Lejbowicz, 2006 : 63). Neither does this paper aligns with a culture of peace or peace understood in 
international law. Indeed, the presence of many low-intensity conflicts in the world questions the 
extent to which international (humanitarian) law succeed in imposing their logic of inter-state 
pacification when state institutions cannot impose a culture of peace (Lejbowicz, 2006: 64). Finally, 





Indeed, it presupposes a ‘universal model of fair and equal trade’ within and outside the state’s 
borders (Lejbowicz, 2006: 68). Besides, the use of force to guarantee internal civil peace is more 
consistent with a culture of war (Lejbowicz, 2006: 70). Therefore, ‘culture of peace’ defined by the 
United Nations and UNESCO and ‘cultures of peace(s)’ understood by academic and philosophical 
views will be related here. A quick historical review of the emergence of the notion of ‘culture(s) of 
peace’ will be done before examining it: 
- 1986: ‘The discipline we now know of as “peace studies” began shortly after the Second 
World War. However, the idea of using education to create a culture of peace was only 
introduced in 1986 (by Filipe MacGregor)’40 (De Rivera, 2009: v). 
- 1986: The Seville Statement on Violence is adopted to ‘refute scientifically the myth that 
violence is biologically predetermined in humans’ (Prera-Flores and Vermeren, 2001: 25). 
- 1989: UNESCO held an International Congress in Yamoussoukro (Ivory Coast) dedicated to 
the theme "Peace in the mind of men and women" where it adopted the vision of peace being 
more than the end of armed conflict and a behaviour. 
- 1992: ‘the UNESCO Executive Board discussed the contribution to be made towards the 
promotion of a culture of peace, in the light of the United Nations Secretary-General’s An 
Agenda for Peace’ (Symonides and Singh, 1996: 11). 
- 1993: The Forum for Education and Culture held in San Salvador led to the establishment of 
the UNESCO Culture of Peace Programme in El Salvador (Lacayo Parajon, Lourenço and 
Adams, 1996; Symonides and Singh, 1996: 11). 
- 1995: UNESCO twenty-eighth session of the General Conference adopted the 
transdisciplinary project ‘Towards a Culture of Peace’ (Symonides and Singh, 1996: 12). 
- 1996: Publication of the volume From a Culture of Violence to a Culture of Peace in 
UNESCO Peace and Conflict Issues Series. 
- 1999: United Nations Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace. It is the 
fundamental document of the culture of peace adopted by United Nations General Assembly. 
- 2000: International Year for the Culture of Peace designated by the United Nations of which 
emerged the Manifesto 2000 for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence produced by Nobel 
Peace Prize laureates. 
- 2000: Publication of Elise Boulding’s book Cultures of Peace: The Hidden Side of History. 
- 2001-2010: International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children 
of the World (resolution 53/25) was proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly for 
the first decade of the 21st century. 
 
The ‘main’ milestones of the emergence of culture(s) of peace are briefly recalled here with United 
Nations/UNESCO and academic documents mentioning culture(s) of peace. 
 
40 ‘The first reference of the "culture of peace" comes out in 1983 at the III Congress of Theology "Christians for Peace 
and Poverty” organized by the Association of Theologians John XXIII in Madrid. The same year was founded in Lima 
the Peruvian Association on Studies for Peace under the leadership of Father Felipe Mac Gregor. The General Assembly 
of the United Nations declared 1986 International Year of Peace and, in this occasion and in a joint venture of the Peruvian 
Ministry of Education and UNESCO-Peru, the book “Culture of Peace” was published in October 1986’ (The History of 






The focus is made on the last fifteen years of the twentieth century as it is when the notion 
was greatly emphasized in these types of documents. It also illustrates and parallels the involvement 
and crucial role of Federico Mayor Zaragoza, head of UNESCO from 1987 to 1999, in the promotion 
of culture(s) of peace. Besides, with the September 2001 dramatic events in the United States, 
negative peace and peace through war have mainly been used in the world instead of positive peace 
and culture(s) of peace, despite the 2001-2010 International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-
Violence. The United Nations designating the current decade 2013-2022 as the International Decade 
for the Rapprochement of Cultures engages with Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations (1993). It may 
also illustrate the extent to which the more philosophical notion of culture(s) of peace has faded to 
focus on a more practical concept of rapprochement of cultures which, nevertheless, embodied 
culture(s) of peace. Indeed, between 2001 and 2019, few steps to implement culture(s) of peace have 
been taken by the UN and UNESCO. It is only at the end of 2018 and throughout 2019 that the theme 
came back to the fore since the twentieth anniversary of the United Nations Declaration and 
Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace was in order (Chowdbury, 2019). This historical review 
has mainly highlighted the -nonbinding- legal framework of culture(s) of peace, thus also illustrating 
my international law background. The features of culture(s) of peace will now be highlighted from 
this legal framework, the peace psychology volume Handbook on Building Cultures of Peace edited 
by Joseph de Rivera and published for the 10th anniversary of the United Nations Declaration and 
Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace and other academic works. 
 When talking about culture(s) of peace, it is as important to focus on what culture is as what 
peace is. The last sub-section reviewed peace. Chapter 1 examined culture: something created and 
cultivated by the interventions of human (Omar, 2009). The culture(s) of peace refers to a metaphor 
where a plant (here, peace) is cultivated to allow it to take root and blossom to bear fruit (Prera-Flores 
and Vermeren, 2001: 33). The end goal of the culture(s) of peace is to avoid the violent aspect of 
conflicts (Prera-Flores and Vermeren, 2001: 34) since they are an inherent part of life. 
The notion of a culture of peace is a complex one as it can be approached from various 





to the development of the concept and to the development of the cultures suggested by the concept’ 
(De Rivera: v). A commonality that is to underline is the symbolic aspect of the notion of culture(s) 
of peace as being ‘a dynamic process based on democratic principles’ (Prera-Flores and Vermeren, 
2001: 13), due to the changing, flexible and not static aspect of culture. As ‘culture is a system with 
interacting parts’, the change of any element is necessarily affecting the other elements. Thus, talking 
about a ‘global culture of peace’ or ‘the different cultures of peace developed by different nations or 
communities’ (De Rivera, 2009: 3-4) is accurate as long as the systemic aspect is acknowledged. 
Another feature and ‘underlying spirit’ of culture(s) of peace (Symonides and Singh, 1996: 
11) is the respect of cultural diversity in all its dimensions: from the ‘ethical dimension and principles 
of solidarity, burden-sharing as well as respect for each other’s culture and moral values’ (Symonides 
and Singh, 1996: 19). The prioritisation of ‘cultural contacts, exchanges and creativity, at national 
and international levels, as a means of encouraging recognition of respect for others and the ways in 
which they differ’ (Symonides and Singh, 1996: 11) and the emphasis on cultural pluralism and 
intercultural dialogue of the transdisciplinary project ‘Towards a Culture of Peace’ (Symonides and 
Singh, 1996: 12) illustrate this aspect. 
Peace psychologists also have qualified the cultures of peace framework incorporating 
inclusiveness, respect for difference, participation by different groups, meeting identity needs and 
cultural sensitivity (Wessells, Schwebel and Anderson, 2001: 351). 
There is also a nexus to be made between culture(s) of peace and human rights. The culture(s) 
of peace consists of an interactive triangle between democracy, human rights and development: a 
virtuous circle where the synergies that are formed are irresistible and invulnerable (Prera-Flores and 
Vermeren, 2001: 37). Elements of the set of ethical and aesthetic values as well as attitudes, traditions 
and modes of behaviour of culture of peace encompass features of exchange and acceptance: 
tolerance, acceptance of differences, communication and understanding between diverse groups, free 
flow of information and knowledge, dialogue, respect, life in full vibrancy, pluralism, cultural 





Another nexus between culture(s) of peace and nonviolence is also mandatory to highlight. 
Eastern approaches to peace highly influence such understanding of culture(s) of peace. The ‘Tangled 
Hierarchy of Love/Sharing/Compassion/Sustainability/Peace Consciousness’ (Annex 1) may thus 
equal to a different approach to a culture of peace (Chopra, 2006: 15). Nevertheless, cultural peace is 
characterised as ‘not a set of peaceful, non-violent representations of a reality’ but as the extent to 
which it ‘affects behaviour in conflict’ (Galtung, 1996: 77). In this sense, Martínez Guzmán stated 
that the construction of new ways of cultivating human relationships and new cultures to make peaces 
and foster cultural dialogues41 were needed (Martínez Guzmán, 2001: 68). These peaceful human 
relationships’ traits are now reviewed. 
 
 3.2.3 – Peaceful relationships 
The concept examined in this sub-section is valuable in finding another layer to the nexus 
between identity and (cultures of) peace(s). According to John Paul Lederach: 
Here, peacebuilding is understood as a comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates, and sustains 
the full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict towards more 
sustainable, peaceful relationships. […] Metaphorically, peace is seen not merely as a stage in time or a 
condition. It is a dynamic social construct (Lederach, 1997: 20). 
 
Thus, the transformation of identity conflicts presupposes the reach of peaceful relationships. The 
past two sections have inspected the processes and stages of peace knowledge and culture(s) of peace. 
This sub-section will briefly examine the features of the peace epistemologies of Ubuntu, Satyagraha 
and Buddhist approaches to peace (Gatelier, Dijkema and Mouafo, 2017: 71-73) fostering peace(ful 
relationships). This sub-section takes thus a more spiritual approach to peace while the past two 
encompassed a more rational and emotional one. Peace epistemologies coming from South America, 
such as Sumak Kawsay, are also recognised as significant in building peaceful relationships as the 
African and the two Asian above-mentioned. However, the South American type is not examined as 
this paper has a postcolonial lens and not a decolonial one, which many South American 
 
41 My own translation. Original in Spanish: […] necesitamos construir nuevas maneras de cultivar las relaciones 





epistemologies foster and stem from. Features of exchange, connection and acceptance will be 
stressed in the three epistemologies. 
Ubuntu is a South African life philosophy expressing the importance of humanity as whole, 
with the feeling of belonging to something bigger which is translated by openness and availability to 
others (Gatelier, Dijkema and Mouafo, 2017: 71). Its diversity of definitions attest of the 
predominance and importance of human connection. Desmond Tutu qualified it as having to do with 
‘what it means to be truly human, to know that you are bound up with others in the bundle of life’. 
He continues saying that one is human because one belongs, and that Ubuntu is about wholeness 
(Hailey, 2008). The South African government’s definition of Ubuntu also illustrates the exchange, 
connection and acceptance features that may also be related and impact the approach of discourses 
on identity: 
[…] a spirit of mutual support. Each individual’s humanity is ideally expressed through his or her [or 
their] relationship with others and theirs in turn are people through other people. It also acknowledges 
both the rights and responsibilities of every citizen in promoting individual and societal well-being 
(Hailey, 2008: 3). 
 
Satyagraha, although born in South Africa, is the invention of Indian peace activist Gandhi. It 
designs the mode of thought and action fighting against oppression and discrimination. Politically, 
Satyagraha is translated as the refusal to obey to a law considered unjust while accepting the incurred 
penalty. Using such nonviolent tool is done in the aim to reach a new level of social truth and build 
healthy relationships between people having opposing points of view, despite the possibility of being 
punished (Gatelier, Dijkema and Mouafo, 2017: 71-72). The Sanskrit meaning of Satyagraha 
exemplifies acceptance: ‘Satya’ means ‘the way things are’ or ‘the state of being or truth’ and ‘graha’ 
means ‘to grasp, to understand or to capture’ (Martínez Guzmán, 2006: 341). Thus, this concept helps 
‘self-realisation’, the ‘construction of the being itself and everything related to one’s multiple trials 
with truth’ (Martínez Guzmán, 2006: 342). The relationship between means and end in Satyagraha 
reveals the importance of connection while the exchange feature is displayed by the recognition of 
the absence of actual opponent or enemy: 
The means may be likened to a seed, the end to a tree; and there is just the same inviolable connection 
between the means and the end as there is between the seed and the tree (Jack, 2005: 88). 
 






In the dictionary of satyagraha there is no enemy (Jack, 2005: 96). 
 
Finally, Buddhism contains many ideas which are sources of peace. Twenty strong points for 
peace are recounted by Johan Galtung, including anatta doctrine which opposes the fragmentation 
concept as there is ‘no individual soul’ (Galtung, 1985: 3). Buddhism contradicts the idea that an 
individual is a specific and unique being to propose the unity of all living beings. Unity within 
diversity is put at the fore. In this sense, the answer of a Buddhist person to the question “Is it this or 
that?” would be “It is this AND that”. The dialectic breaking the binary opposition is regularly 
mentioned in Buddhism, as well as impermanence. Both elements permit the imagination of a space 
for complexity to be allowed, differences to be integrated and interdependence to be emphasized 
(Gatelier, Dijkema and Mouafo, 2017: 72-73). The following quotes by Thich Nhat Hanh, zen 
Buddhist master, and his Holiness the Dalai Lama display the exchange, connection and acceptance 
features necessary for the building of peaceful relationships: 
Peace is not simply the absence of violence; it is he cultivation of understanding, insight and compassion, 
combined with action (Nhat Hanh, 2003: 5). 
 
As my friend Martin Luther King Jr. wrote. “All life is interrelated. We are all caught in an inescapable 
network of mutuality, tied into a single garment of destiny” (Nhat Hanh, 2003: 6). 
 
The spiritual teachings of all traditions help us cultivate the seeds of compassion, nonviolence, 
inclusiveness, and reconciliation (Nhat Hanh, 2003: 6). 
 
To build community, it is important to accept the insight of interbeing, of interconnectedness (Nhat 
Hanh, 2003: 175). 
 
The practice method of contemplating with loving-kindness and compassion can bring great ease and 
happiness (Nhat Hanh, 2011: 53). 
 
Love does not discriminate (Dalai Lama, 2000: 53). 
 
Love and compassion are the moral fabric of world peace (Dalai Lama, 2000: 147). 
 
Since experience and knowledge are impermanent and subject to disintegration, the mind of which they 
are functions is not something that remains constant and eternal (Dalai Lama, 2000: 156). 
 
These epistemological knowledges demonstrate that all kind of knowledges must be recognised 
at all levels (global, national, local, personal) for peaceful relationships to blossom. This right to a 
collectivity’s own knowledge, the right to be different, is part of Vicent Martínez Guzmán’s 





characterised by plurality, peaceful relationships are possible when individual and collective identity 
construction is recognised because of those human relationships: 
In short, our conception of human beings in relation to making peace(s) recognizes that the constitution 
of our own personal and collective identity is always done through interactions with other identities and 
human groups. […] Nevertheless, through the fostering of our humility, terrastrialness and frailty, 
interdependence can also lead to organizing ourselves both and politically, and can generate the 
transformation of conflicts through peaceful means (Martínez Guzmán, 2005). 
 
Cultures of peace(s) and peaceful relationships are thus built and regenerated through a virtuous circle 
composed of creativity and alternative thinking that allows to positively transform any conflict, 
including identity conflicts: 
If the solution to the conflict were within mainstream thinking, then that solution would probably already 
have been found, and enacted. When this is not the case, a reasonable hypothesis would be that sufficient 
creativity is needed to transcend mainstream thinking (Galtung, 1996: 80). 
 
Peace studies and research have helped in theorising alternative hypotheses to transcend mainstream 
thinking. The observation of the flourishing of alternative identities is one of them. 
 
3.3 – Alternative identities features  
 
 This section will very briefly recall a couple of characteristics of hybrid and transcultural 
identities, the alternative identities that have been studied in Chapters 1 and 2, in order to highlight 
some negative aspects they may entail. It will then be examined the concept of international identity, 
another type of alternative and newly coming identity that will help to analysing the nexus between 
(cultures of) peace(s) and alternative identities of the next section. 
Hybrid and transcultural identities are concepts that have emerged due to the tremendous wave 
of immigration movements and globalisation in the world. The technological and internet revolution 
added to the rise of the flying industry are the aspects that have permitted a lot of people to diversify 
their experiences and understanding of the world. This accumulation of cultural experiences added to 
the original cultural background(s) of the individual may provoke internal identity conflicts. The 
‘emotional turmoil’ and ‘sense of attachment and detachment’ experienced by the subject is due to 
the internal elements in movement and emerging depending on the topic, person or place they are 
interacting with (Crawford and al., 2014: 98). Nevertheless, hybridity and transculturality of a person 





Individuals from the dominant culture may also become 'hybrid' by selectively appropriating minority 
cultural practices, symbols and ideas, but this process does not lead to genuine openness and the 
abandoning of some of the dominant cultural practices, values, and symbols. […] Furthermore, the remix 
generation may also be less interested in upsetting the status quo […] (Marotta, 2011: 197). 
 
The characteristics of the three types of ‘international identity’ may help in understanding in 
what ways alternative identities can have a role in disturbing the status quo and contribute to (cultures 
of) peace(s), peaceful relationships and societies. The conception of ‘international identity’ by Holly 
Arrow and Norman D. Sundberg (2004) is defined as: 
those aspects of a person's sense of self that transcend national boundaries - relates to three truths about 
people articulated by Kluckhohn and Murray (1953, p. 35): Every person is in certain respects like all 
others, like some others and like no other.  
 
The three truths are associated with the three types of international identity. First, every person being 
like all others amounts to ‘global-human identity’ (Der-Karabetian and Balian, 1992) arising from 
the recognition and the ‘world-mindedness’ (Sampson and Smith, 1957) of everyone being like all 
other people (Arrow and Sundberg, 2004: 55). Defining features include identification with all 
peoples of the world and transcending national boundaries (Arrow and Sundberg, 2004: 55). Second, 
every person being like some others can sound slightly exclusive at first. It relates to the person’s 
social identification with a large social group and recognises that for many aspects of self, one is like 
some people and unlike others, regardless of other people nationalities (Arrow and Sundberg, 2004: 
55-56). Religious identity is the most common example of this type of international identity. Finally, 
every person being like no other is a complete reflection of today’s globalised world. People have 
indeed unique individual networks and idiosyncratic connections with other people and places across 
the world (Arrow and Sundberg, 2004: 55). Such ‘personal set of connections’ implies a ‘more 
individualized, interpersonal aspect of international identity’ (Arrow and Sundberg, 2004: 56). It 
involves the relational self (Brewer and Gardner, 1996). It is thus talked about an ‘ego-centered 
network’ which is unique and based on personal experience and history. It involves people, places 
and events that create personal and emotional connections to the subject (Arrow and Sundberg, 2004: 
56-57). Therefore, it becomes possible for an individual to feel as belonging and coming from those 
peoples, places and experiences. This latter thus also echoes Taiye Selasi’s TED Talk titled Don’t ask 





from. Nevertheless, these three types of international identity may not be developed by all people 
around the world, since each subject’s privileges -or lack of- and personality may influence its 
emergence or not (Arrow and Sundberg, 2004: 61). Moreover, even if global-human identity 
‘promotes working for the good of the whole’, some ‘people who see themselves as "world citizens" 
may not fully appreciate or respect national differences’ (Arrow and Sundberg, 2004: 63), as it was 
evoked above. In this sense, analysing the extent of the openness to differences of individuals having 
an international identity is also necessary to measure if they disturb the status quo and promote 
(cultures of) peace(s) and peaceful relationships and societies. This is out of the scope of this paper, 
but next section will analyse the theoretical nexus between (cultures of) peace(s) and those alternative 
identities. 
 
3.4 – Nexus between (cultures of) peace(s) and alternative identities  
 The analysis of the nexus is based on the findings of Chapter 1 and 2 of this paper as well as 
the assessment undertaken in the past sections of this Chapter 3. 
The recompilation of peace and alternative identities features has permitted to extract thirteen 
aspects to examine the nexus between the two notions. Eleven of the aspects are shared between at 
least one element of each notion while two remain in peace features (at least in this analysis). Peace 
features elements are peace studies and research, culture(s) of peace(s) and peaceful relationships. 
Alternative identities features are hybrid, transcultural and international identities with the latter being 
divided in the three types above-mentioned. The thirteen aspects of analysis are 
acceptance/recognition [1], openness/cultural diversity/creativity [2], process [3], space [4], inter- 
(interculturality, interaction, exchange) [5], no dichotomy [6], dialectic [7], pluralism [8], movement 
(active/dynamic) [9], trans- (transdisciplinary, going through and beyond) [10], connection [11], 
dialogue [12]  and healing [13]. The latter two aspects are only found in peace features in this analysis. 
Nevertheless, it must be mentioned that such analysis is not exhaustive and only aims to open the 
reflection on the relationship between peace and alternative identities and the influence that they have 





The findings highlight that the nexus can be divided in three prospects: the aspects that the 
three peace features and at least one alternative identities feature tick (aspects from 1 to 5, in light 
green in the table below), the aspects that two peace features and at least one alternative identities 
feature tick (aspects from 6 to 11, in light blue in the table below) and the aspects that only peace 
features tick (aspects 12 and 13, in purple in the table below). 
While peace studies and research tick all the boxes, hybrid identity is the main type of 
alternative identities ticking the majority of boxes. While culture(s) of peace(s) and peaceful 
relationships are respectively lacking three and four boxes to tick, transcultural identity, global-
human identity and international personal links each only tick two or three boxes. For the peace 
features, more literature review and research may fill up the gaps. However, for the identity types, it 
may be trickier to find the qualitative connections to the lacking aspects. The social identity element 
is the only alternative identity not being linked to any aspects (in red in the table below). This 
emphasize the ‘exclusiveness’ of being ‘like some other’ that may fuel a clash between those who are 
in and those who are out. Finally, a certain ‘exclusiveness’ (in yellow in the table below) is visible in 
all elements except for hybrid identity, transcultural identity and peaceful relationships (in green in 
the table below). Such ‘exclusiveness’ depends however on how they are approached and managed 
by the entities and individuals concerned. This overall ‘exclusiveness’ aspect is also more salient with 
the three types of international identity and stress the extent to which international identity can still 
embody a certain type of domination and cultural hegemony. 
Below is a recapitulative table of the nexus analysis. Annex 2 demonstrates the specific 





Source: my own elaboration.  
 It thus visually appears from this nexus analysis table that alternative identities, especially 
hybrid identity, have a close connection to peace features, with Annex 2 showing to which extent. 
Therefore, peace and alternative identities share mutual elements and the possibility of each other to 
emerge and foster the other one is highly thinkable. A brief counter-nexus of this finding will be 
undertaken in the next section to support and argue it. 
 
3.5 – Counter-Nexus: connections between what peace and alternative identities are not 
This counter-nexus will serve as an attempt to verify the veracity of the findings of the past 
section. Nevertheless, it must be mentioned that there is no true truth, only a plurality of realities. 
Therefore, this nexus and counter-nexus are only attempting to understand the theoretical mechanisms 
and links of peace and alternative identities to later bring them into realities. 
Reminding Galtung (2010: 21), it is acknowledged that violence, war, conflict and peace share 
a relational aspect. The difference between them is how such relationality is run. In the other side of 
the spectrum of peace studies and research are found war (studies) and nationalism. Patriotism and 
nationalism, ideologies embedded in the notion of attachment (Herrmann, Isernia and Segatti, 2009: 
725), create the concept of national identity. This latter is criticised has being the root of ‘mass-based 

















Acceptance, Recognition x x x x x
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Diversity, Creativity
x x x x
Processus x x x x
Space x x x x
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x x x x x x
No dichotomy x x x
Dialectic x x x
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is also often approached from a sentiment of superiority and generates a culture of competition and 
contest (Herrmann, Isernia and Segatti, 2009: 729), whether it be in the military, sports or even 
cultural realms. Besides, according to Reardon (1985) war and violence are justified because of fear 
of diversity, which is translated with the fear of identity loss at the cultural level (Comins Mingol, 
2003: 101). All these above aspects of war and nationalism demonstrate a dichotomic and competitive 
approach to relationships which does not amount to the ‘unity in diversity’ and cooperative ones 
found in peace features. Besides, these ideologies do not embody a nonattachment feature that allows 
individuals and their identity to move freely in peace as highlighted previously. Thus, the verifying 
counter-nexus has in this aspect a positive result. 
Cultural violence and colonialism features are then to be analysed in regards of culture(s) of 
peace(s). According to Fanon (1963), violence is colonialism’s natural state. Therefore, any aspects 
experienced as colonialist -whether by the colonised or the coloniser- do not amount to the peace 
features of ‘healing’. Even if no alternative identities feature was found as ‘healing’ in the previous 
analysis, the impossibility of auto-definition imposed by colonialism -and Orientalism- leaves to 
think that alternative identities, especially the hybrid one, allow a sort of ‘healing’ (space) and self-
realisation. 
The mainstream concepts of ‘objectivity, neutrality and lack of commitment to values’ found 
in Western societies have erased and ‘continued dominating, excluding and marginalizing other 
knowledge, wisdom, cultures and modes of understanding’ (Martínez Guzmán, 2005). This verifies 
the lack of inter-subjectivity and diversity that, however, illustrates both culture(s) of peace and 
alternative identities. 
Finally, conflicts are often seen as an obstacle to peaceful relationships and not as a positive 
‘catalyst’ to work towards these latter. As Dietrich (2014: 50) recalls, ‘individuals mostly perceive 
peace as the harmonious flow of all existing things, as long as they are not asked about religious, 
cultural, societal or political values and norms’. By omitting the often critical and conflictual social 
and political topics, individuals would therefore neglect Lederach’s ‘inherent to life’ aspect of 





amount to their certain essentialisation and mutual exclusivity (Crawford and al., 2014: 89), two 
aspects that peace and alternative identities do not epitomise. 
 
3.6 – Conclusion  
 This chapter aimed at opening a new reflection on the connection between peace and identity, 
especially the alternatives of hybrid, transcultural and international identities. Such research and 
reflection have indeed never been undertaken before. Thus, this chapter is a sketch for further research 
on the relationship between peace and alternative identities. It is also an investigation that will support 
and fuel the reflections of next Chapter 4 since the hypothesised finding at the beginning of this 
chapter is confirmed. Therefore, it can be affirmed that alternative identities (hybrid, transcultural 
and international) stems from and foster cultures of peace(s) and also contribute to peaceful 
relationships. 
The examination of theoretical and practical features of peace allowed to gather aspects for 
comparation with alternative identities features. The thirteen aspects found exemplify a reciprocal 
recognition between the subjects through exchange, connection and acceptance. Peace studies and 
research embody all thirteen aspects. On the contrary, few aspects were not found in cultures of 
peace(s) and peaceful relationships. It, however, may seem understandable since peace studies aims 
at examining theoretically the two other peace mechanisms. However, the theories used in this chapter 
all come from Western white men and it would be interesting to find out aspects stemming from more 
diverse backgrounds, for inclusiveness. The world of academia being also Westernised, it appears a 
challenging task nonetheless an exciting one. 
‘Inclusiveness’ is also the ‘mother’ aspect to which the thirteen aspects refer to. ‘Exclusive’ 
features have also been found in some of the peace and alternative identities ones, except peaceful 
relationships, hybrid and transcultural identities. Therefore, an emphasis on hybrid identity must be 
highlighted. Indeed, the analysis demonstrated that it nearly ticked all the peace features boxes, except 
the ‘trans-’, connection, dialogue and healing aspects. Nevertheless, the analysis is mainly a textual 





elements to make them interact and connect in dialogue, in the view of healing the individual and, 
consequently, society in their identity conflicts. 
The counter-nexus confirmed the incompatibility of any war, violent, colonialist or 
competitive features with, obviously, the peace ones and, therefore, the alternative identities ones. 
Thus, alternative identities do not stem from and foster cultures of war, violence, colonialism or 
competition (and vice-versa). Sadly, France exemplifies such cultures, as found in Chapter 2. The 
introduction of alternative identities, specifically hybrid identity, in the French context would thus 
help the positive transformation of such cultural state. Chapter 4 will now inspect how it can be done 























CHAPTER 4: FRENCH -ALTERNATIVE- IDENTITIES 
 
 
4. Taming the Panther (Maalouf, 2003) 
4. There is a path to the end of suffering (Nhat Hanh, 2003: 87) 
 
4.1 – Introduction  
The last three chapters examined the concepts of the two ‘top sides’ of the nexus triangle 
between identity, France and peace. Chapter 1 focused on the immense topic of identity. Chapter 2 
focused on the ‘right side’ of the triangle with the nexus between identity and France. Finally, Chapter 
3 focused on the ‘left side’ of the triangle with the nexus between identity and peace. This Chapter, 
Chapter 4, is the last of this thesis. It focuses on the ‘bottom side’ of the triangle with the nexus 
between France and peace. This chapter aims to continue the constructive perspective of peace studies 
in this paper. Indeed, the first two chapters took a critical approach to the identity issue in France 
while Chapter 3 and this one are attempts to draw constructive paths towards its peaceful 
transformation. 
The means exposed below aim at finding ways to introduce institutionally and in popular 
wisdom within society the concepts of alternative identities, specifically hybrid identity, in France. 
This would go along with the introduction and practice of cultures of peace(s) in France. This last 
chapter aims at answering the sub-research question: 
- How can alternative identities be institutionally and societally introduced and recognised in 
France through the practice of cultures of peace(s)? 
To institutionalise into French norms the concept of alternative identities is unthinkable and almost 
impossible to establish from one day to another. Indeed, introducing the concept itself would require 
a bold move from French (high positioned) politicians and is far from being possible. It is, thus, the 
cultivation in the long term of the notion cultures of peace(s) that will lead to their legitimation and 
legalisation. Thus, the seeds of French alternative identities must be planted from the bottom up with 





from the bottom up’ (Social Justice Initiative, 2020). This will facilitate the understanding of the need 
to accept and include French alternative identities. 
In the last chapter the visible correlation was sketched between alternative identities and 
culture(s) of peace(s). Therefore, working towards the institutional and social recognition of 
alternative identities can be done by fostering culture(s) of peace(s). Thus, French alternative 
identities can be introduced by promoting cultures of peace(s), peace studies or peaceful relationships 
but also by supporting the concept itself of alternative identities -content wise- at the societal level.  
Whether to introduce alternative identities ‘directly’ or ‘indirectly’, the processes to be undertaken 
must be examined at the various levels of society: macro (institutional), meso (societal, community) 
and micro (interpersonal, intrapersonal). At the macro level, a paradigm change in French policies 
would need to take place. At the meso and micro levels, the concept can be introduced and promoted 
through interpersonal contacts and interactions, through deep and honest dialogue aiming at 
understanding each other’s point of view. 
Nevertheless, it is socially felt that culture in France is a culture of protest and contest, hence 
a culture of conflict and war. Indeed, whenever a new law is enacted without consent from even a 
small part of the population, strikes movements (mouvements de grève) are likely to happen. There is 
not a culture of ‘for something’ but a culture of ‘against something’.42 Thus, the culture in France is 
more of negative peace than positive peace. Some reflections alike came from my Colombian 
housemate who lived in Lyon for two years and noticed that when saying the antonyms of words 
(from her point of view), French people add the negative ‘not’ (pas) to the adjective in question (c’est 
cher/c’est pas cher) when speaking; whereas in other languages (cf English and Spanish) there are 
specific words for that antonym (expensive/cheap – caro/barato). This illustrates the approach to 
peace in France highly linked to security and neutrality (Vaïsse, 2004: 331-332). Such approach goes 
against the commitment to peace values of Vicent Martínez Guzmán’s epistemological turn. Such 
turn is probably what is needed in France: a paradigm shift on the topic of French identity and, also, 
 
42 This reflection came out while discussing with Barbara Torrente, a peace master student and French citizen, on 27th 
May 2020. Maurice Vaïsse’s 2004 article on ‘A Certain Idea of Peace in France from 1945 to the Present Day’ 





on the approach to peace and the cultures of peace(s). It can take place only with a systemic change 
and transformation at multi layers and interactional levels theoretically (first) and practically 
(second), both nourishing each other in a virtuous circle. 
This paradigm shift towards the construction of cultures of peace(s) in France to introduce 
French alternative identities is needed, for positive peace to blossom and transform the structural 
violence (Muñoz, 2001) present in France. This chapter will thus sketch the staple concepts to 
implement at the macro-institutional level (4.2) and the ones at the meso-societal and micro-
interpersonal levels (4.3) needed for French alternative identities to be accepted. As Lederach’s 
pyramid of conflict suggested (Lederach, 1997: 39), the type of interventions must be undertaken by 
different actors in various layers in society: from top leaders, through middle range actors to the 
grassroot essential ones. A brief recollection of actions and interventions currently present in France 
will be also highlighted (4.4) which will lead to consider what could be the next steps to undertake 
(4.5). The conclusion will gather the findings of this chapter (4.6) before advancing to the general 
conclusions of this thesis. 
 
4.2 – Staples to implement at the macro-institutional level 
The classical tradition of European social theory affirms the apprehension of the social world 
in a rational way via discourses in the public sphere aimed at resolving questions of ordering society 
(Preston, 1997: 3). ‘Ordering society’, however, does not always equals to peace. Thus, discourses in 
the public sphere aimed at peace presupposes the recognition of equality and dignity of all (Prera-
Flores and Vermeren, 2001: 28): dignity of all people and cultures and the equality of access to -
peace- education. 
 
 4.2.1 – Recognition  
[…] without the moral conviction that there is a duty to recognise and value the distinct cultural identity 
of the Other, the foreigner, the immigrant, the asylum seeker, immigration policies will fail and civic 
peace will remain a distant dream. We have to understand, following Lévinas, that we are morally 
responsible for preserving these differences, as they are constitutive of our own global humanity. A 






Recognition is the first duty that must be established at the macro-institutional level. However, there 
is a paradigm shift to build in the moral conviction of French institutions, by going from embracing 
the moral concept of tolerance -but implementing a politics of forgetting (Hannoum, 2019; Spencer, 
2006: 204)- to embrace the moral concept of recognition. 
Indeed, even if tolerance promotes respect towards each other in the negotiation of solutions 
(Prera-Flores and Vermeren, 2001: 40), it can also have a negative connotation. Indeed, Galtung 
(2010: 30) defines tolerance as ‘space for them as well’ which is ‘not good enough’ in going beyond 
dualism; and Maalouf (1998: 68) is ‘not satisfied’ with it as he wishes to be considered in his full 
identity. Dictionary definitions define tolerance as ‘capacity to endure pain or hardship’, ‘sympathy 
or indulgence for beliefs or practices differing from or conflicting with one's own’ or ‘the allowable 
deviation from a standard’ (Merriam-Webster). It also means ‘willingness to accept behaviour and 
beliefs that are different from your own, although you might not agree with or approve of them’ or 
the ability to deal with something unpleasant or annoying, or to continue existing despite bad or 
difficult conditions’ (Cambridge). It therefore appears that the knowledges as such are accepted but 
the content of the variety of knowledges is ignored. With tolerance, there is thus an ignorance of the 
actual knowledge which are, however, formally accepted. Ignorance fuels perceptions. Therefore, 
perceptions may replace knowledge and, when a ‘clash’ is taking place, it is a Clash of Perceptions 
(Cataldi, 2011). Sidi Omar (2015) proposed to tackle ignorance by going beyond such Clash of 
Ignorance (Said, 2001). Indeed, ignorance is not only the ‘accidental unconsciousness’43 but it is 
constructed and is perpetuated through the social and cultural normalisation of some knowledges and 
lack of knowledges which become generalised ‘common sense’ after some time and serve political 
and social end (Omar, 2015: 204-205). Omar also adds that etymologically ‘recognition’ derives from 
re-cognoscere in Latin. The prefix re- means ‘again’ and cognoscere means ‘to know’. Therefore, ‘to 
recognise’ means ‘knowing again’ and ‘recognition’ presupposes a ‘continuous process of knowing 
and understanding each other in a critical and self-reflective manner’. On the contrary, tolerans in 
Latin means ‘hold on and endure’ and, thus, can suppose ‘an attitude of moral or cultural superiority 
 





and indifference’ (Omar, 2015: 207). This traditional view of tolerance is based on the fusion between 
cultures and values which make differences and distinctions disappear (Audard, 2003), equating the 
French approach to being blind to difference. 
This paper aligns with Sidi Omar’s proposition of the critical interculturality which implies a 
mutual recognition44 beyond the mere and passive tolerance (Omar, 2015: 207). The mutual 
recognition was advised by Frantz Fanon (1986: 217) to break the vicious circle of denying the other; 
and the critical interculturality can be related to Axel Honneth’s structure of relations of recognition 
including love, rights and solidarity (Honneth, 1995: 95). However, his theory emphasises on self and 
interpersonal recognition. Even though the capacity for self-recognition is an important issue (Hall, 
1996: 8), this sub-section will focus on recognition at the macro-institutional level and will rely on 
Charles Taylor’s work on the politics of recognition. Taylor’s reflection interests this research as it 
draws on the ‘supposed links between recognition and identity’ where 
identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a 
person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them 
mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves (Taylor, 1992: 25). 
 
Taylor considered recognition as a ‘vital human need’ (Taylor, 1992: 26). It is thus equalled in this 
paper to identity, which is also a basic human need as observed in Chapter 1. At the end of the 
eighteenth century, the change in the understanding of identity with the emphasis on individual 
identity affected the conception of the concept of recognition (Taylor, 1992: 28). Recognition was 
thus illustrated by the politics of universalism and equal dignity with the ‘equalization of rights and 
entitlements’ as all human beings are ‘equally worthy of respect’. Nevertheless, the existence of ‘first-
class’ and ‘second-class’ citizens remains an issue to be theoretically and practically avoided with 
such politics (Taylor, 1992: 37-39), as witnessed in France. On the contrary, the politics of difference 
emerged with the development of the modern conception of identity. The politics of difference 
recognises the unique identity and the distinctness of an individual or group from any other else. 
However, such difference still remains ‘assimilated to a dominant majority’ which goes against an 
‘authentic’ recognition of identities and the needs linked to it. The universalist views on which the 
 
44 Lola Akin Ojelabi (2010) also used this term as ‘mutual recognition and acknowledgement of needs and interests is 





politics of difference relies upon may explain this lack of full recognition (Taylor, 1992: 38). This 
paper sides with Taylor’s approach where true recognition acknowledges the dialogical character of 
human life, hence the dialogical character of identity, as ‘people do not acquire the languages needed 
for self-definition on their own’ but ‘through interaction with others’. This dialogical approach to 
human life was however never visible in Western, mainstream and modern philosophy (Taylor, 1992: 
32). As Taylor stated, identity, who one is and where one comes from, is defined ‘in dialogue with, 
sometimes in struggle against, the things [our significant] others want to see in us’ (Taylor, 1992: 
33). 
In relation to peace studies and cultures of peace(s) perspectives, defining identity ‘in dialogue 
with’ rather than ‘in struggle against’ should be preferred. This latter definition is sadly more 
observed in France. A kind of ‘general recognition’ of differences is acknowledged with the politics 
of equal dignity and difference as ‘socially derived identity’ are built on social categories taken for 
granted. However, a kind of generally particular recognition (equalling ‘unity in diversity’) is not yet 
observed in France as ‘inwardly derived, personal, original identity doesn’t enjoy this recognition a 
priori’ (Taylor, 1992: 34), yet. 
Recognition in France is based on differentiation. The public and general recognition does not 
emphasize the importance and ‘moral requirement’ of cultural identity, whether people come from 
minorities of the provinces or immigration (Audard, 2003). Nevertheless, Catherine Audard (2003) 
argues that it is not all ‘doom and gloom’45 and that hope and possibilities for a change ‘have not all 
been completely exhausted’. The balance between universality and particularity can be achieved, 
though with challenges, if ‘universality is attributed only to the political institutions of the state and 
not to the cultural tradition within which they have emerged’. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Christian 
influences of the French Republic would need to be, first, acknowledged to, second, be dropped. 
Audard’s proposition to reach such balance is to use ‘this ambiguity to open up another vision of the 
"civic nation", a polycentric one within which differentiated sub-national communities could 
 
45 Rosa Freedman’s 2014 book Failing to Protect: The UN and the Politicisation of Human Rights also contains a 
chapter called ‘It is Not All Doom and Gloom’. Moreover, the last three chapters of her book are alternatives proposals, 





flourish’. She calls for a multicultural citizenship to be considered as it would strengthen the 
individual’s attachment to republican and democratic values. She also emphasizes that with a 
hypothetic French multicultural citizenship to become reality, ‘group-differentiated rights should 
always be seen as rights of the individual’ to be ‘conducive to integration in the long run and not a 
source of division and hostility’. The word ‘integration’ could be replaced by ‘inclusion’ to embrace 
peace studies and cultures of peace(s) perspectives. She concludes that the issue regarding French 
identity is a moral one, impeding any attempt of inclusion in France: 
The moral problem, which is at the basis of multicultural citizenship is then clearly formulated: how to 
create peace and solidarity within a fractured polis, between divided allegiances, fragmented identities, 
where daily fears of the otherness of the Other are obstacles in the quest for inclusion? This is a truly 
moral problem, not simply a political one (Audard, 2003). 
 
Whether an inclusive approach to French identity would be called ‘multicultural citizenship’ or 
French alternative/hybrid/transcultural identities as proposed in this research, the common aim and 
demand of these proposals follow Charles Taylor’s point that ‘we all recognize the equal value of 
different cultures; that we not only let them survive, but acknowledge their worth (Taylor, 1992: 63-
64). This -moral- institutional recognition aims for a reconciliation between France and its historical 
past which fuels a French divided society (de la Rey, 2001: 251). Recognition also endeavours 
towards the reconstruction of the French social fabric. As it is a moral issue, the paradigm shift must 
first happen in the minds of French people, through grassroot moral work, with the personal 
recognition of the identity depth present in each French human being and the moral importance of 
being true to oneself (Taylor, 1992: 29-30). Personal identity map and identities visual representation 
for understanding oneself (Sirin, Katsiaficas and Volpe, 2010: 22) can be the first step to a generally 
particular recognition. The French education through its school system is the institutional means that 
can induce a paradigm shift. Primary and secondary schools as well as university departments must 
rely on an inclusive and intercultural (as in beyond multicultural) curriculum. This latter would take 
in account both colonisers and colonised historical, sociological, political, philosophical or gendered 
(amongst others) points of views to avoid only relying on ‘dead white males’ contributions (Taylor, 
1992: 65-66). Recognition of the pluralities will lead to the reconciliation of the multiplicity. The 






 4.2.2 – Peace education  
As Federico Mayor Zaragoza, UNESCO ex-General Director stated, ‘education is THE 
solution’ to build the defences of peace in the minds of humans; such education taking place all along 
one’s life in an interactive way (Prera-Flores and Vermeren, 2001: 6). However, when examined more 
closely, education curricula are often constructed from a violent and competitive perspective; leaving 
on the side educative notions, readings and practices based on peace values (Fernández-Herrería and 
López-López, 2014: 118). Peace education must be implemented, instead of the current universal 
education based on the hegemonic discourse of French history and culture (Chapter 2), to proceed to 
the paradigm change. Indeed, peace education stems from and fosters cultures of peace(s) contexts. 
Thus, when the social and political context is one of a culture of war, conflict and contest, education 
is not undertaken with peace values. Since it has been demonstrated in Chapter 3 the close link 
between peace knowledge and alternative identities, it is thus logical to assume that conveying peace 
knowledge and values can lead to the acceptance and recognition of alternative identities. 
Ian M. Harris (2004) defines peace education as the teachings about peace, what it is and how 
to achieve it. He states that peace education has five main postulates: explaining the roots of violence, 
teaching alternatives to violence, adjusting to cover different forms of violence, seeing peace itself as 
process and acknowledging that conflict is omnipresent (Harris, 2004: 6). As peace educators attempt 
to address different forms of violence in different social contexts, peace education may not clearly be 
named as such in those social contexts (Harris, 2004: 7). It may thus take various shapes as in 
international education, human rights education, development education, environmental education 
and conflict resolution education which can embody both approaches of negative and positive peace 
to a certain extent (Harris, 2004). Peace education has also some controversy because of the word 
‘peace’ that can be seen as a synonym of quiet and passive, against the possibilities of war and the 






France is one of the countries not implementing peace education namely yet as such. Only 
international education, human rights education and conflict resolution education can be perceived 
within the French education system, whether in primary and secondary schools or universities. 
Regarding universities, only one denominated Master in Peace Studies currently exists in Paris, 
however it is highly focused around security, humanitarian and conflict management studies. 
Development education and environmental education are, however, nearly absent of French curricula. 
Development education, based on Paulo Freire’s conscientization on the various forms of 
structural violence, aims ‘to build peaceful communities by promoting an active democratic citizenry 
interested in equitably sharing the world’s resources’ (Harris, 2004: 12). ‘Resources’, here, probably 
mean economic ones. However, it can also imply cultural and political ones. Sharing these latter two 
therefore suggest a recognition and teaching in popular wisdom of all cultural and political means 
available. Consequently, it would amount to practicing cultures of peace(s) and peaceful 
relationships. It would thus facilitate the introduction and acceptance of alternative identities in 
France. French pedagogue and researcher Philippe Meirieu expressed why he thinks the French 
school system is failing: 
Teaching about peace and citizenship are seen as lessons whereas, in fact, it is a way of life. It is not 
about what we learn but how we learn it: the pedagogy of cooperation should take precedence over the 
pedagogy of competition. However, it is not yet the case in our schools.  Too much emphasis is placed 
on the transmission of raw knowledge. It is a question of culture46 (Aide et Action, 2016).  
 
In the same interview on the fundamental role of schools regarding peace education, Patrice Clerc, a 
former trainer in the French National Education system, also gives his perspective on the failure of 
the French school system to implement peace education: 
At the moment, the school is based on a logic of individualization, a logic of war. It is a model that does 
everything possible to value some and devalue others. Since our economic system is already negative, 
if the education system is the same, […] there will always be a feeling of imbalance. However, for this 
change to happen, we have to make a philosophical and political choice. It is our whole society that has 
to be rethought47 (Aide et Action, 2016). 
 
 
46 My own translation. Original in French: L’enseignement à la paix et à la citoyenneté sont vus comme des leçons alors 
que c’est une manière de vivre. Ce n’est pas ce qu’on apprend mais comment on l’apprend : la pédagogie de la 
coopération devrait primer sur celle de la compétition, mais ce n’est pas encore le cas dans nos écoles.  On reste trop 
sur une transmission de savoirs bruts. C’est une question de culture. 
47 My own translation. Original in French: Pour le moment, l’école est basée sur une logique d’individualisation, une 
logique de guerre. C’est un modèle qui fait tout pour en valoriser certains et en dévaloriser d’autres. Déjà que notre 
système économique est négatif, alors si le système éducatif est pareil, […] il y aura toujours un sentiment de déséquilibre. 





An interesting question to be asked, however, can also be raised: if educating about peace or its variant 
does not blossom and end up failing, can an ‘inclusive citizenship’ (Salo-Lee, 2003: 252) still be 
observed within (French mainstream) population? Salo-Lee answers as such: 
Construction of “intercultural identity” is a developmental continuum along which people travel. 
The role of educators in facilitating intercultural learning process is important. The path to a truly 
multicultural society requires, in education, a wholistic intercultural approach which goes beyond the 
mere exposure to differences (eg. multicultural classrooms per se) to the whole educational system and 
learning environment. In that approach teachers are also part of the learning community (Salo-Lee, 2003: 
252). 
 
The ‘wholistic intercultural approach’ that is recommended to go beyond (cultural) differences and 
recognise and appreciate (cultural) diversity may thus be the ‘in-between’ step before any hypothetic 
holistic48 peace education be taught in France. For both ‘wholistic’ approaches, the roles of educators, 
the educational system, the content and the format of teachings are emphasized. In terms of format, 
Sidi Omar recommends to also practice intercultural education with peace education to foster the 
acquisition of competencies that will allow learners to relate effectively with people of other cultures 
and peacefully transform conflicts (Omar, 2015: 206). In terms of contents, he states the importance 
of rethinking knowledges available in textbooks with the ‘integration of wide-ranging knowledge 
about other cultures’ that promotes a ‘cosmopolitan ethic’ (Omar, 2015: 206). Indeed, if mandatory 
educational materials can ‘offer students multiple readings that reflect the plurality, diversity and 
cultural hybridity of contemporary societies’, it would influence highly the way pupils and students 
view and understand the world around them. It is indeed not only what is present within textbooks or 
discourses that influence worldviews but also, and especially, what is omitted (Omar, 2015: 207). 
The French educational system is an example of the presence of such omission of perspectives which 
reverberates in the everyday experiences of its citizens. Paulo Freire qualified ‘education’ as a 
political act. When education is geared from and towards war and competition at the macro-
institutional level, it is at the meso-societal and micro-interpersonal levels that the paradigm shift 
must start, with political acts towards peace. 
 
4.3 – Means to implement at the meso and micro levels of society 
 
48 Term taken from the PhD research ‘La praxis de educación para la paz desde la paz holística’ by Dr. Gloria María 






[For the culture of peace] ‘it is not only States that must be mobilized, but all actors of civil 
society (jointly with the military and the churches), for the United Nations’ actions at the dawn of the 
third millennium’49 (Prera-Flores and Vermeren, 2001 : 14). This ‘philosophy for the culture of peace’ 
quote can be applied to alternative identities and, thus, demonstrates the need for actors at the meso-
societal and micro-inter/intrapersonal levels to be mobilised and act towards a paradigm shift in 
France. This entices to put in practice the ‘fractal’ element of Adrienne Maree Brown’s emergent 
strategy, where the relationship between small and large is defined as ‘how we are at the small scale 
is how we are at the large scale’ (Maree Brown, 2017: 52). That is why ‘there is a direct link from 
interpersonal violence to interstate wars’ (Galtung, 2011: 5). 
There are so many ways and means of actions that the following proposals and findings are 
only a grasp of what could help in opening the discourse on French identity. All means working for 
cultures of peace(s) and peaceful relationships can help towards such turn, but the crucial aspect is 
that they need to take place within a systemic change. 
Cultures of peace(s) can be put in practice through the ‘socialization of all citizens into a 
common political culture’ as Alfonsi (1997: 70) states; a common political culture of peace, as 
supported by this research. This would foster a ‘democratic citizenship’ (Alfonsi, 1997: 70), equalling 
to Audard’s multicultural citizenship or Salo-Lee’s inclusive citizenship. Such socialization must be 
carried out through social and collective meaningful actions by people aiming to reach common 
objectives (Alfonsi, 1997: 81). To have common objectives regarding a hypothetical peaceful 
coexistence means the necessity of paradigm shift in consciences. It requires a turn from the 
hegemony of mainstream discourses as much from those who are advantaged by them as those who 
are suffering from them. The shift is to be done linguistically, philosophically and practically. 
To go from liberté (freedom) to libération (liberation, in reference to Freire) embody a 
linguistic and, consequently, philosophical shift. In France, liberté is a notion highly valued as it is 
part of the national motto Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité (Freedom, Equality, Fraternity). Nevertheless, 
 
49 My own translation. Original in French: [Pour la culture de la paix] ce ne sont pas seulement les Etats qui doivent 
être mobilisés, mais tous les acteurs de la societé civile (avec les militaires et les églises), pour les actions des Nations 





it may not permit the full freedom (of expression, for instance, where a double standard applies) of 
all French citizens as it still has a firm background in French republican values. Liberté may thus 
actually connote, to a certain extent and for certain people, a sort of oppression to which one needs 
to be liberated from. Paulo Freire’s works on critical pedagogy such as Pedagogy of the Oppressed 
(1970), Education for Critical Consciousness (1973) or Learning to Question: A Pedagogy of 
Liberation (1992) are thus staples books that could be promoted more widely to French population. 
The title of the latter work emphasizes the criticality of libération in opposition to the uncritical 
acceptance of liberté in France. To refrain from what Freire called banking education must be 
introduced and established in France to reach liberation. The education shift must also be built on the 
language, experiences and skills of the learners (‘educatees’) rather than only being imposed on them 
by the teachers (‘educators’) and their culture (Rugut and Osman, 2013: 23). ‘Going beyond’ liberté 
towards libération is also illustrated by the Centre for Story-Based Strategy in an initiative called 
#the4thbox where the difference between equality and equity is explained in two boxes, then the 
alternative of liberation is drawn in a third box. The 4th box is then an opening to envision new other 
possibilities to the first two boxes, that contain rather than unleash, but also to the third one to 
recognise the infinite potential of human beings (see Annex 4). These boxes may also indirectly refer 
to the dimensions proposed in Chapter 1. The first two boxes of equality versus equity refer to 
mainstream discourses on identity, such as national identity and citizenship, while the third box of 
liberation amounts to alternative identities, such as the hybrid and transcultural ones. The fourth box 
of any other possibility embodies any identity that stems from and foster cultures of peace(s). It could 
also lead to creating a fifth or more boxes. It is also interesting to remark that ‘equality’ (égalité) is 
the second word of the French motto after ‘freedom’ (liberté). It thus also demonstrates the paradigm 
shift that is deeply needed in France. 
This turn must also be worked at the meso and micro levels in every concept where double 
standards and dualism are observed. To go from ‘dual to dial’, from double standards and dualism to 
dialectics and dialogue, is a change in approaches to implement. Fostering dialogue, which 





arguments to formally encounter, must be implemented in every area at the community and 
interpersonal levels. As examined in the past section, one’s identity not only arises on its own, but it 
is also constructed by the recognition -or misrecognition- of others. Identity is not worked out in 
isolation but ‘through dialogue, partly internal, with others’ (Audard, 2003). Dialogue is not only 
important regarding the politics of recognition but also regarding the building of peace. Since, the 
link between peace and alternative identities was demonstrated in the last chapter, approaching 
dialogue and dialectics from the peace concept or the alternative identities one will foster 
automatically the other. Indeed, Todorov stated that he would choose dialogue over identity as 
dialogue allow distinct voices to be heard, especially when taking place between cultures (Todorov, 
2010: 425-426). According to Ramin Jahanbegloo (2007), dialogue (and therefore also dialectics) 
must take place at various levels. Dialogue at the intra and inter-civilisational level will allow 
intellectuals to reflect, exchange and expand their thinking. Intercultural dialogue must then be put in 
the top priorities of political practice (Jahanbegloo, 2007: 31), through education, development and 
dialectics. Finally, fostering interreligious dialogue must be also practiced in order to find a common 
ground with nonviolence. These three levels of the practice of dialogue is part of what Jahanbegloo 
calls the ‘intercultural paradigm’. This paradigm shift is a sine qua non condition (Jahanbegloo, 2007: 
18) to allow the universal (humanity) and the particular (diversity) to interact peacefully in a same 
space. Such peaceful state arising from the meeting of the universal and the particular is possible. 
Indeed, the case of Al Ándalus and the ‘paradigm of Cordoba’ in Spain witnessed such cultural 
complexity with the full coexistence of three religions in a symbiotic and plural society that practiced 
religious humanism (Jahanbegloo, 2007: 63-70). Besides, as Galtung (1985: 2) stated, diversity and 
symbiosis are necessary conditions for peace. The reconstruction of narratives within cultures will 
also foster their dialogue (Martínez Guzmán, 2006: 25). However, dialogue and dialectics must first 
be practiced from the bottom up. Dialogue at the grassroot level will foster conflict transformation 
through a transformative practice and reverberate at the higher institutional level. Dialogue and 
dialectics will shift the approach to peace in France from conflict management/prevention or 





This change of paradigm can only take place with an alternative to current and traditional education 
in France, as peace education is. 
In the last section, peace education was approached in its theoretical content. However, 
practical methods of peace education differ from the theory and include the socio-affective approach, 
the communicative ecological model, the reconstructive-empowering approach, the socio-critical one 
and education in and for conflict (Herrero-Rico, 2020: 496). The latter two are the approaches 
examined in this section. Freire’s socio-critical approach was reviewed above. It bridges the 
theoretical implementation at the macro-institutional level and the practical implementation at the 
meso-societal/community level. Paco Cascón’s approach to educate in and for conflict and the 
importance of provention50 is now to be examined. Indeed, it is an illustration of a possible and easy 
practical implementation of peace education in small groups and interpersonal relationships. It builds 
on Galtung’s conflict formula of the addition of attitudes/assumptions, behaviour and contradiction 
to be transformed with the peace formula of empathy, non-violence and creativity (Galtung, 1996: 
79). Cascón recommends having a positive view of conflict as it is ‘inescapable’ and ‘inseparable 
from human relationships’ (Cascón, 2001: 3). He also understands conflict as a process and highlights 
the various attitudes parties to a conflict can have such as avoidance, submission, competition, 
compromise or cooperation (Cascón, 2001: 6-7). The way of acting stressed in this paper is the 
practice of provention: ‘intervening in the conflict when it is at its very earliest stages, without waiting 
for it to develop into a crisis’ (Cascón, 2001: 11). The change of prefix from ‘pre’ to ‘pro’ (from 
prevention to provention) illustrates the negative to positive approach shift. Cascón suggests a set of 
skills and strategies to practice provention: group-building in an environment of appreciation and 
trust, fostering communication, consensus decision-making and working on cooperation (Cascón, 
2001: 12-15). This approach appears to be well suited to be practiced at the meso and micro levels of 
the French societal context. The availability of a French version of Cascón’s work can lead to envision 
a possible implementation in France. Even if it is not directly a peace values approach, it is a positive 
approach of conflict. Departing from a conflict approach, it can thus help the paradigm shift from a 
 





culture of negative peace to a positive peace one, going from a culture of war and contest to cultures 
of peace(s). Going beyond a culture of contest is a work that Michael Karlberg has delved into in 
200451 and up until today as I had the chance to listen to in an online conference in May 2020 (Social 
Justice Initiative, 2020). This may bring tools to complement this present work that aims to go beyond 
the culture of war in France through cultures of peace(s). 
The practice of cultures of peace(s) must first be implemented in close circles such as family 
and close interpersonal relationships. As such, it can help change the paradigm from the grassroot 
level. An ethics of care must be practiced at the inter-personal level as ‘for above all a culture of 
peace would be a culture of caring’ (Reardon: 2001, 85). Cascón’s emphasis on the reach of 
cooperation reflects the importance of an ethics of care within relationships. The attention to 
multiplicity, the absence of winners or losers and the priority put into the attention to the needs 
(Comins Mingol, 2007: 93) are aspects that will foster peaceful relationships and, consequently, the 
recognition and reconciliation with diverse identities. 
Finally, at the micro-intrapersonal level, spiritual action can also be undertaken to facilitate 
the paradigm change. Indeed, an internal positive and peaceful change will resonate externally. As 
His Holiness the Dalai Lama stated on the basis for world peace: ‘genuine peace, genuine lasting 
world peace, can be achieved only through inner peace’ (Dalai Lama, 2000: 142). Practicing internal 
spiritual actions will help in achieving external ‘good’ and ‘appropriate’ actions through 
understanding, deep listening and loving speech (Nhat Hanh, 2003: 88). Carrying out for each day of 
the week the seven practices for peace (being-thinking-feeling-speaking-acting-creating-sharing for 
peace) as advised by Deepak Chopra (2006: 24) will transform individuals and help them acquire 
virtues to be elicitive peace/conflict workers (Dietrich, 2014: 54). 
French alternative identities have been equated above as multicultural, inclusive and 
democratic citizenships. Elise Boulding (2003) stated that one is not born but becomes a citizen 
through the ‘process of social learning and personal growth’. The recognition of French alternative 
identities at all levels of society thus implies a challenging paradigm change: 
 






Our challenge is to learn “how things work” so we can exercise that citizenship. School systems must 
play in increasing part in this, along with those critically important bodies in the civic arena: non-
governmental organisations especially INGOs (Boulding, 2003: 87-88). 
 
The next section will examine the current French endeavours and entities that work towards those 
French alternative identities and cultures of peace(s). 
 
4.4 – What is there already? 
 The previous sub-sections, sections and chapters all have encompassed a qualitative analysis. 
This section and the next one, however, will rely on both qualitative and quantitative analysis. This 
section will mostly list and briefly examine academic reflections, organisations and processes that are 
currently acting towards the paradigm shift mentioned above, in the aim of introducing alternative 
identities and the practice of cultures of peace(s) in France. The next section will mostly list and 
briefly explore the next steps to implement this paradigm shift, taking into account the reflections 
undertaken in this paper and the findings of this section. 
Alternative identities such as hybrid and transcultural identities are not recognised in France. 
They are neither a topic largely talked about, whether academically, in practice, in the activist sphere 
or institutionally. It is indeed more discussed, argued and protested against the paradox and double 
standard that French citizens proceeding from diverse cultural backgrounds other than Caucasian and 
Christian are suffering from, because of the French universalist republican framework. Besides 
Catherine Audard’s work on the politics of recognition in France, two other academic works on the 
politics of recognition and hybrid identities in France will be examined to find out the limits of their 
applications. 
French sociologist Bernard Bier (2007) has worked on the politics of recognition as an 
analysis category for youth public action. His hypothesis is that a politics of recognition established 
could help answering social challenges in France and a reflection on its potential and limits could 
help constitute a new public action norm. He joins what was examined in Chapter 2 by highlighting 
the French difficulty to approach questions of recognition due to the universal republican model, 





deviation of the French translation of Charles Taylor’s book52, demonstrating the reluctance of the 
concept of recognition in French institutional, societal and intellectual areas (Bier, 2007: 54). He, 
however, sides with the concept. He acknowledges the opportunities it allows to undertake analysis 
from ‘plural and evolutive’ approaches on identification and democracy topics and to go beyond ‘the 
concept of knowledge reduced to a dominant model, which for a long time in France resulted in the 
virtual monopoly of "formal education" and the concealment and invalidation of other forms of 
knowledges, as well as "non-formal" or "informal" learning’53 (Bier, 2007: 63). He supports the 
concept of recognition in allowing plural identities to enter the public space and debate, and the 
reparation of ‘humiliating’ institutional wrongs (Bier, 2007: 63). 
Regarding, hybrid identities, the issue impeding their acceptance may lay in the specificity of 
French vocabulary which distinguishes between hybridity (hybridité) and hybridisation (hybridation). 
This leads to the preference of using the notion of ‘diversity’ instead of the ‘hybrid’ concept to ‘to go 
beyond the dialectic of identity-otherness and to assume the diverse and shifting character of cultural 
subjects’54 (Sauvaire, 2012). The approach taken on diversity as ‘the understanding of cultural 
processes as they are experienced and interpreted by diverse and interacting subjects’55 and its 
definition as ‘the movement by which an individual or a group understands itself as a plural, changing, 
mobile subject, sometimes in a contradictory or marginal way, in relation to other subjects and in 
relation to cultural works and practices’ (Sauvaire, 2012) demonstrate that the acceptance of 
alternative identities is not a closed path in France. It just may need to take a deviation and overcome 
obstacles. The medias are one of the main obstacles, especially when right wing newspapers, such as 
Le Figaro, publish articles on the fear of hybrid identities pervading French society (Mandeville, 
2010). The promotion of peace journalism can help tackle such type of negative approaches. 
 
52 ‘Multiculturalism and “the Politics of Recognition”’ was translated as Multiculturalisme. Différence et démocratie 
(Multiculturalism. Difference and democracy). 
53 My own translation. Original in French: une conception des savoirs réduits à un modèle dominant et qui s’est traduit 
longtemps en France par le quasi-monopole de l’« éducation formelle » et l’occultation et l’invalidation des savoirs 
autres, ainsi que des apprentissages « non formels » ou « informels ». 
54 My own translation. Original in French: dépasser la dialectique de l’identité-altérité et d’assumer le caractère divers 
et mouvant des sujets culturels. 
55 My own translation. Original in French: la compréhension des processus culturels tels qu’ils sont expérimentés et 





The other path that can also be taken is the promotion of peaceful relationships, cultures of 
peace(s) and peace studies in France. This path is more present in academic, activist, practical and 
institutional spheres; even though they remain in small amounts due to the culture of war and contest 
prevailing in France. Below are listed various endeavours working towards peace knowledges and 
practices. 
In the research and academic sphere, there is only one Master in Peace Studies in France at 
the University Paris Dauphine. However, it aims ‘to develop an international, legal and managerial 
approach to conflict management’ with ‘an approach similar to political science and international 
relations masters’. Therefore, with the ‘Dauphine touch’ focusing on ‘learning the basics of decision-
making models and game theory’ (Association Peace Studies Dauphine), it does not seem to rely 
much on the theories of peace studies and the philosophical and critical approaches linked to it. 
Despite this inexistence of peace studies/philosophy for peace section in France, an Open Education 
Unit on the culture of peace is available at the University of Evry-Val-d’Essonne. An Open Education 
Unit is a cultural openness module aimed at all students whatever their field of study. Finally, two 
institutes composed of many French researchers on peace exist: the Institute on Peace Research and 
Documentation (Institut de Documentation et Recherche sur la Paix) and the Research Institute for 
Non-violent Conflict Resolution (Institut de recherche sur la Résolution Non-violente des Conflits). 
Since this latter institute focuses on nonviolence and not peace itself, it demonstrates the French 
approach to the negation of violence and conflict rather than a positive perspective to transform them. 
The establishment of a census of university training in France related to non-violence (Starringer, 
2018) shows that slightly less than a hundred academic courses are offered. It would be interesting to 
qualitatively analyse the content of these courses in terms of a peace studies and philosophy for peace 
perspectives. 
In the activist sphere, organisations can be found working on peace advocacy, providing peace 
resources or also offering courses on peace education and nonviolence. Amongst them are 
Mouvement de la Paix, Graines de Paix, Culture of Peace News Network Français (CPNN Français), 





la paix or the CREA-Apprendre la vie (Cercle de réflexion pour une ‘éducation’ authentique). This 
latter is an illustration of critical pedagogy with a ‘French touch’.  
Such a ‘French touch’ is also visible when it comes to education practices in France. Indeed, 
education is rarely linked to the concept of peace, but focuses more on the development of the pupils 
through practical activities. Freinet pedagogy, conceptualised by French couple pedagogues Célestin 
and Élise Freinet and present in 26 French schools (ICEM, 2016) exemplifies this focus. The 
Montessori pedagogy, conceptualised by Italian physician Maria Montessori and present in 200 
French schools (Association Montessori de France), also focus on children’s ability to lead their own 
development through practical activities. Although these two pedagogies draw near peace education, 
their content will not be reviewed in this paper. The association Inversons La Classe! advocates for 
a ‘flipped classroom’ where the teaching logic would go ‘from face to face to side by side’ (Inversons 
La Classe). The aim is to strengthen student/teacher relationships, differentiate teaching ways, reveal 
students to be actors and producers of their knowledge and deepen the learnings (Inversons La 
Classe). Considered as a philosophy more than a methodology (Classe Inversée), it closely echoes 
Freire’s pedagogy as it focuses on exchanges and interactions. As such it aims at breaking away from 
banking education to ‘liberate education’ (Classe Inversée). Finally, the association Enseignants pour 
la paix (Teachers for peace) gather teachers advocating for peace education and peace culture. 
Finally, a couple of endeavours will be mentioned at the institutional level. Vers Le Haut 
(Upwards), launched in 2015, is the first French think-tank dedicated to youth and education. It aims 
to ‘tackle the educational crisis by capitalizing on what works’. This fairly recent think-tank seems 
to embrace a quite resolutive and negative approach to the educative environment rather than a 
transformative and positive one. Their written reports that interest the topic of this research indeed 
all have a negative concept within their titles: Living, growing, building together: ideas & actions 
against the "clash of incultures"56 (Vers Le Haut, 2016); Young people facing the temptation of 
radicalization: what to do?57 (Vers Le Haut, 2018); Peaceful Transition: Educational Ideas and 
 
56 My own translation. Original in French: Vivre, grandir, construire ensemble: idées & actions contre le “choc des 
incultures”. 





Actions to Cope with Violence58 (Vers Le Haut, 2019). Nevertheless, their goal-oriented approach to 
reach solutions based on achievement observed in the French context is an interesting aspect to 
recollect current practical endeavours in France. However, their recurrent focus on violence omits the 
examination of roots of the conflict leading to violence, in order to transform it positively. Their latest 
report Education, a mayor's matter59 (Vers Le Haut, 2020), launched on the occasion of the 2020 
French municipal elections and presenting 50 inspiring educative actions carried out by 
municipalities, is a bridge to acknowledge the 141 local collectivities members of the network Mayors 
for Peace France (AFCDRP, 2018). Members of this network work for ‘conflict prevention through 
substantive work and actions for culture of peace’ (AFCDRP). This endeavour may be the 
institutionally highest active, effective and the most explicit in favour of peace in France and, 
consequently, to the inclusion of alternative identities. The next moves to continue and expand these 
previous ones are briefly explored in the next section. 
 
4.5 – What are the next steps? 
 As mentioned in the previous sections, the introduction and acceptance of alternative identities 
in French society will unlikely be achieved from one day to another. Whether from the top down, the 
bottom up or the mix of both, decades, if not perhaps up to a couple of centuries (or more), will be 
necessary to proceed to the paradigm shift. Thus, the change must and probably will happen lentement 
mais sûrement.60 The most assured and gentle way to do so is thus by working on cultures of peace(s) 
and peaceful relationships in France, in a systemic way. 
The peace studies’ imperfect peace theory states that ‘a peaceful society […] encourages the 
relationship of its comprising individuals through the processes of its socialisation (kindness, 
language, education, etc.)’. These processes of socialisation are a synonym of the interactive format 
needed to build cultures of peace(s) and peaceful relationships. Kindness, language, education or the 
media make part of the content ways and means to construct them (Symonides, Janusz and Singh, 
 
58 My own translation. Original in French: La transition pacifique : idées et actions éducatives pour faire face à la 
violence. 
59 My own translation. Original in French: L’éducation, une affaire de maire 





Kishore 1996). Actions from the bottom up will influence decisions from the top down, then 
reverberating on actions and decisions from the bottom up, then nourishing this circle. Like theory 
fuelling practice and vice-versa, the circle must continue so it becomes virtuous and not vicious. 
Continuation, promotion and expansion of the above endeavours are the three steps to undertake 
towards the systemic paradigm shift. 
At the institutional level, the continuation and expansion of the work and advocacy of Mayors 
for Peace France is to be more promoted. Interacting with Vers Le Haut’s conferences and 
intervention to introduce peace education to their range of topics may turn out fruitful. 
In the educative practice sphere, Freinet and Montessori pedagogies must be continued, 
promoted and expanded. However, these schools are often not public ones and require substantial 
financial input to access them, therefore making them exclusive. Professors teaching in a ‘flipped 
classroom’ philosophy may thus be a point to foster more. It would be also interesting to make an 
introductive link between professors teaching this way and the association of Teachers for Peace, to 
reinforce the effectivity of both. It is also intriguing to wonder how many teachers and professors of 
both are initiated, knowledgeable or practice Freire’s critical pedagogy. In anyway, the 
implementation of peace and intercultural workshops and activities should be introduced in their 
teaching program, in the aim to work and imagine how it would be to live together in a future with ‘a 
world at peace’61 (Boulding, 2002: 51). 
In the activist sphere, advocacy, workshops and trainings in cultures of peace(s), intercultural 
dialogue, conflict transformation and nonviolence must also continue, be promoted and expanded.  
However, theses NGOs and associations may also sometimes, if not often, rely on volunteers and 
have financial issues. Therefore, their economic and philosophical survival may be a constant 
struggle.  
Finally, in the academic sphere, moreover than the three steps mentioned above, deepening 
of the knowledge on the nexus between peace, alternative identities and France is also a necessity. 
Indeed, too little is found on the topics of cultures of peace(s), philosophy for peace and peace studies 
 
61 Galtung (2011: 10) reasserted this necessity by rephrasing Gandhi’s quote ‘Be today the future you want to see 





in France. The topics of French hybrid and transcultural identities is also a niche to be deepened and 
expanded. The lack of resources coming from French authors on all these topics is visible in this 
paper. As change starts at the micro level, the personal steps that I can undertake towards the paradigm 
shift is the translation in French and spreading of this research paper. Taking further the research on 
the nexus between identity, France and peace from various social sciences and humanities fields of 
study can be revealing. Assessing the theoretical and practical state of cultures of peace(s) in France 
may also help in drafting recommendations to recognise all French identities. I wish to undertake this 
endeavour through a PhD research, co-tutored by the Doctoral School in Peace Studies at the 
Universitat Jaume I and a French Doctoral School in political science or sociology. By doing this, a 
bridge and dialogue between diverse philosophies and perspectives on peace could take place, with 
each entity influencing on the becoming of each other. In this sense, a connection or link between the 
Peace Master at the Universitat Jaume I in Castellón de la Plana and one or more French Universities 
could also be created, to foster intercultural knowledge exchange. This would help the registration of 
more French students into the Peace Master since only thirteen French students registered in the Peace 
Master over the span of twenty-five years. This would then promote and expand its philosophical 
teachings and contribute to the paradigm shift in France. 
 
4.6 – Conclusion  
 This final chapter of this research paper examined how alternative identities could be 
introduced and acknowledged in the French context where a mainstream discourse on identity 
prevails. The chapter represented the constructive approach of the peace studies perspective the thesis 
embodied after reviewing identities (Chapter 1), critically assessing French identity (Chapter 2) and 
exploring the links between peace and alternative identities (Chapter 3). The main finding of this 
Chapter 4 is the need of a paradigm shift in France. The necessity to gear towards positive peace and 
cultures of peace(s) in French institutions and society is crucial in order to consider the recognition 
of French alternative identities. Indeed, French alternative identities cannot be recognised and 





of peace(s) must be cultivated in France before French alternative identities can be officially and 
widely accepted. This would allow French people of diverse cultural backgrounds to be at peace with 
themselves and live in peace with each other in a context of structural and cultural peace. 
For this, a (U-)turn is required at all levels of society in France and in all aspects influencing 
French people consciences. Such change must happen in a systemic way linguistically, 
philosophically and practically. Indeed, the domination and influence of the use of French language 
do not allow a full recognition of hybridity but allow diversity. In this sense, instead of mentioning a 
French hybrid identity within French alternative identities, it may perhaps be used the term ‘French 
diverse identity/ies’. However, such term would not encompass the legal affinity a person would have 
with France. A French multicultural citizenship, a French inclusive citizenship or a French democratic 
citizenship may be terms to be used to acknowledge French alternative identities. However, these 
terms would only operate and serve their aims when a critical and active politics of recognition is 
established in France. 
For such policy to take place, there is a need of an institutional, social and personal moral 
commitment, responsibility and conviction of the French people to shift from liberté to libération, 
from dualism to dialogue, from conflict prevention/management/resolution to conflict transformation 
and, to exemplify the current French paradigm, from ‘going against’ to ‘going beyond’. 
Before a complete turn, shift or change in minds, perhaps what is needed for a start is an 
openness to another way of life, wholistically dedicated to peace and its values. Education and 
specifically peace education are the way to achieve so. The French endeavours dedicated to peace 
education and culture(s) of peace(s) are sparse and francisées (Francised, or perhaps rather 
frenchised). However, they are well present. This gives a basis and hope -one of the ‘essentials for 
peace’ alongside care, according to Betty Reardon (2001: 85)- to continue working towards inclusive 
French alternative identities and peace; and each day is a new opportunity to express ourselves, look, 









This thesis starts from the premise of the study of the triangle nexus between identity, France 
and peace. This has never been studied altogether from a peace studies perspective, especially since 
peace studies is very much absent in the French context. The general objective stated in the 
introduction to ‘discuss the significant interest in recognising French alternative identities at the 
institutional and societal level to foster cultures of peace(s) in France’ and the specific ones all have 
been fulfilled throughout the four chapters. The specific objectives were: 
1- Identify the discourses on identity and the implications they have in society. 
2- Analyse and deconstruct the discourse on French identity of the French republican model 
and of French society from a peace studies perspective. 
3- Explore the societal role and importance of alternative identities that reflect and foster 
cultures of peace(s). 
4- Propose ways to introduce the recognition of alternative identities in French institutions 
and society for and from cultures of peace(s). 
 
The first chapter focused on identities and, as being the longer chapter of the thesis, it is the 
entrance of the ‘funnel analysis’, encompassing and touching various theories that were useful for the 
next chapters. As such, identity is a human need but also a process where various components of 
identification are used towards political aims that fuel essentialist and constructivist discourses on 
identity. The constructivist discourse is then recalled as having been expanded with the postcolonial 
discourse on identity which expands the alternative discourses on identity, on the contrary to the 
mainstream essentialist or the constructivist based on international relations theory. The first key 
finding of the first chapter is the naming of mainstream types of identities (nationality, citizenship, 
ethnicity and hyphenated identity) related to the mainstream discourses. Alternative types of identities 
(postcolonial, hybrid and transcultural identity) which are related to the alternative discourses on 





approaches, they are expressed through the analysis of existing postcolonial theories such as Homi 
Bhabha’s third space and its extension to encompass the existence of a general specific field where 
identity is constructed. Such field or space has been named under various appellations in the academic 
sphere. This thesis recalled them (Third Space, in-between, suture, intersection). However, it was 
done in order to emphasize the existence of such field or space where one is free to be who one wants 
to be in relation to all the components of one’s identity. The re-examination from a peace studies 
approach of key concepts in identity and identities studies (such as cultural difference, cultural 
diversity, multiculturalism and interculturalism) permitted to propose a more positive approach to the 
political impacts of the emphasis on difference. As such, topics of identity politics, fragmentation, 
situational ethnicity, acculturation and the diaspora phenomenon where examined and their negative 
aspects in relation to their resistance to mainstream identities were drawn out. On the contrary, the 
thesis’ finding of promoting alternative identities implies the transformation of a firm resistance to 
mainstream (discourses on) identities towards a flowing, fluid and malleable espousal of one’s 
plurality of identity facets. These alternative identities are named under various types such as the 
postcolonial and hybrid or the transcultural one. These may reflect a truer identity of a person, 
alongside the ‘higher’ and spiritual dimension identity aspect. This latter would however imply 
reaching another level in nation-states’ open-mindedness in recognising a type of identity free of 
oppression. Indeed, the truthfulness of one’s identity tends to be oppressed in the current nation-states 
system. Nation-states do rely on mainstream discourses on identity in their attempt to build national 
and state cohesion, which is often implemented in an oppressive, dominant and imposing way where 
structural and cultural violence are often present. Chapter 2 deepened the ‘funnel analysis’ by 
reviewing the case of French identity. 
 The French Republic is a system, an ideology and a framework that was implemented since 
the 1789 French Revolution in order to homogenise the management of the French state and notably 
of the French population, through the creation, unification and universalisation of French attributes, 
nationality and citizenship. Chapter 2 allowed to bring to light four key findings. The first is a 





laïcité are deemed as a constraint in the official recognition of French citizens’ other cultural and 
religious belongings. Chapter 2 bases its first finding on this premise and by adding a peace studies 
perspective to it. As such, the values of the French Republic are qualified as a mainstream and 
hegemonic discourse in regards of French identity, where a French citizen must be moulded under 
assumed and invisible criteria dating back to 1789. In this sense, the universal, ‘colour-blind’ and laic 
values are theoretically, constitutionally and socially inscribed in institutions and popular wisdom. 
However, in practice, these values are not always observed or exercised by French institutions 
practitioners or French people. The values are practiced in a way that creates some oppression towards 
certain types of French citizens. Indeed, those values have been established in a period where the 
‘common’ French citizen was a Caucasian and Christian man. These values have been conserved over 
231 years until today. They have gone through many war and violent periods and have not profoundly 
changed -yet- of signification despite enduring colonisation and its effects -such as immigration- after 
it ended. This is due to the unacknowledged continuation of colonialism. Indeed, colonisation -a 
practice- may have ended but the ideology of colonialism is still present in France. The presence of 
such ideology demonstrates the absence of a profound state of peace and the practice of cultures of 
peace(s) in France as ‘besides chaos, then the next great enemy of peace is ideology (Chopra, 2006: 
174). The second finding of this chapter reflects the peace studies lens of analysis of this thesis. 
Chapter 2 highlights the negative culture of war, violence, conflict, competition and contest that the 
French Republic stems from and fosters. The third finding of the prevalence in the French context of 
the exclusive idea of what is French or Frenchness may explain the negative approach demeaning 
other cultures, religions and ways of life that, at first, do not seem to fit with the French one. This 
garners wider implications where the perpetration of an hegemonic and colonialist ideology (the 
French Republic) in a postcolonial era produces an effect -whether conscious or not, whether wanted 
or not- of domination and oppression of some French citizens (Caucasian and Christian influenced) 
over others (non-Caucasian and/or non-Christian influenced). Thus, French people coming from 
different cultural and/or religious backgrounds than the mainstream ‘C²’62 one may have difficulties 
 





to be fully included in certain institutional and societal spheres of their everyday life in (metropolitan) 
France. This is often observed in the paradox and double standard applied in concepts such as laïcité, 
the freedom of expression, or the integration policy in France and self-identification where to be 
French is a public matter and implies leaving other cultural and/or religious belongings to the private 
sphere. The absence in official discourses and texts of the concepts of hyphenated and, even less, of 
hybrid identity (and alternative identities in general) in France demonstrates the neglect of 
postcolonial theories and practices in the French institutions. This is the fourth finding that Chapter 
2 highlights. Such French postcolonial absence is also underlined regarding the academic sphere. 
Chapter 2 has deconstructed the nexus between identity and France -the ‘right side’ of the triangle 
nexus’- and revealed a negative, colonial and hegemonic aspect to it. 
Chapter 3 switched to the ‘left side’ (identity and peace) of the triangle nexus and aimed at 
exploring and reflecting on the relationship between peace features and alternative identities in order 
to find possible inherent links. Indeed, intrinsic connections have been found between the mainstream 
discourse on French identity, which negates any type of alternative identities, and cultural violence. 
Thus, this third chapter delved into the new reflection on the probable links between alternative 
identities and cultural peace from a peace studies perspective. Alternative identities are encompassed 
through the analysed postcolonial hybrid and transcultural identities and with the wider concept of 
international identity which is declined in three sub-divisions. The analysis of the relationship 
between peace and alternative identities in Chapter 3 is primarily the examination of correlation 
between theoretical features of peace, including peace studies and research, culture(s) of peace(s) and 
peaceful relationships. The key finding of this chapter is the confirmation of the positive relationship 
between peace and alternative identities, where both stem from and foster each other in a continuous 
virtuous circle. By extension, alternative identities therefore also stem from and foster cultures of 
peace(s) and contribute to peaceful relationships. The overall inclusive aspect that link the two 
concepts is the presence of reciprocal recognition through the characteristics of exchange, connection 
and acceptance found in both. From a peace studies and philosophy for peace perspectives, reciprocal 





of individuals’ backgrounds and experiences. Such finding reconfirms the findings of Chapter 2 
where the non-recognition of any type of alternative identities in France corroborates with the 
omnipresence of a culture of war/violence/conflict/competition/contest and the absence of a deeply 
peaceful coexistence in France, where people proceeding from diverse backgrounds and experiences 
reside. Such cultural violence in France especially regarding the topic of French identity or French 
heritage is visible in the French policies that involve ex-colonies countries (i.e: The issue with 
Madagascar of the Scattered Islands in the Indian Ocean or the still-use of CFA franc in fourteen 
Western and Central African countries). It reaffirms the finding of Chapter 2 of the presence of a 
French colonialist ideology. However, such statement is rarely brought to light by medias or in the 
(French) academic sphere and remain a profound issue that the French government has still to 
recognise and work on. The French activist sphere is the only light of hope that envisions and practices 
the knowledges on cultures of peace(s) and peaceful coexistence in France. 
Chapter 4 examined these types of endeavours existing in France and how they could be 
implemented institutionally and in popular wisdom. The first three chapters found that a mainstream 
and hegemonic discourse on identity in France impeded the recognition of alternative identities, 
which are an illustration and promoter of cultural peace and peaceful coexistence. The key finding of 
Chapter 4 is the necessity of a paradigm shift in France. This would transform the cultural violence 
observed in French institutions and (metropolitan) society towards the building of cultures of peace(s) 
that would permit the acknowledgement and acceptance of French alternative identities. Indeed, since 
these alternative identities cannot be implemented directly into the French current republican system, 
the U-turn (or even ‘YOU turn’) needed is one at the individual micro-level. In this sense, consciences 
of French people need to shift linguistically, philosophically and practically. This would allow a 
ripple effect at the institutional level where the shift in values would turn from liberté (freedom) to 
libération (liberation), from dualism to dialogue/dialectics, and from conflict 
prevention/management/resolution to conflict transformation.63 Such a model change would enable 
the appreciation of French alternative identities, whether French hybrid, transcultural or international 
 
63 I have already worked on such a paradigm shift of the French republican frame in the full paper of my abstract on ‘An 





identities. Nevertheless, the ‘French touch’ or Frenchness of these alternative identities might have 
to remain in such paradigm shift for sustainability. This is due to the deep-rooted culture of the idea 
in France and, also probably, to the specificity of the French language and its interpretations of certain 
words. In this regard, the following terms equivalent to alternative identities would be more suitable 
to the French context: French diverse identities, French multi/inter/pluricultural citizenship or French 
(inclusive) democratic citizenship. The tools to achieve this paradigm shift is in the institutional 
implementation of a necessary politic of recognition in France. Such recognition must encompass 
broad issues such as colonialism and its effects to the specific matter of recurring double-standard 
police random identity check-up. Nevertheless, the implementation of a politic of recognition in 
France signifies a shift in the government political approaches of social problems in France. The 
steadier and more sustainable way of accomplishing this ideal is through education and, specifically, 
peace education. However, given the state of the obligatory, universal and laic values of the French 
institutional and official school system, it is also tainted of republican -hegemonic and colonialist- 
ideology. As mentioned previously, the French activist sphere is where the paradigm shift can plant 
its most powerful seeds. Even if the endeavours are scarce, they must continue and be made 
sustainable. Nevertheless, this paradigm shift must take place in a systemic way. In this regard, the 
French academic sphere is perhaps the first concerned in drafting more theoretical paths to do so. 
 
By undertaking this study through these four chapters, this thesis succeeded in mostly 
answering the general research question and backing up the thesis statement raised in the introduction. 
‘Mostly’ is used here as, indeed, the thesis statement of the dismantling of essentialist and colonialist 
discourses on French identity by French alternative identity is only theoretically previewed but would 
require further empirical research. Most of the general research question also found adequate answers. 
However, since alternative identities are not yet very well known in French popular wisdom, the 
extent to which it promotes cultures of peace(s) is also only a theoretical preview that would need 






This leads to highlight the general limitations of this thesis. Since it is a theoretical research, 
it would undoubtedly benefit from an empirical research on the triangle nexus between identity, 
France and peace to be correlated afterwards with this thesis. Another limit of this research is the 
peace studies perspective taken that mainly relies on Western academic sources and may not convey 
the large array of peace epistemologies available. This has also been limited due to time and space 
restriction.64 Besides, academia is based on a Western concept, especially in human and social 
sciences which are ‘the products not only of the Enlightenment, but also of the post-Westphalian state 
system, from 1648 onward, in Europe’ (Galtung, 2010: 23). Therefore, despite the fact that this work 
-written from my Westerner point of view- has been highly influenced by Southern and Eastern 
perspectives, these two non-dominant approaches may also be surreptitiously Western influenced. 
Moreover, the sources of this research have all been recollected and reflected from three different 
languages (English, French and Spanish). The thinking process was made in each language according 
to each source, which allowed me to grasp the meaning of the concept fully in its original tone. 
However, the concepts had to be translated and written in English. Therefore, it is possible that some 
interpretations and meanings have been lost in the process due to the absence of equal meaning, time 
limit or also language abilities; French being my mother tongue, English and Spanish being 
respectively my second and third ones. Besides, English, French and Spanish are the three ‘colonial’ 
languages. In this sense, another limit of this thesis is its inability of recollecting sources coming from 
languages proceeding from French ex-colonies. As such, the absence of sources in Arabic, Wolof, 
Soninke, Bambara or Lingala -to name only a few- also limits this study. Besides, with extra-time 
and the help from relatives for translation, I could have also looked for sources in Malagasy language 
on the subject. Last but not least, the gender approach -crucial in identity matters- has also been 
omitted in a substantial part of this research, which has been however already recognised in the 
general introduction. Indeed, the bibliography of this thesis is approximately composed of only 32% 
women authors compared to 54% of men authors, with 14% of other sources. This is due to the 
presence and availability of diversity within academic authorship but as well due to how I personally 
 





directed my research with the sources and time I was given. The ‘race’ approach is, in the sense, also 
a limitation of this research. The percentage of references used is approximately divided as such: only 
20% of authors proceed from a non-Caucasian background compared to 58% from a Caucasian one, 
with 22% of other sources. Finally, the intersection of these limits demonstrated that approximately 
38% of the bibliography of this research comes from Caucasian men, 20% from Caucasian women, 
11% from non-Caucasian men and 9% from non-Caucasian women; with 22% of other sources. As 
such these numbers are a basis for improvement in any of my future research endeavours. 
 
 Limitations entice further research. I mentioned four times the fact that some reflections were 
‘out of the scope’ of this paper’s research. As such, culture paralleled to a wound; the application of 
equality by the French Republic since 1789; the purposefulness of the discriminating universalism of 
the French Republic; and the extent to which individuals with international identity disturb the status 
quo and foster cultures of peace(s) are all theoretical based and literature-based research that can be 
done. Nevertheless, empirical research is the main further study that can be undertaken to measure 
the extent to which the mainstream discourse on French identity is perceived amongst French officials 
and French society. Indeed, theory is only a tool to organise reality in social sciences. Thus, this thesis 
is only (re)assessing and (re)organising what is already there to undertake the next steps. Conducting 
‘dialogues on French identity’ (to the contrary of the ‘debate on national identity’) in the aim of 
fostering reflection and critical thinking among participating French people and towards the building 
of inclusive and diverse communities in France is an exciting fieldwork to start. An empirical 
quantitative research can also be carried out through surveys to scratch the surface of the 
understanding of the topics of identity and alternative identities by a small random segment of French 
society. This can then be correlated to another empirical qualitative research that would aim French 
students (citizens, nationals or both) proceeding from the Peace Master. Such qualitative research 
would be conducted through interviews and focus groups. The aim would be to examine the impact 
of a peace studies training on the identity reflection of French subjects. Nevertheless, surveying a 





probably leave a gap in the knowledge produced. The former type of subjects may certainly have 
little to no approach to alternative identities and peace studies while, on the contrary, the latter type 
may well be acquainted to these topics. The surveys will quantitatively scan the understanding of 
French identity and alternative identities in France, while the interviews and focus group of French 
Peace Master students will qualitatively dig deep on such understandings. Finally, further research 
could be undertaken parting from the premises of the triangle nexus of France and peace with either 
one of the other basic human needs than identity: survival, well-being and freedom. Replacing ‘peace’ 
with ‘violence’ in the nexus would also open even more research from a peace studies perspective. 
Below is a recollection of these possible research paths: 
 
 Nevertheless, before delving into the bigger pool of above research topics, it is mandatory to 
‘finish the job’ that this thesis started by analysing the ‘bottom’ side composed of ‘peace and France’ 
of the triangle nexus identity, France and peace. Such endeavour could lead to a deeper research on 
the theory and practice of the cultures of peace(s) in France, sparked by this thesis. 
 
 The general conclusions, limitations and propositions for further research reported by this 
thesis finally guides the following recommendations and suggestions for policy and practice in 
France. A first recommendation is to reconsider the discourse of the French nation-state. By this, I 
suggest rethinking about the goals of the French state project and let go of the term ‘nation-state’. 
Indeed, France is not a homogenous nation-state (it can be argued that it has never really been). 
Therefore, through the fusion of French nationality and citizenship it restricts its subjects’ relationship 
to their own and unique identity. A second recommendation linked to this issue is for the French state 
(through its governmental institutions) to start opening and diversifying the possibilities of 
identification of French subjects. The available option to have a double citizenship is already a 
Nexus of current 
research
Identity, France and Peace
Identity and cultures of peace(s): critical assessment of the mainstream 
discourse on French identity
Survival, France and Peace France’s military regarding cultures of peace(s)
Well Being, France and Peace France’s social system and cultures of peace(s)
Freedom, France and Peace Discourses on ‘Freedom’ in relation to cultures of peace(s) in France
Identity, France and Violence Cultural violence in identity matters by French institutions and society 
Survival, France and Violence
La Francafrique = the violent survival connection between France and its 
African ex-colonies
Well Being, France and Violence
Types of violence proceeding from the economic and political well being 
of the French state
Freedom, France and Violence Types of violence in the French discourses on freedom













positive opportunity to do so, however, such possibility needs to be obtainable from the second 
country too. I do not approve for various cultural and/or religious belongings to appear on a French 
identity card. Nevertheless, I would suggest for official discourses, laws, educational curriculums and 
institutional practices to not discard -and even recognise- those affiliations when they are expressed 
by French subjects. French governments must find a way to reassess French identity, in a French 
way.65 The third recommendation is for such French way or Frenchness to be redefined and newly 
exercised from cultures of peace(s) instead of a culture of war. This would be beneficial regarding 
the topic of French identity but also many other socio-cultural, political and economic ones. I would 
suggest further to undertake this paradigm shift first ‘at home’ in France -inwardly- so it can later 
blossom ‘abroad’ in other countries. Indeed, what is sowed is always ripped afterwards. In this sense, 
French identity -and other- issues and conflicts originate from migration waves, colonisation era and 
the ongoing financial and human input in arms and French military which, at the end of this vicious 
circle, come back to (metropolitan) France. Transforming the still present colonialist ideology in 
France is mandatory to undergo this paradigm shift. The fourth recommendation is to nurture the 
French way of going beyond colonialism. Indeed, postcolonialism is linked to the Anglo-Saxon world 
and decolonialism to the Latin-American one. Even if anticolonialism seems to me embodying a quite 
negative aspect with the prefix ‘anti’, promoting more anticolonial authors that expressed themselves 
in French and continuing such radical writing nowadays by alive French writers is a step to go past 
colonialism in France. Besides, the word radical comes from ‘root’ and means ‘to relate or to affect 
the fundamental nature of something’. Therefore, employing and fostering radical anticolonial 
discourses will affect -and positively transform- the foundation and roots of colonialism and cultural 
violence in France. The fifth recommendation concerns changes in economic investment policy by 
the French government for France to stay a country powerhouse but become one from a cultures of 
peace(s) strategy. The economic shift must take place through the de-financing of war institutions 
such as the military, investment and involvement in arms trade towards the refinancing and increased 
monetary contributions in -peace- education, intercultural/interreligious projects and environmental 
 
65 David Oppenheimer reflected on a part of the subject in his 2008 article ‘Why France Needs to Collect Data on 





commitments.66 As Gandhi stated, ‘peace will never come until the great powers courageously decide 
to disarm themselves’ (Settel, 1997: 108). Finally, the sixth and last recommendation is directed to 
individuals’ practice to initiate and support the paradigm shift. In these globalised times, I suggest for 
every French subject (regardless of how they are related to France) to master the French language but 
also a minimum of two others, if possible, including one language proceeding from one of the French 
ex-colonies. This would foster open-mindedness of the French subjects regarding diverse 
worldviews, realities and, by extension, truths. This suggestion can be followed as well by French 
subjects through the mastering of Western/French philosophy and opening up to non-Western ones 
from African, Asian and Latin-American continents. 
 
In any way, whether at the institutional-macro, societal-meso or personal-micro levels, 
practicing peace values -here, perhaps, in a French way- requires a deep open-mindedness, deep 














66 Buddhist zen Master Thich Nhat Hanh (2004) addressed such move to ‘replace desctrutive weapons by planetary 
solidarity’ (Chapter 14) to the United States, Russia, China and countries producing arms. 
67 The later three requirements (deep questioning, deep experiences and deep commitment) come from Arne Naess 








Dear reader, I hope that you have enjoyed and managed to extract anything valuable to you in 
the previous pages that embody my thesis. I thank you for your effort in reading my humble attempt 
to make a dent in building peace in France which could potentially foster more peaceful interactions 
in the world. The following lines are not officially part of the above thesis, but they will close the 
loop of this academic and very much personal endeavour. I will mention below theories, thoughts and 
reflections that I could not include in the thesis or part of it that I had to remove, but I still wanted to 
share with you here. Like at the end of a movie when you waited the whole credits to scroll to have 
the cut scenes or the bloopers, I hope to make this epilogue an extra enjoyable experience to 
understand the full emotional context of writing this work. 
 
Regarding Chapter 1 and the theme of ‘Identities’, I would like to make an extra connection between 
the work of Vicent Martínez Guzmán, Deepak Chopra and Amin Maalouf; who were staple authors 
of this thesis. On identity, Vicent Martínez Guzmán stated that: 
 
"Identity" comes from Latin language of the family of idem and means "to be the same". [...] "the same" 
does not always mean "the same [thing]"68 (Martínez Guzmán, 2001: 327). 
 
The difference between being ‘the same’ [oneself] and being ‘the same’ [thing] is substantial as it 
evokes the differentiation between approaching identity from a relational subjectivity and non-
relational objectivity. Relational subjectivity also leads to understand identity/ies to a deeper spiritual 
realm. Deepak Chopra has put into words: 
 
The way of peace tells us that our true identity is at the level of spirit and nowhere else. All other 
identities are temporary. […] For me as an individual to be free, I have to confront myself with questions 
about who I really am, and this is done in large part by examining the layers of false identity that I 
mistakenly call me (Chopra, 2006: 39). 
 
When there is pressure from one side, we identity with it; when there is pressure from another, our 
identity shifts (Chopra, 2006: 47).  
 
This latter quote makes a parallel with Amin Maalouf’s hierarchy of identity elements that changes 
with time and context and thus influences behaviour. He exemplifies this shift with the identification 
process of a fascist and homosexual Italian in fascist times (Maalouf, 1998: 20-21). Such kind of 
situation can often happen when an individual is entangled between many belongings. John Green 
may have indicated one way of positively transforming such situation when saying that ‘you have to 
get lost before you can find yourself’ (Green, 2008). Identity is a tangled issue, ‘a tangle of matter 
and energy’ (Chopra, 2006: 13) and it must be tackled from all its parts in a systemic way. As Chopra 
(2006: 15) explains, a tangled hierarchy of identity would be a redefinition of identity. Such 
redefinition is ongoing and permanently changing as the Buddhist ‘recycling’ gatha69 mentions: ‘In 
the garbage, I see a rose. In the rose, I see the garbage. Everything is in transformation. Even 
permanence is impermanent’ (Nhat Hanh, 2011: 137). 
 
Regarding Chapter 2, critics on universality from international law -consequently applied to the 
French republican system- had also been stated by my LLM thesis supervisor, Dr Rosa Freedman: 
  
 
68 My own translation. Original in Spanish: "Identidad" viene del latin de la familia de idem y significa "ser el mismo". 
[...] "el mismo" no significa siempre "lo mismo". The noun ‘thing’ in brackets has been added to the English translation 
to grasp the difference between Spanish meanings of "el mismo" and "lo mismo" that cannot be directly translated. 
69 ‘Gathas are short verses that we can recite during our daily activities to help us return to the present moment and 





The notion that international human rights represent universal values fails to take in account that those 
norms predominantly stem from the powerful countries that created the law. Just because the language 
is couched as universal, with grandiose statements about the rights applying to 'everyone' and 'all human 
beings', does not mean that this is actually the case (Freedman, 2014: 39). 
 
Therefore, my personal and academic interests and mentoring have been quite coherent along the 
way. This strengthen my will to continue in this path. Besides, I believe that the culture of war 
witnessed in France is deeply printed in its DNA. This is perhaps due because of the French language 
that shapes French culture and its underlying, undermining and hierarchising vision of foreign 
cultures, especially non-Western ones. For instance, the noun ‘chauvinism’ which is ‘the strong and 
unreasonable belief that your own country or race is the best or most important’ originates from the 
French word chauvinisme, based on French soldier’s name Nicolas Chauvin who glorified all things 
military and became devoted to Napoleon. Nevertheless, it is not all doom and gloom and it can be 
found a (French) light of hope amongst French writers in French language. Pierre Weil, a French 
psychologist dedicated to world peace wrote L’art de vivre en paix. Manuel d’éducation pour une 
culture de la paix (The art of living in peace. Handbook on Education for a Culture of Peace). This 
contrasts the essay of Patrick Weil, a French historian and political scientist, who wrote about ‘The 4 
pillars of nationality’ (Les 4 piliers de la nationalité). I had never heard of both authors and books, 
and I am now wondering which book any French person would choose first to read. The intriguing 
coincidence is that both authors are named ‘P. Weil’. However, they are each placed in opposite sides 
of the culture of war/culture of peace spectrum. From one ‘P.Weil’ to the other ‘P.Weil’, a shift is 
present. This is this shift that is necessary in France, as explained in Chapter 4. A first shift in 
awareness is essential (Chopra, 1995: 95). A shift in consciousness (Freire’s conscientisation) is then 
required. Finally, a shift in willingness is critical to permit change to take place. This would allow 
France to move up, from the 44th place out of 140, to higher ranks on the Happy Planet Index.70 
 
On this whole identity topic, the final question to ask is if one is actually thinking for oneself and 
exercises their critical thinking. With his ‘the only think I know is that I know nothing’ quote, Socrates 
initiated the necessary labour of making people think and not banking the teachings in empty heads. 
While making people think is an action done towards peace, banking education has a violent 
constituent in it. As Vicent Martínez Guzmán stated, we have the abilities to act in either direction. 
Johan Galtung joins him in this vision as ‘the human spirit is capable of accommodating cultures of 
war and cultures of peace’ (Galtung, 2011: 6). A same vision is present in Buddhist thoughts where 
we have the seeds of compassion (and thus peace) and the seeds of violence within us (Nhat Hanh, 
2003: 1). We can either water the seeds of violence or cultivate seeds of compassion. The latter must 
be the path to take as ‘once we have a path [the path of the Buddha], we have nothing more to fear’ 
(Nhat Hanh, 2003: 140). Nevertheless, we must acknowledge that we have many paths because of 
living many realities and, therefore, experiencing many truths. ‘Life is a gift, experience is the 
beauty’: This is the Yogi Tea quote that I read on Wednesday April 15th of 2020. After experiencing 
living in France, the UK and Spain in Europe; Senegal in Africa and Vietnam in Asia; I am entangled 
in an application process to possibly grasp what it means to live in Colombia, South America. If it is 
confirmed, I will have experienced many realities and truths in a few years, and my identity will have 
transformed as well. As Chopra (2006: 76) stated ‘we are here to discover who we are […] that’s life 
central mystery’. Reconstructing normativelly, theoretically and practically ways of living in peace 
should be everyone’s life central purpose, with the concept of care -and, consequently, love- at its 
basis:  
 
What science can’t explain, it doesn’t see. This includes beauty, devotion, faith, inspiration, nobility, 
compassion, empathy, fate, intuition, and love itself (Chopra, 2006: 118). 
 
To conclude this epilogue, I would like to give an update on my situation as of September 2020. I 
have finished writing the four chapters at the beginning of July 2020. I obtained a short-term contract 
in Paris as a social worker with the association France Terre D’Asile, working with foreign 
 





unaccompanied minors for the two summer months. I worked in a place located in the 10th 
arrondissement where many people from African and Asian decent live and work. This allowed me 
to experience a routine in a French neighbourhood composed of diverse backgrounds after over eight 
years living abroad. Funnily (or not), I was asked (again) when working in this neighbourhood: ‘Are 
you Indian?’. The man who asked the question walked away when I answered negatively, which 
saddened me in realising that my deeper identity, who I really am, did not interest beyond only 
knowing my ethnic background. Indeed, there are still a lot of work to reconstruct the look and 
attitudes expressed towards others to continue building a more peaceful world: 
 
I know it is not realistic to expect all our contemporaries to change overnight the way they express 
themselves. But I think it is important for each of us to become aware that our words are not innocent 
and without consequence: they may help perpetuate prejudices which history has shown to be perverse 
and deadly. 
For it is often the way we look at other people that imprisons them within their own narrowest 
allegiances. And it is also the way we look at them that may set them free (Maalouf, 2003: 22). 
 
During this time, I also had the chance and took the time to visit Parisian monuments: the Eiffel tower 
(introduced to the world at the 1889 Universal Exposition which exposed the French colonial empire), 
the Arc de Triomphe and the army museum (epitomising the French culture of war), the royal castle 
of Versailles and the Pantheon (epitomising the pride of the idea of the uniqueness of the French 
culture). When taking time in the boutique shops of these monuments, I had a look at the books 
relating the history of France. All of them, especially the ones directed to kids, very briefly mentioned 
the episodes of colonisation and the independence of the colonies in a couple of pages. These pages 
were also often sugar-coated and did not attempt to engage in critical thinking on the concept of 
colonisation per se. This is part of one of the reasons why French identity and its current republican 
discourse -underlying a colonialist discourse- is still a deep-rooted issue. It needs to be tackled 
through the deconstruction of the culture of war in France and reconstructed with cultures of peace(s). 
French cinema was also part of this informal French culture bath this summer. Tout Simplement Noir 
(Plain Black) is a comedy movie that helped my reflection on what it means to be French. La Cravate 
(The Tie) is a documentary movie that delved into the daily life of a far-right political activist during 
the 2017 French presidential election, which can help empathise with individuals that engage in some 
extremist positions. Indeed, ‘peace is attained by telling your story’ (Galtung, 2010: 25). 
Documentary movies as this one or Deeyah Khan’s 2015 documentary movie ‘Jihad: A Story of the 
Others’ must be screened more often to a larger public to foster empathy and, therefore, cultures of 
peace(s). Perhaps writing and publishing books on ‘how to understand’ (whether X, Y or Z) can also 
foster this goal, since ‘understanding is the foundation of love’ and ‘the right gift’ to ever give 
someone (Nhat Hanh, 2015: 92). I offered myself this introspective gift when I bought the book 
Comment comprendre les malgaches? Guide voyage interculturel (How to understand Malagasy 
people? Intercultural travel guide) when going to an exposition at the Musée du quai Branly – Jacques 
Chirac, a Parisian museum featuring the indigenous art and cultures of Africa, Asia, Oceania, and the 
Americas, this July 2020. It would be interesting to analyse to which extent such museum embodies 
an ‘Orientalist’ perspective. I also continue my personal training on gender by completing the 
UNWomen ‘I know gender’ free courses on its online training centre and commit to include this 
perspective in all my future behaviours and endeavours. 
 
Finally, reflecting on this (personal) research journey, I would now answer the prologue question 
Where are you from? in a simple way that does not lead to a personal mental strain. The shift goes 
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